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ABSTRACT 
 
This study was triggered by an observation that many regional integration institutions (RIIs) in 
Africa have fallen short of effectively delivering on their mandates.  The objective of the study, 
therefore, was to generate a deeper understanding of some of the key factors that determine the 
organisational effectiveness of RIIs.  Informed by public administration theories of 
organisational effectiveness, the study hypothesised that RIIs are likely to be effective in 
achieving the objectives for which they were established if the basic fundamentals of 
organisational effectiveness theory are embedded in their institutional structures, systems and 
processes.  In this context, the fundamentals of organisational effectiveness core to successful 
institutions identified included: clarity of purpose, facilitative organisational culture, rational 
organisation structure and processes, ability to acquire and manage adequate resources, internal 
harmony, satisfaction of strategic constituencies, transformational leadership, ability to adapt to 
change and, in the specific case of RIIs, which are public sector institutions, adequate political 
will.   
 
In seeking to achieve the research objective, the study used the East African Community (EAC) 
as a unit of analysis.  The EAC was analysed from the premise of the fundamentals of 
organisational effectiveness theory identified and determination was made on the extent to which 
these fundamentals are ingrained in its institutional structure, systems and processes.  A 
comparative analysis of the institutional framework of the world’s most successful RII, that is, 
the European Union (EU), was also undertaken to establish how the fundamentals of 
organisational effectiveness theory are embodied in its organisational system.  The aim of this 
comparative review was to draw on best practices that can inform the kind of changes that can be 
introduced in the EAC to spur greater organisational effectiveness. 
 
The study utilised a quantitative and qualitative research design in data collection.  This involved 
the design and distribution of questionnaires covering questions that focused on the basic 
fundamentals of organisational effectiveness and how the EAC organs respond to them to key 
EAC stakeholders, face to face interviews with respondents who preferred to be interviewed, 
analysis of official reports and policy documents of the EAC and EU and analysis of relevant 
journal and newspaper articles.   
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Data analysis was mainly descriptive and narrative.  The Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) was used to generate simple frequencies from the data received from 
questionnaires and interviews. The views of the majority were then analysed.  Where the views 
were split in the middle, meaning no clear majority view was discerned, both sides of the views 
received were analysed.   
 
The study revealed an overwhelming consensus among the EAC’s key stakeholders that the EAC 
had not effectively achieved the objectives for which it was established.  The study further 
revealed that the main reasons for the shortcoming rest on EAC’s weak institutional structures, 
systems and processes.  In other words, a deficit of some key fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory.  In contrast, a comparative analysis of the EU revealed that the basic 
fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are well ingrained in the EU’s institutional 
structures, processes and systems which explains why the EU has achieved organisational 
effectiveness.  These findings seemed to support the hypothesis that guided the study. 
 
Recommendations based on the findings point to the need to re-orient the institutional 
framework of the EAC if the EAC is to better realise its goals and objectives. This would 
involve, among others, formulating a more succinct vision and mission for the EAC, developing 
a Staff Code of Conduct and Ethics, developing a more pro-active mechanism of financing the 
EAC, improving the terms and conditions of service of staff, separating powers between the key 
organs of the EAC, reflecting the aspirations of the private sector and civil society in the EAC’s 
integration process, operationalising the principle of variable geometry, giving executive 
authority to the Secretary General and transferring a certain degree of national sovereignty to 
regional organs such as the EAC Secretariat, the EALA and the EACJ.   
 
Given the limited scope of this study, a more extensive study needs to be undertaken by 
Consultants who would have the time and resources to delve more deeply into the factors that 
underpin the organisational effectiveness of the EAC.  Research also needs to be undertaken to 
establish specific factors that militate against a more robust support by the EAC Partner States in 
making EAC a more effective institution.  It should similarly be interesting to conduct an in-
depth analysis of the EU’s institutional framework in order to establish what best practices can 
be replicated in African RIIs such as the EAC.   
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Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Regional integration arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa started way before the achievement 
of political independence.  Indeed, in the case of regional integration in East Africa, the 
arrangement dates as far back as the turn of the 20th century.  However, the impetus for the 
establishment or strengthening of these arrangements, which have come to take the 
description of Regional Integration Institutions (RIIs) also known as Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs), was born out of the birth of the Abuja Treaty of the then Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) which came into force in May 1994 (UN Economic Commission for 
Africa, 1999:53; Kouassi, 2007:1). That Treaty envisages the creation of an African 
Economic Community through six phases of regional cooperation and integration using the 
RIIs as its building blocks.  The aim and objective of these institutions is primarily to bring 
about social, economic and even political integration among Africa’s countries with the aim 
of fostering higher economic growth and bolstering the prosperity of the African peoples. 
 
In the light of the above, the past two decades especially, have witnessed an intensification of 
Africa’s regional integration process and the establishment or strengthening of RIIs in the 
continent.  To mention but a few, these RIIs include the East African Community (EAC), the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).  It is important to mention, 
however, that one of the oldest regional integration institutions in the world is the European 
Union (EU) which has almost similar objectives as those applicable to the RIIs in Africa.   
 
The principal factors that have driven governments to establish RIIs are not novel.  In other 
words, going by experience that one can draw from the performance of these institutions, the 
identification of objectives and the drawing up of broad strategies and programmes have not 
been a matter of concern.  What is at issue is how effectively these objectives, strategies and 
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programmes have been implemented (United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2006:1-9).   
 
It is the disjuncture between objectives and organisational effectiveness that raises 
fundamental questions about the costs and benefits of RIIs.  Indeed, a close examination of 
RIIs in Africa reveals varying successes when compared to the mandated objectives.  It is the 
shortcomings that broadly stand out. These shortcomings raise a number of questions, most 
of which, revolve around the theory of organisational effectiveness.  Evidently, RIIs, as 
intergovernmental institutions and therefore public sector oriented bodies, by definition, are 
often influenced by external and internal environmental factors which tend to override and 
even clash with the fundamental principles that underpin organisational effectiveness.   
 
This study sought to review and examine some of the key factors that underline the 
effectiveness of RIIs in carrying out and realizing their objectives as set out in the treaties that 
establish them.  In the context of public administration organisational theory the study 
determined and proposed organisational systems and processes that bring about improved 
organisational effectiveness in RIIs.  In this respect, the East African Community (EAC) was 
taken as a unit of analysis.  However, in light of the fact that the EAC bears similarity to 
other RIIs in terms of mandate, processes and structure, it is hoped that the particular findings 
of this analysis can be generalized and applied to other RIIs. 
 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
The idea of integrating countries and regions has long been promoted by political leaders in 
Africa for varying reasons.  Throughout the 1990s, regional integration was the catchword in 
African politics and was seen as the answer to all social and economic problems facing the 
region. This is not surprising given the fact that, if properly conceived, regional integration 
offers many advantages to the participating countries.  For example, through closer trading 
links between countries, the capacity of the cooperating states to participate in world trade is 
strengthened.  Cooperating countries are also able to overcome the obstacles normally 
represented by their relatively small domestic markets and thereby enable producers to realize 
greater economies of scale as well as exploit the benefits of more robust regional 
infrastructures (Saku, 2006:1-2).  
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A regional integration approach involving tariff reductions and harmonization, legal and 
regulatory reform, payment systems rationalization, financial sector reorganisation, 
investment incentives and tax systems harmonization, and labour market reform also enables 
participating countries to pool resources and avail regional institutional and human resources 
that foster the attainment of higher levels of technical and administrative competence 
otherwise not possible on an individual country basis (Saku, 2006:1-2). 
 
Research by Ouattara (1999:2-3) has also shown, in the case of the African Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP)-European Union (EU) Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) negotiations and the negotiations under the Doha Development Round1, that a regional 
approach empowers countries to assert their interests from a stronger and more confident 
position in the international arena. Furthermore, the conditions and obligations associated 
with participation in ambitious reform programmes within a regional organisation framework 
often facilitate the work of domestic authorities in deciding and implementing what are 
otherwise politically sensitive measures, such as harmonization of tax laws and instituting 
wide-ranging reforms in areas such as the regulatory, governance and judicial systems. In 
addition, regional surveillance and the dialogue between multi-stakeholder constituents (like 
civil society, business actors and non-governmental organisations) help reduce the risks of 
macroeconomic slippage thus resulting in more stable and predictable environments that 
enable private sector to flourish. It is against these benefits, which are probably more in 
theory than in practice, at least in so far as RIIs in Sub-Saharan Africa are concerned, that the 
governments have resolved to establish RIIs.   
 
As noted, these lofty theoretical benefits of regional integration are indisputable.  It is how 
effectively they have been enforced that lies at the heart of the justification of this study.  In 
fact, a close analysis of the operations and functioning of RIIs in Africa reveals that many of 
these institutions have actually shown limited success on the ground (Foroutan & Pritchett, 
1993; Ogunkola, 1994; Elbadawi, 1997; and Lyakurwa, McKay, Ng’eno & Kennes, 1997).  
                                                 
1 The Doha Development Round commenced at Doha, Qatar in November 2001 and is still continuing. Its objective is to lower trade 
barriers around the world, permitting free trade between countries of varying prosperity. As of 2008, talks have stalled over a divide between 
the developed nations led by the European Union, the United States and Japan and the major developing countries (represented by the G20 
developing nations), led and represented mainly by India, Brazil, China and South Africa.  The Doha Round began with a ministerial-level 
meeting in Doha, Qatar in 2001. Subsequent ministerial meetings took place in Cancún, Mexico (2003), and Hong Kong, China (2005). 
However, the successive rounds of negotiations have failed to produce agreements on key issues such as cuts on subsidies and tariffs.  In the 
ministerial meeting in Cancun for example, developing countries, forming about two-thirds of the World Trade Organisation members let 
the meetings fail rather than agreeing to a compromise. 
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The question is why such limited success?  One can conjecture several reasons: lack of 
inadequate political will; institutional decision making weaknesses; mistrust by various 
stakeholders at national levels that are often based on protectionist tendencies; over ambitious 
development programmes that are not well prioritized and funded; overall inadequacy of 
financial resources and very low absorptive capacity of donor funding in terms of utilization; 
low capacity by the executive agencies (Secretariats or Commissions) of these institutions at 
the levels of professionalism; low technology application; and low morale due to poor 
remuneration.   
 
In the specific case of the EAC, there are some notable successes that have been achieved 
since the adoption of the Treaty for its establishment in November 1999; the most notable 
being the establishment of the EAC Customs Union in January 2005.  Even then, the 
negotiations leading to the adoption of the Customs Union Protocol revealed serious 
negotiating capacity weaknesses within the EAC Partner States as well as in the EAC 
Secretariat in relation to the complexities of regional trade issues (Chande, 2007:21-22).  As 
the EAC embarks on new negotiations for the establishment of a Common Market, slated for 
January 2010, the limited success of RIIs like the EAC, based on the experience shown in the 
Customs Union negotiations, would be an important area for examination in the context of 
how best the EAC can be transformed into a more effective institution. 
 
From a broader perspective, the EAC is yet to realize many of its grand objectives as outlined 
in its Treaty.  For example, almost ten years since the adoption of the Treaty establishing the 
EAC, the EAC has yet to develop harmonized policies and laws in a number of areas most 
notably in negotiating as a bloc, establishing a Development Fund, reducing reliance on 
donor funding, eradicating non-tariff barriers in order to make the Customs Union more 
effective, harmonizing domestic tax laws, implementing strategic infrastructure projects in 
the areas of roads, railways and energy, establishing a civil society forum, enhancing the role 
of women in development, developing a robust statistical database that captures various 
economic indicators such as intra-EAC trade, to mention but a few of the more important 
shortcomings.  A specific and significant shortcoming is the multiplicity of memberships of 
the Partner States in RIIs. This is one of the reasons why the EAC has failed to negotiate as a 
bloc and to garner a more concerted political will in support of EAC objectives.  In this 
context, the EAC’s integration process has suffered.  And precisely because of some of these 
shortcomings, the EAC Summit of Heads of State that met in Nairobi in August 2004 raised 
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concern that the EAC integration was proceeding at too slow a pace (Committee on Fast 
Tracking East African Federation - henceforth Wako Committee, 2004: 1).    
 
To the researcher, the highlighted EAC organisational shortcomings and the concerns that 
have been raised are both indicative of the reality that the EAC, as an institution, is not 
effectively achieving the objectives mandated to it.  It is, however, widely acknowledged that 
effective institutions can play a fundamental role in providing the right framework for the 
achievement of organisational goals.  The failure by the EAC as well as other RIIs in Africa 
to effectively achieve their objectives may therefore be an indication of organisational 
ineffectiveness on their part.   
 
Organisational effectiveness is a term that is generally used by organisational theorists to 
discuss the ability of an organisation to be effective at achieving expected outcomes.  The 
study of organisational effectiveness has evolved over the past fifty years and continues to 
confront new complexities as organisations respond to fast changing and dynamic external 
and internal environments.  Whilst business organisations have had to adapt more quickly to 
such dynamic environments, largely in view of intense competition spurred by globalization, 
public sector organisations, which include intergovernmental institutions like the RIIs, have 
not been equally adaptive or responsive even when they are not immune from the impact of 
environmental dynamics.  In Africa, in particular, given the wave of democratization and 
liberalization, the quest for greater accountability of governmental and other public sector 
institutions, in response to rising expectations of the people for better and more cost effective 
delivery of public services, has become a dominant feature of organisational effectiveness.    
 
Indeed, Public Administration today finds itself in an environment where results-oriented 
management has become a key determinant of performance; almost to the same extent as it 
has applied to business-oriented organisations (Rondinelli and Cheema, 2003:8-9).  Drucker 
(1985b:162), argues that public sector institutions need to be fully entrepreneurial and 
innovative as much as any business does.  He goes further to posit that the rapid changes in 
today’s society, in technology and economy, are posing even greater threat and offer great 
opportunity to public service institutions.  This view has further been reinforced by Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992:xxi), who, in discussing entrepreneurial government, have argued that 
public sector institutions must habitually use their resources in new ways to heighten their 
effectiveness.   
 5
There are several theoretical frameworks or models that organisational theorists use to 
discuss the ability of an organisation to be effective at achieving its expected outcomes.  One 
such model is the closed rational organisation or bureaucratic control-oriented model.  This 
model argues that organisational effectiveness can be achieved by institutions having clarity 
of purpose, formalization of rules and roles and monitoring conformance to those 
expectations (Baker & Branch, 2002:3).   The closed, rational model, also assumes that 
organisations are fairly generic and hence management faces basic generic tasks which if 
carried out will lead to effectiveness (Barnard, 1938; Dessler, 1982; Drucker, 1985a; Stoner, 
1978).   
 
A second model, the natural systems or human relations perspective argues that for an 
organisation to be effective, it has to harness the minds and hearts of its participants.  It 
emphasizes the importance of informal social relations over formal structures (Likert, 1961; 
Weick, 1999).  Organisational effectiveness is seen as resulting from organisations engaging 
the hearts and minds of the organisational participants.  The natural systems/human relations 
perspective has been expanded to include efforts to engage not only the hearts and minds of 
organisational participants but also those of the organisation’s customers and external 
stakeholders (Porter, 1985; Powell, 1990).    
 
A third model, the open systems model postulates that the effectiveness of an organisation 
depends on the organisation’s interaction with its external environment.  It views an 
organisation as an open system that self-maintains on the basis of throughputs taken from and 
given back to the environment.  It also argues that effective organisations are those that are 
able to become flexible and adaptive to the complex, varied and rapidly changing 
environment confronting them.  Under the open systems approach, transformational 
leadership (Simic, 1998:1) is seen as a crucial ingredient for organisational effectiveness 
whereby it is argued that managers needed to be leaders whose real added value is the 
provision of vision and direction that engages the hearts and minds of employees, and, 
subsequently, customers and external stakeholders (Hesselbein, Goldsmith & Beckhard, 
1996).  
 
A fourth model focuses on the internal processes and operations of an organisation and 
argues that for an organisation to be effective in achieving its objectives, it must have an 
absence of internal strain.  This means that its members should be highly integrated into the 
 6
system, its internal functioning should be smooth and typified by trust and benevolence 
toward individuals and information should flow smoothly both vertically and horizontally 
(Cameron, 1980: 67-68). 
 
Yet a fifth model, the contingency model argues for models of organisational effectiveness 
that are more tailored to the specific requirements and objectives of a particular organisation.  
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) coined the label contingency theory to capture the notion that 
different environmental contexts place different requirements on organisations.  This study 
observes that the unique environmental context under which RIIs operate is that they are 
institutions established by sovereign states to safeguard or promote issues of common interest 
through harmonization of their respective policies. This entails ceding of some sovereignty.  
In this regard, political will is crucial for the effectiveness of RIIs.   
 
The above theoretical frameworks of organisational effectiveness though not exhaustive, 
when examined in the specific context of current organisational environments, basically help 
to determine how organisations are best able to realize their set objectives more effectively.  
They dominantly point out that organisational effectiveness stems from a number of generic 
factors:  clarity of purpose, facilitative organisational values, simplified and rational 
organisational structure and processes, availability of adequate resources, satisfaction of an 
organisation’s strategic constituencies, the organisation’s agility to adjust and respond to 
dynamic changes and requirements of and in the environment and existence of 
transformational leadership.  It is argued that these theories of organisational effectiveness 
apply equally to business and public sector organisations like the RIIs.  A particularly 
important aspect in this area is the existence of right type of mindsets not only of the 
employees of the RIIs but also of the various participants in the institution who are largely 
political and public officials representing the Partner States  (Mwapachu, 2005: 285, 353-
354).   
 
In the light that many RIIs are yet to achieve their objectives effectively, this is a clear 
indication to the researcher that the fundamentals of the theories that underpin organisational 
effectiveness are either non-existent or are only weakly embedded in the organisational 
structures, systems and processes of these institutions.   
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1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
There are many benefits to be derived from regional integration schemes such as:  higher 
economic growth, macro-economic stability, institutional and human capital development, 
greater capital formation through regional capital markets, increased regional security, 
promotion of common development projects especially infrastructure and increased 
bargaining power in international forums   To this end, African governments have come 
together to establish RIIs and have vested in them the onerous responsibility of promoting 
regional integration initiatives.  However, many of these institutions are yet to effectively 
achieve their objectives.   
 
Asante (1995:53), for example, argues that although RIIs which have been established in 
Africa are expected to play a vital role in the socio-economic transformation of the African 
economies and help alleviate poverty through sustained recovery and growth, there is the 
striking contradiction between general emphasis on the need for economic integration in 
Africa and the scanty evidence of practical success.  Evidence tends to suggest that, to date, 
none of the RIIs has made any appreciable progress towards the all-engaging objective of 
creating a robust and competitive sub-regional economic market, let alone an economic 
community, despite the human and financial resources deployed.  For example, no significant 
progress has as yet been made on industrial development and fiscal harmonization which are 
important objectives of the treaties establishing the institutions.  Asante (1995:54), further 
notes that the main objectives set out in the Final Act of Lagos2 in 1980 in the field of 
promotion of Cooperation at the sectoral level are yet to be achieved and there is generally a 
lack of harmonization of sectoral policies in agriculture, industry, transport and energy.  His 
verdict is that despite great expectations, the existing regional integration schemes have still 
not been able to make positive steps towards achieving their pre-established goals.   
 
In similar vein, Saku (2006:5), notes that unlike the integration schemes in other parts of the 
world, such as the EU in Europe, the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in North 
America and the Common Market for the South (MERCOSUR) in South America, RIIs in 
Africa have not succeeded in accelerating growth or trade or reducing poverty which are 
some of their main objectives.  He highlights for example, that intra-African exports as a 
                                                 
2 The Final Act of Lagos committed the African governments to establish an African Economic Community by the year 2000 and stated 
steps to be taken to this effect (Nyong’o, 2002: 1). 
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proportion of the continent’s total exports amounted to only 7.6 per cent in 2000 as against a 
ratio of 17.2 per cent for Latin America, a region which has not been as active as Africa in 
the promotion of cooperation and integration.  He further notes that in spite of the multitude 
of regional integration schemes on the Continent, average income per capita is lower today in 
Africa than at the end of the 1960s. This viewpoint is corroborated by UNCTAD (2007:93-
109) who reveal that intra-African exports as a proportion of the continent’s total exports 
amounted to only 7% in 2006 while it was 51.2% in Asia and 73.2% in Europe.   
 
Several studies carried out to assess the performance of RIIs in Africa, though having slightly 
varied results, also generally conclude that the experience of RIIs in Africa has been that of a 
failure in achieving their objectives (Foroutan & Pritchett, 1993; Ogunkola, 1994; Elbadawi, 
1997; and Lyakurwa et al. 1997).  These studies indicate that Africa’s regional integration 
schemes have generally not been fully implemented as designed.  As a result, in many of 
them, internal trade barriers have not been eliminated, free movements of factors of 
production remains a largely unrealized dream while poor infrastructure and other constraints 
continue to ensure that intra-regional transactions costs remain very high.  As such, RIIs in 
Africa have denied the citizens of the participating countries the full enjoyment and benefits 
of integration.   
 
Many analysts of the integration process in Africa seek to explain the ineffectiveness of the 
RIIs in achieving their objectives on the grounds of political, economic and socio-cultural 
factors such as political instability, poor economies and cultural mistrust among neighbouring 
countries among others (Geda & Kebret, 2007:1-38; Mpungwe, 1995:7-13).  Important as 
these are, they ignore other important factors that underpin the effectiveness of the integration 
process, notably the role played by the institutions themselves that are charged to spearhead 
the integration process.   
 
A few scholars, however, have realized the importance of the role of institutions in the 
regional integration process.  For example, Kennes (1997:2-7), asserts that inadequate 
institutional design contributes to the difficulties facing RIIs in Africa.  He notes that if 
countries say they want to form a Customs Union or Free Trade Area, it is simply taken for 
granted that they can do it, provided only that they devise a workable scheme on paper.  
However, the actual implementation is a delicate process covering the setting of realistic 
targets, negotiation, implementation, control and resolution of disputes.  It is conditioned by 
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the nature of the decision making process which can be intergovernmental, supranational or 
mixed.  He goes further to note that since its origin, the EU has been following a 
supranational approach on economic integration and notes that for various reasons, 
developing countries, especially in Africa, are not keen on supranationalism, which would 
have implied the sharing of sovereignty.  The result, in almost all cases, is the creation of 
regional institutions with weak secretariats and little or no authority.  These bodies are 
invariably hampered by lack of resources and political interference in personnel management.  
They are not able to ensure adequate preparation, implementation and control of agreed 
integration policies.  And in some cases, they are over dependent on donor funding, even for 
their day-to-day functioning.   
 
Oyejide (2000:9) further suggests that the design and implementation of many of the RIIs in 
effect actually constrain rather than promote regional integration.  He asserts that this 
counter-intuitive result seems to emanate from such prominent organisational features as 
consensual decision-making arrangements, over-lapping and sometimes conflicting 
memberships, lack of regional level monitoring of the implementation of decisions, apparent 
unwillingness of governments of member countries to cede authority to the regional 
institutions and the consequent lack of adequate resources and power by the regional 
secretariats to take initiative and promote regional perspectives.  From the foregoing, it is 
clear that the institutional framework of RIIs has a bearing on the institutions’ ability to be 
effective in achieving their expected outcomes. 
 
This study sought to investigate the important reasons that underlie the institutional 
weaknesses of RIIs in achieving their objectives effectively.  The study was concerned with 
the following research questions:  
 
1. What are the key objectives that RIIs have been mandated to achieve? 
2. What has been the broad performance of the RIIs in the light of the set objectives? 
3. What explains the shortfalls in performance of RIIs in achieving their objectives?   
4. What needs to be done to bring about greater organisational effectiveness of RIIs? 
5. What broad lessons can be drawn from this study that can be of relevance to RIIs 
generally?   
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The credibility of regional integration institutions (RIIs) depends on their ability to deliver 
what they have been established to achieve.  In developing countries and in Africa in 
particular, they are expected to play a vital role in the socio-economic transformation of the 
African economies and help alleviate poverty through sustained recovery and growth.  
However, research as well as practical realities on the ground indicate that there is a striking 
contradiction between what these institutions are meant to achieve and what they have 
actually achieved (Foroutan & Pritchett 1993; Ogunkola, 1994; Elbadawi, 1997; and 
Lyakurwa et al. 1997).  In most cases they have failed to achieve or unsatisfactorily achieved 
their intended objectives.   
 
The ineffectiveness of RIIs in Africa in achieving their objectives is often attributed to a 
myriad of political, economic and socio-cultural factors.  It is common to read that RIIs in 
Africa are unable to undertake their mandate due to political instability, perceived economic 
imbalances between participating countries, socio-cultural differences and intolerance 
between citizens of participating states, differences in member states’ legal systems, mistrust 
and suspicion held by political elite on the benefits and costs of integration and external 
interference by powerful groups who fear losing out if countries integrate among others 
(Geda & Kebret, 2007:1-38; Kaahwa, 2003: 38-44; Kibua & Tostensen, 2005: 2; Kituo cha 
Katiba, 2000:5; Mpungwe, 1995:7-13; Wako Committee, 2004: 86). 
   
Important as the foregoing are, they ignore another important factor which the researcher 
believes underpins the effectiveness of the integration process, notably the influence of the 
manner in which the institutions that are charged with spearheading the integration process 
are organized, in other words, the institutional framework of these institutions.  In contrast, 
there are various analyses of the European Union (EU), an institution considered to be the 
most advanced example of regional integration in the world (being the only RII which has a 
functioning Monetary Union in the form of the Euro, an Internal/Common Market, a common 
commercial policy and a common agricultural policy), which reveal that the positive 
advancements made by the EU have crucially been aided by the presence of effective 
supranational institutions (Babarinde, 1996:11, Patten, 2005:122-141).  Whilst the EU model 
is not perfect or ideal and, indeed, the model is still undergoing radical review  for instance in 
areas such as the decision making process, voting system by the Council of Ministers and 
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institutional changes (Treaty of Lisbon, December 2007), it presents useful best practices to 
consider in examining the organisational effectiveness of the EAC. 
 
The researcher believes that the EU’s success may be attributed to the way in which the 
institution is organized, that is, its institutional framework.  Studies abound on how the EU 
can be better organized to enable it to effectively achieve its goals and objectives 
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2004).  Recommendations from such studies have contributed to the re-
organisation of the EU’s institutional framework into one which enables the institution to be 
effective in achieving its goals.   
 
There is however, paucity or lack of equivalent rigorous analysis with respect to the 
institutional framework of RIIs in the developing world and especially Africa.  Not only have 
attempts to assess organisational effectiveness been problematic, but almost no consideration 
has been given to identifying factors that may help guide managers of these institutions in 
understanding or improving their own effectiveness. This situation, in a way, is paradoxical 
since all the treaties that establish the RIIs place their organs and institutions at the heart of 
the integration process.  This study is significant as it intends to address the paucity of 
research in analyzing the relationship between the institutional framework of RIIs in the 
developing world and Africa in particular and their ability to effectively achieve their goals.   
 
Secondly, the many benefits to be reaped from regional integration make it crucial to have 
RIIs that are capable of effectively achieving their objectives. Higher economic growth, 
macro-economic stability, institutional and human capital development, greater capital 
formation through regional capital markets, increased regional security, common 
development projects and increased bargaining power can be realised by countries in the 
developing world and Africa in particular, if only the RIIs established by their governments 
are able to undertake their mandate successfully.  By analyzing how these institutions can be 
better organized to achieve their objectives, this study will contribute to the realization of 
effective RIIs in Africa and thus enable the citizens of Africa to experience the full 
enjoyment and benefits of integration.   
 
Ultimately, the study also hopes to contribute to the field of study of public administration 
and especially, the sub-field of international public administration.  By analysing the factors 
that impact on the organisational effectiveness of RIIs, this study hopes to contribute a body 
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of public administration organisational theory on how best RIIs, as public sector international 
governmental institutions in a developing country framework can better be organized and 
managed to achieve results more effectively. 
 
 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
This study sought to generate a deeper understanding of some of the key factors that 
determine the organisational effectiveness of RIIs.  The study further sought to determine 
how and why the external environmental influences and the internal management factors 
combine to promote organisational effectiveness of RIIs.  In this regard, the external 
environment included the influence of political actors, the business community and civil 
society and, amongst the internal management factors, are issues related to organisational 
culture, relationships between the different organs of the RIIs, results-oriented management 
and the decision making system.  The study also sought to determine why some RIIs have 
achieved greater effectiveness than others.  In this context, the study compared and contrasted 
different integration schemes. The European Commission (EC) as well as the other European 
Union (EU) institutions such as the EU Parliament and the European Court of Justice 
constituted important benchmarks in this regard.  Through this comparative empirical 
research approach, the study sought to contribute a body of public administration 
organisational theory on how best RIIs, as public sector intergovernmental bodies in a 
developing country framework, can better be organized and managed to achieve results more 
effectively.   
 
In achieving the research objective, the study contextualized the EAC as a unit of analysis.  
However, it is hoped that the particular findings of this analysis can be generalized and 
applied to other RIIs.  In this context, the researcher largely applied the theory of 
organisational effectiveness to determine whether the EAC’s shortfalls in achieving its 
objectives are a result of its not fulfilling the basic fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory.  At the same time, and to the extent that the EAC as a public sector 
institution is subject to a fundamental political process in its decision making, the study also 
examined how political will, the fuzziness of the subsidiarity principle (Ederveen & 
Pelkmans, 2006) and the enlargement of the EAC through admitting additional members, 
affects organisational effectiveness.  Among other key factors that the researcher examined 
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are whether the EAC has clarity of purpose in terms of clearly spelt out goals and objectives 
and prioritization and capacity of their implementation; whether the EAC has the right 
structure and rational processes to enable it carry out its mandate, whether it has adequate and 
competent staffing levels; whether the staff are well trained and motivated to accomplish 
their tasks, the status of mindsets of employees and other decision making players, whether 
the organisation has adequate financial and supporting resources such as modern information 
technology; to what extent the EAC relates well with its own internal and external 
environment and finally whether it has a transformational leadership, that is,  the ability of 
the organisational leaders to influence major changes in the attitudes and assumptions of 
organisational members thereby building commitment for the organisation’s mission, 
objectives and strategies.   
 
 
1.6 HYPOTHESIS 
 
This study postulated that regional integration institutions (RIIs) are likely to be effective in 
achieving the objectives for which they were established if the basic fundamentals of 
organisational effectiveness theory are embedded in their institutional structures, systems and 
processes.  To the extent that the basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory 
are not embedded or are only weakly embedded in the institutional structures, systems and 
processes of a RII, then it is less likely that the institution will be able to effectively achieve 
its mandate. 
 
The basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory include: 
 
 clarity of purpose, that is, clearly spelt out goals and objectives in terms of their 
clarity, prioritization and capacity for implementation; 
 facilitative organisational culture; 
 rational organisational structure;  
 rational organisational processes; 
 ability to acquire needed resources (finance and human); 
 internal harmony;  
 satisfaction of strategic constituencies both internal and external; 
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 ability to adjust and respond to dynamic changes and requirements of and in the 
environment;  
 transformational leadership; and 
 political will, on the basis of the intergovernmental nature of RIIs. 
 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The unit of analysis in so far as organisational effectiveness is concerned is the operations 
and functioning of the seven organs of the EAC, that is, the Summit of Heads of State, the 
Council of Ministers, the Co-ordination Committee, the Sectoral Committees, the East 
African Court of Justice (EACJ), the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and the 
EAC Secretariat.  These organs were selected because, through the various roles assigned to 
them, they play critical roles in determining the degree to which the EAC is able to achieve 
its objective in the most effective manner.  Further, the key players who are directly involved 
in the EAC’s regional integration process are to be found within these organs.  For example 
staff of the EAC, Members of Parliament of the EALA, Judges of the EACJ and the Heads of 
State as well as Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and senior officials from the EAC Partner 
States’ ministries. 
 
The data collection methodology used is of three types.  First, data was collected on the 
organisational structure and processes of the seven EAC organs to determine whether they 
promote or impede EAC’s integration objectives.  Secondly, data was collected on the actual 
operations and interactions of the actors within these organs,  in other words how they go 
about performing their duties, interact with one another, as well as the inter-organ 
relationships, challenges they face and the factors that enable or could enable them to 
perform their roles effectively or more effectively.  Thirdly, the views of key external 
stakeholders (business community and civil society) on how they perceive the EAC’s 
performance and what can be done to improve its effectiveness were also sought. 
 
The following were the main sources of data.  First, the views of staff of the EAC organs and 
institutions, Judges of the EACJ and Members of Parliament of the EALA.  These players 
were chosen because they work in organs of the EAC that best qualify to be described as 
formal institutions in the sense that the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC has 
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established them as formal bureaucratic entities with an organisational structure and some 
autonomy in the management of their activities.  Moreover, in the context of their being 
directly involved in the executive, judicial and legislative functions of the EAC, the members 
of these three organs are the ones who are better placed to identify the institutional factors 
that have positive or negative bearing on the EAC’s ability to achieve its objectives 
effectively.    
 
Secondly, it was also important that the views of members of the EAC’s policy making 
organs (Council of Ministers, Coordination Committee and Sectoral Committees) be sought.  
In this regard, the views of Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and senior government officials 
from various ministries in the EAC Partner States, as key players in the EAC’s decision 
making structure and process, were sought.  Third, were the views of selected members of the 
business and civil society.  These respondents were selected because they constitute key 
external stakeholders in the EAC region in so far as the performance of the EAC is 
concerned.  The fourth source of data was policy documents and official reports of the EAC 
organs.  This data included EAC’s Development Strategies, the Treaty for the Establishment 
of the EAC and Reports of the Meetings of EAC organs.  This source of data was chosen 
because it contains much of the information relating to the goals, strategies and operations of 
the EAC organs and notably how decisions are arrived at.  The final source of data was from 
journal and newspaper articles on the EAC’s regional integration process.  Such source 
enabled the researcher to identity some of the reasons behind the EAC’s inability to 
effectively achieve its goals, reasons which may not be captured or are inadequately covered 
in official reports of the EAC, for whatever reasons. 
 
The researcher utilized a quantitative and qualitative research design.  In the case of the 
quantitative research, the researcher distributed to 120 selected respondents a closed and open 
ended questionnaire on the basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness and how the 
EAC organs responds to them.  Questionnaires were chosen because they provided the best 
means through which the researcher could highlight the basic fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory she was interested in studying.  In this way, key stakeholders who have a 
close and intimate understanding of the EAC were able to pronounce their opinions on 
whether the key fundamentals of organisational effectiveness are in place at the EAC or 
otherwise.  A copy of the questionnaire distributed is hereto attached as Appendix A.   
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The questionnaires were distributed during the 16th Ordinary Meeting of the EAC Council of 
Ministers held in Arusha from 8th-13th September, 2008.  The researcher chose to collect data 
during this period as the Council of Ministers meeting is a major policy organ meeting of the 
EAC during which Ministers, Permanent Secretaries as well as senior officials from the 
various ministries in the EAC Partner States converge at the EAC Headquarters in Arusha.   
Further, during such meetings, key members of staff of the various organs of the EAC are 
required to be present at the duty station. Similarly, Judges of the EACJ as well as Members 
of the EALA also attend these meetings.  Members of the business community and the civil 
society from EAC Partner States are usually also represented at these meetings.  It was 
therefore easy for the researcher to find the targeted respondents.   
 
A total of 120 respondents were targeted:  
 
 36 from EAC Partner States as follows: 12 Ministers, 12 Permanent Secretaries and 
12 Senior officials;  
 6 Judges of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ);  
 18 Members of Parliament of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA);  
 10 members of the business community;  
 10 members of the civil society; and  
 40 members of staff of the EAC organs and institutions as follows:  2 from the EACJ, 
2 from the EALA; 2 from the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) and 34 from 
the EAC Secretariat as per following division: 6 from Office of the Secretary General, 
10 from Office of the Deputy Secretary General (Projects and Programmes), 9 from 
the Office of the Deputy Secretary General (Finance and Administration), 3 from the 
Office of the Deputy Secretary General (Political Federation) and 6 from the EAC 
Trade and Customs Directorate).  
 
Due to poorly filled questionnaires and some respondents literally vanishing with the 
questionnaires, the response rate was 60%.  Out of the 120 questionnaires distributed, only 57 
well answered questionnaires were received.  15 other questionnaires were well filled on the 
basis of personal face to face interviews conducted between the researcher and respondents 
who said they were too busy to fill the questionnaires but preferred the researcher to read out 
the questions to them and fill in the questionnaire forms on their behalf as they answered the 
questions.  They included: 3 Ministers, 4 Permanent Secretaries, 3 Executive Staff of the 
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EAC, 3 Members of the EALA and 2 members of the EABC.  In total 72 well completed 
questionnaires were obtained.  It should be noted that the respondents were informed that the 
information they would provide would strictly be treated with utmost confidence and used for 
academic purposes in the said study only.  Under the circumstances it was not obligatory for them to 
provide their names if they did not wish to do so.   In this regard, none of the respondents gave 
consent for use of their names.  However, since the respondents were known to the researcher, she 
was able to categorise the received questionnaires and interviews according to the organ, institution or 
affiliate body of the EAC that the respondents belonged to without exposing their identity. 
 
The table below shows the study population.   
 
Table 1:  Profile of the study population 
Characteristics Number 
Interviewed 
Percentage (%) of 
total study 
population 
 
Staff of the East African Community  
 Executive Staff 
 Professional Staff 
 Support Staff 
 
 
 
3 
18 
7 
 
 
4.16% 
25% 
9.72% 
 
 
 
 
39% 
 
Members of Parliament of the East African Legislative 
Assembly 
 
 
9 
 
 
12.5% 
 
12.5% 
 
Judges of the East African Court of Justice 
 
 
3 
 
4.16% 
 
4.16% 
 
Members of the EAC’s Policy making organs 
 Ministers 
 Permanent Secretaries 
 Senior officials 
 
 
3 
6 
10 
 
 
 
4.16% 
8.33% 
13.88% 
 
 
 
 
 
26.38% 
 
Members of the Civil Society 
 East African Law Society 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
8.33% 
 
 
8.33% 
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Characteristics Number 
Interviewed 
Percentage (%) of 
total study 
population 
 
Members of the Business Community 
 East African Business Council 
 
 
7 
 
 
9.72% 
 
 
 
9.72% 
 
TOTAL 72  100% 
 
The researcher was mainly interested in obtaining the overall view of key EAC stakeholders 
on whether various aspects of organisational effectiveness are embedded in the EAC’s 
structures and processes. In this regard, simple frequencies were produced from the responses 
collected from the 72 respondents using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS). The data analysis was mainly descriptive and narrative.  The researcher analysed the 
majority view on various aspects of organisational effectiveness and how they impact on the 
EAC’s ability to effectively achieve its goals.  Where the views of the respondents were split 
in the middle, meaning there was no clear majority view, the researcher analysed both sides 
of the views received.  The research findings are presented in Chapter Five. 
 
The quantitative data was supplemented by qualitative research.  The researcher mainly 
analyzed the official reports and policy documents of the EAC to determine the extent to 
which the organisational structure and processes of the EAC adhere to the fundamentals of 
organisational effectiveness theory.   Journal and newspaper articles on the EAC’s integration 
process were also reviewed to enable the researcher identify a wider picture about factors 
impacting on the EAC’s organisational effectiveness.   
 
The Harvard Reference Technique was employed to provide the researcher’s source of 
information.   
 
 
1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
Even though this study examines the organisational effectiveness of regional integration 
institutions, the researcher paid particular reference to RIIs in Africa and in particular to the 
EAC. Within the EAC the researcher paid attention to the structure, processes and operations 
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of the seven organs of the EAC, that is, the Summit of Heads of State, the Council of 
Ministers, the Co-ordination Committee, the Sectoral Committees, the East African Court of 
Justice (EACJ), the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and the EAC Secretariat.  
The study population was thus limited to Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and senior 
government officials within the EAC region, staff of the EAC organs and institutions, 
Members of Parliament of the EALA, Judges of the EACJ and selected members of the 
business and civil society in East Africa.   
 
Due to limited resources, the business and civil society groups who formed part of the study 
population were limited to those groups based in Arusha, that is, the East African Business 
Council and the East African Law Society. 
 
Owing to the fact that Rwanda and Burundi only became full members of the Community in 
July 2007 and have therefore not fully participated in the activities of the Community since 
its establishment, the study population was further limited to respondents from the founder 
three EAC Partner States of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.   
 
The study location was limited to the headquarters of the EAC in Arusha, Tanzania.  This 
study location was ideal to the researcher as three organs of the EAC under study, that is, the 
EACJ, the EALA and the EAC Secretariat are based at the Arusha headquarters office.  
Members of the other four organs, that is, the Summit of Heads of State, the Council of 
Ministers, the Co-ordination Committee and the Sectoral Committees, though based in the 
respective Partner States, regularly convene at the Arusha headquarters for meetings.  
Further, two prominent business and civil society groups, that is, the East African Business 
Council and the East African Law Society have their headquarters in Arusha.  All this made it 
easy for the researcher to locate the respondents.   
 
 
1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The researcher encountered four main difficulties in the course of the study.  The first 
difficulty had to do with data collection.  Since data collection from respondents was by 
means of structured questionnaires which were self-administered, there was a low response 
rate because of the liberty given to respondents to carry the questionnaires home, fill them 
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and bring them back later.  Besides this, since the respondents involved in the study were 
mainly senior government officials, international civil servants as well as members of the 
business and civil society with busy schedules, most of them did not have the time to 
complete the questionnaires adequately, if at all.  It was also difficult for the researcher to 
access some of the respondents especially the Ministers and Permanent Secretaries given 
their seniority and the fact that they appear at the EAC headquarters only when they have 
important meetings to attend and this is usually for a day or two.  The fact that data collection 
took place during the 16th Meeting of the EAC Council of Ministers held in Arusha from 8th-
13th September 2008, further impacted negatively on the ability of the respondents to 
concentrate on the questionnaires and hence many did not return the questionnaires. 
 
Secondly, since the researcher was mainly interested in obtaining an overall view of key EAC 
stakeholders on whether various aspects of organisational effectiveness are embedded in the 
EAC’s systems, structures and processes, the hypothesis that guided this study was not 
scientifically tested before it could be accepted or rejected.  Instead, the study relied mainly 
on an analysis of what the majority of the respondents felt on various aspects of 
organisational effectiveness and how they impact on the EAC’s ability to effectively achieve 
its goals.  Further, discourse analysis was not used to analyse the views of the respondents.  It 
is thus possible that the bias or prejudices of the respondents as well as the researcher may 
have influenced the research findings. 
 
Thirdly, it is important to note that conducting a full-blown organisational effectiveness 
evaluation of an institution is a difficult, time-consuming and costly exercise which requires 
full time commitment.  The researcher is currently employed as a Senior Personal Secretary 
to the Secretary General of the EAC, a job which is very demanding and entails a lot of 
travel.  The researcher was thus not able to carry out an in-depth analysis of all the aspects of 
organisational effectiveness theory as she would have wanted to given her busy schedule and 
the fact that the dissertation had to be completed within one year. 
 
Fourthly, since the study was being supervised through long distance study, communication 
between the researcher and her supervisor was mainly by telephone and email which are not 
reliable given that the communication system in Arusha, Tanzania, where the researcher is 
based, is not very reliable.  The researcher thus had to contend with infrequent 
communication with her supervisor besides missing the quality guidance which comes 
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through direct face-to-face interaction between supervisor and researcher.  The researcher 
attempted to make up for this shortfall by making three visits to Pretoria where she was able 
to have constructive face-to-face interactive discussion with her supervisor.  Out of this, the 
researcher was able to obtain valuable guidance on how to proceed with the study. 
 
All in all, despite the foregoing shortcomings, the study was conducted in a most objective 
and in-depth manner as possible; consequently generalizations were drawn in respect of the 
hypothesis advanced.   
 
 
1.10 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
 
The following eight terms form the key concepts in this study: effectiveness, efficiency, 
institution, organisation, organisational effectiveness, regional integration, regional 
integration institution and the East African Community.  In order to get a deeper 
understanding of the issue under study, these concepts are briefly defined below. 
 
1.10.1 Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 
The College of Devankur Thakur (2004:1-6), gives the following examples: effectiveness is 
doing the right things while efficiency is doing the things right.  Effectiveness means being 
able to achieve a set goal while efficiency is achieving the goal with minimum resources.  
Effectiveness is concerned about the ends while efficiency is concerned about the means.  
Effectiveness is related to achieving results (desired effects) regardless of how efficient or 
inefficient the involved system(s)/process(es) is or are.  Efficiency seeks to save money, time 
and efforts regardless of quality while effectiveness focuses on how well the job gets done, 
focus is on quality.  Effectiveness is a measure of completeness of a product/service while 
efficiency is a measure of correctness of a product/service. Efficiency is concerned with the 
relationship between planned processes and actual processes while effectiveness is concerned 
with the relationship between planned outputs and actual outputs. 
 
Despite their differences, effectiveness and efficiency are interrelated.  While efficiency looks 
at how a work is done, effectiveness on the other hand looks into what is being done.  
Efficiency means doing things right, accomplishing organisational goals with a minimum of 
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time and resources.  An efficient organisation will do what it does with the least waste it can 
reasonably achieve.  There is nothing wrong with that, but it is not enough.  Lillywhite 
(2002:1) observes that an organisation can easily go out of business for doing the wrong 
things right.  An effective organisation does the right things.  Such an organisation will spend 
a lot of time deciding just what it should do.  The effective organisation is at least going the 
right direction, even if it is not getting there very fast.  The efficient organisation is taking the 
fast track to wherever it is going, whether it is a good or bad direction.  The company that is 
both efficacious and efficient will grow and take business away from companies that do only 
one or the other. Kelly (2001:1), however, observes that it is a rare and delightful occasion 
where solutions to organisational problems are both efficient and effective.  Usually 
organisations have to decide which they prefer because, they usually cannot have both.  
 
The question is thus asked, is it better to be efficient at the expense of efficacy?  According to 
Lillywhite (2002:2), there is a natural tendency to concentrate on the means at the expense of 
the ends.  It is easier to look at how well you are accomplishing a task than to determine if 
that task really helps you reach your goals. The result can be disaster.  She advises that 
organisations should look at their own actions.  Are they ignoring what they should be doing 
and how that changes with changing conditions?  If so, they are on the road to trouble.  Kelly 
(2001:2), advises that each organisation needs to balance efficiency against effectiveness and 
where there is a conflict between the two, the organisation must decide what is more 
important to them.  The decision will often be determined by the organisational goals.  Some 
organisations are more willing to sacrifice quality for efficiency; some do the opposite, to 
them, quality is everything and they sacrifice efficiency to achieve it.   
 
Lillywhite (2002:2), however, argues that although there is need to pay attention to efficiency 
in organisations, effectiveness is even more important.  She advises that Executives should 
regularly review what the company is doing and if those activities are the right actions for the 
current climate.  Middle level management should do something similar to be certain they are 
working towards the real needs of the company.  Lower level managers and even non-
management employees should do similar reviews to be certain that their work is efficacious, 
not just following policy or meeting paperwork goals.  Similarly, every employee should 
know what the company is doing and why and how his or her work helps reach those goals.   
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For the purpose of this study, effectiveness means doing things that lead to quality results in 
the realm of an organisation’s responsibilities while  efficiency means getting things done in 
a manner that consumes just the appropriate amount of an organisation’s energy and 
resources.  When combined, effectiveness and efficiency lead to an unstoppable result 
orientation which feeds organisational success.   
 
1.10.2 Institution and Organisation 
 
The concepts institution and organisation are often used interchangeably yet they refer to two 
different things.  According to March and Olsen (1998:943-969), an institution is a relatively 
stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour of a specific group of 
actors in specific situations. This definition of institutions is widely accepted and used by a 
variety of scholars (March & Olsen, 1998; Duffield, 2003; Koremenos & Snidal, 2003).  
Auriacombe and De Giorgi (2000:10), define an institution as a formally ordered and 
contractually arranged grouping of people and functions which pursue the realization of 
predetermined objectives by means of organized work.  They note that institutions, especially 
public or state institutions are created by means of a constitution but not exclusively.  
Furthermore, an institution has an organisation, but is not an organisation.  This definition 
works well for the purpose of this study due to its applicability to regional institutions in 
general and the EAC in particular.   
 
An institution in this study therefore refers to a formally ordered and contractually arranged 
grouping of people and functions with shared values, norms, standards and rules that 
constitute and legitimize actors as well as define appropriate behaviour for, and govern 
relations among, occupants of these functions, which pursues the realization of predetermined 
objectives by means of organized work.  In this regard, the EAC is an institution.  It was 
established by a multilateral treaty signed, ratified and acknowledged by its Partner States.  
This treaty lays down the objectives to be pursued by the EAC, its formal structure as well as 
the values, norms, standards and rules which define appropriate behaviour for, and governs 
the relations among, members and organs of the institution.   
 
An organisation, on the other hand, represents the structure that supports an institution.  
Management Help (2008:1), defines an organisation as a group of people intentionally 
organized (through formal established roles, methods of coordination, procedures, culture and 
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space) to accomplish an overall, common goal or set of goals.  Organisations have a set of 
rules, statement of objectives and a rationalized administrative instrument which, according 
to Duverger (1972:68), possesses a formal technical and material organisation, constitutions, 
local chapters, physical equipment, machines, emblems, letterhead stationery, a staff, an 
administrative hierarchy and so forth.  Management Help (2008:1-2), identifies certain 
dimensions and concepts that are common to organisations.  These are: vision, mission, 
values, strategic goals, strategies and systems and processes that (hopefully) are aligned with 
achieving the goals.  Organisations are also seen to operate as systems meaning that they 
have various inputs which are processed to produce certain outputs, which together, 
accomplish the overall goal desired by the organisation.  
 
For the purpose of this study, an organisation refers to formal structures with defined roles, 
responsibilities and decision-making processes which support institutions to realize their 
predetermined objectives.  Organisations are the mechanisms that create structure for actors 
within a given institution.  North (1993; 1994), proposes that institutions are the game and 
organisations are its players.  Institutions tell us the game being played for example in the 
case of the EAC institution the game being played is regional integration.  The norms, values, 
standards and rules of the game are found in the treaty that established the EAC institution.  
The players of the game are the various organs and institutions of the EAC for example, the 
Summit of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the Coordination Committee, the 
Sectoral Committees, the EAC Secretariat, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), the East 
African Legislative Assembly (EALA), the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) just to 
mention but a few.  These ‘players’ represent the formal structures or organisations that 
support the EAC institution pursue its pre-determined objectives; in other words, they are the 
institutional arrangements of the system. 
 
From the foregoing, we can deduce that institutions have a wider application and comprise a 
system of relationships which do not necessarily find expression in concrete manifestations of 
regulated relations, as is to be seen in the formal and material aspects of organisations.  
Furthermore, an institution has an organisation, but is not an organisation.  One may however 
talk of institutions that govern organisations and the organisation as an institution.   Thus, in 
this study the concept of institution is guided by Best (2006:3), who asserts that the idea of 
institutions goes beyond the organs of a regional agreement.  Institutions are rather the norms, 
rules and values which are accepted as governing a particular order. These may be applied by 
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or become embodied in particular organisations which are thus better referred to as the 
institutional arrangements of the system.  Thus the EAC is an institution which has an 
organisation. 
 
1.10.3 Organisational effectiveness 
 
Defining organisational effectiveness seems a relatively straightforward affair: to inquire into 
effectiveness is to ask how well an organisation is doing, relative to some set of standards.  
This is not wrong, but the pursuit of this simple question leads us into some complex and 
controversial issues.  According to Scott (1998:344-346), organisational effectiveness can be 
viewed from three broad perspectives, the rational, natural and open system perspectives.  
Under a rational system model, organisations are viewed as instruments for the attainment of 
goals, an organisation is thus viewed to be effective if it has clearly defined and attainable 
goals. The natural system model, on the other hand, views organisations as collectivities that 
are capable of achieving specified goals but are engaged in other activities required to 
maintain themselves as a social unit. An organisation is deemed to be effective if the 
satisfaction and morale of its participants are high.  The open system perspective views 
organisations as being highly interdependent with their environments and views 
organisational effectiveness as the ability of an organisation to exploit its environment in the 
acquisition of scarce and valued resources as well as how best it is able to adapt to its 
environment.  
 
Cameron (1980:67-68), offers a similar perspective and highlights that evaluators of 
organisational effectiveness have used four major approaches.  The first approach defines 
effectiveness in terms of how well an organisation accomplishes its goals.  A second 
approach to effectiveness is the system resource approach which judges effectiveness on the 
extent to which an organisation acquires needed resources; the more of the needed resources 
an organisation can obtain from its external environment, the more effective it is.  A third 
approach to effectiveness focuses on the internal processes and operations of the 
organisation.  Effective organisations are those with an absence of internal strain.  The fourth 
approach is the strategic constituencies approach which defines effectiveness as the extent to 
which all of the organisation’s strategic constituencies are at least minimally satisfied.   
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The analysis provided above provides useful guidelines for systematically assessing factors 
that contribute to an organisation’s ability to achieve its objectives.  They point out that 
organisational effectiveness is a multifaceted phenomenon; as such, the researcher is of the 
view that no single approach to evaluation of effectiveness may adequately explain 
organisational effectiveness of RIIs.  In this study therefore, the researcher factors in the basic 
fundamentals of all the major theoretical approaches to organisational effectiveness as factors 
that could potentially account for the ability of RIIs to effectively achieve their objectives.   
 
Organisational effectiveness in this study will thus refer to the ability of a RII to be effective 
in achieving the objectives for which it was established.  Thus when the researcher speaks of 
the organisational effectiveness of the EAC, she is simply assessing how effective the EAC is 
in achieving the objectives for which it was established.  The measures of effectiveness that 
the researcher will utilize include whether the EAC: has clearly spelt out goals and objectives 
in terms of their clarity, prioritization and capacity for implementation; has a facilitative 
organisational culture; has a rational organisational structure and process; is able to acquire 
needed resources to facilitate its operations; has no internal strain in its operations; is able to 
satisfy all of its strategic constituencies both internal and external; is able to adjust and 
respond to dynamic changes and requirements of and in its environment; and whether it has 
transformational leadership capable of steering the institution towards the achievement of its 
goals.  In as far as the EAC is in intergovernmental institution, a measure of the institution’s 
organisational effectiveness will be the extent to which the governments of its Partner States 
have demonstrated adequate political will. 
 
1.10.4 Regional integration 
 
Van Langenhove and Costea (2007:3), argue that the concept ‘regional integration’ acquired 
several meanings as there have been several successive waves of regionalism during the last 
century.  The first wave of regionalization focused on trade and payments liberalization 
between neighbouring countries in order to spur inter-country transactions.  The second and 
current wave of regionalism is different because it is increasingly no longer about trade alone 
but presents itself as a “multidimensional” form of integration which includes economic, 
political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the goal of creating region-
based free trade regimes or security alliances. Therefore, Van Langenhove and Costea 
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(2007:2), define regional integration as a process of deepening cooperation over areas that 
countries agree on as common interests shared by each one.     
 
Soomer (2003:1), on the other hand, argues that regional integration can be described in two 
ways, as a process and as an outcome.  As a process, it entails a country’s willingness to 
share or unify into a larger whole; the degree to which the unifying states share and what they 
share determines the level of integration.  Suranovic (2005:1-3), points out that the 
preferential integration agreements are often based on one or more of the following 
successively more integrating cooperation arrangements: 
 
Preferential Trade Area:  This is an integration bloc that gives preferential access or lower 
tariffs to imports produced by fellow member countries than they do for non-members.  It is 
the weakest form of integration. 
 
Free Trade Area:  This is a Preferential Trade Area without any tariffs on goods from 
members countries.  In other words, such countries agree to eliminate tariffs on imports 
produced by fellow member countries.  However, each partner country applies independent 
trade policy on imports from the rest of the world.  This integration arrangement is regarded 
as the second level of integration. 
 
Customs Union:  This is a Free Trade Area using common tariffs on imports from non-
members, that is, on top of eliminating tariffs on goods between them, member countries go a 
step further by setting up a common external trade policy.  The key element in this 
arrangement is a common external tariff whereby the designated group of countries charge a 
uniform rate of duty on third-country imports, regardless of the port of entry.  A Customs 
Union is regarded as the third level of integration. 
 
Common Market:  This is a Customs Union with free movement of the factors of production, 
wherein the free movement of goods under the customs union is extended to include free 
movement of capital, services and labour.   It is also characterized by free movement of 
persons and the right to residence and establishment. Common Market is regarded as the 
fourth level of integration.   
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Economic and Monetary Union:  This level of integration encompasses all the 
characteristics of the Common Market but goes a step further in that member states cooperate 
in economic and monetary matters such as having a common currency and monetary 
authority, harmonized fiscal systems and deeper cooperation in other economic fields.  It is 
regarded as the fifth level of integration.   
 
Political Federation:  This arrangement refers to a possibility that, at some point, a 
combination of the above five levels leads to the emergence of a cohesive and consolidated 
supranational political region.  It is an arrangement marked by the member states giving up 
their political sovereignty and having common legislation and political structures.  Lindberg 
(1963:6) defines political integration as “the process whereby nations forego the desire and 
ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking 
instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision making process to new central 
organs; and the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to 
shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre”.   
 
As an outcome, Soomer (2003:1) sees regional integration as occurring when pre-set criteria 
are met.  Giving the example of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), she 
argues that if the criterion for the establishment of the institution was only to establish a 
Central Bank, then it could be said that the OECS has achieved integration since it already 
has a Central Bank.  She further clarifies that there are many aspects to the treaties 
establishing regional integration institutions and thus advises that regional integration as an 
outcome means recalling goals previously agreed upon and then evaluating progress made 
and specifying the next set of measures.  
 
For the purpose of this study, regional integration means the coming together of two or more 
countries that are geographically close to each other and/or that share common problems, 
normally through reciprocal preferential agreements, for purposes of safeguarding or 
promoting issues of common interest to the participating countries through harmonization of 
their respective policies.  It is characterized by increased level of interactions among the 
participating countries with regard to economic, security, political and even socio-cultural 
issues and is often formed at different levels.  Starting from the simple arrangements of a 
Free Trade Area, two or more countries may form a Customs Union, a Common Market, an 
Economic Union and/or ultimately a Political Union.  Each of these levels of integration 
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requires their own distinct level of commitment and degree of harmonization of policies on 
the part of member countries.   
 
This is best exemplified in the table below: 
 
Table 2:  Schematic representation of regional integration schemes 
 
Regional 
Integration 
Scheme 
Free intra 
regional trade 
Common trade 
policy 
Free factor 
mobility (good, 
labour, capital) 
Common 
monetary and 
fiscal policy 
One 
government 
Free Trade Area yes no  no no no
Customs Union yes yes no no no
Common Market yes yes yes no no
Economic Union yes yes yes yes no
Political Union yes yes yes yes yes
Source: (Anadi, 2005:26) 
 
1.10.5 Regional integration institution (RII) 
 
In order to get a definition of the term regional integration institution the researcher examines 
two concepts that are often used divergently, ambiguously or inconsistently with the concept 
regional integration institution to the great confusion of many a student.  These are: 
‘international governmental institution’ and ‘intergovernmental agency/organisation’.  The 
concept ‘international governmental institution’ is defined by Auriacombe and De Giorgi 
(2000:27), as an association of states which has come into being by way of agreement, which 
has a permanent organisational structure and whose purpose is to pursue common interest by 
means of cooperation ‘Intergovernmental agency/organisation’ on the other hand is defined 
as an organisation set up by a number of governments in order to cooperate in matters of 
common interest.  Such an agency is funded from dues levied on participating governments 
(Lingualinks, 2005:1).    
 
An intergovernmental organisation, according to Wallace and Singer (1970:245-248), has 
several characteristics: it must consist of at least two qualified members of the international 
system; must hold more or less regular plenary sessions; must have a permanent headquarters 
and some sort of permanent headquarters arrangement; its membership should not be selected 
wholly or in part by another intergovernmental organisation and it should be serviced by 
administratively distinct secretariat personnel who function under the authority of the 
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umbrella organisation setup.  Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke (2005:2), provide a more 
recent and comprehensive definition of intergovernmental organisations, which they define as 
an institution with the following attributes: a formal entity, three or more sovereign states as 
members and possessing a permanent secretariat or other indication of institutionalization 
such as headquarters and/or permanent staff.   
 
Bearing in mind the synonymy between RIIs and the two concepts reviewed above, a 
regional integration institution, in this study, shall mean a formal institution, with a 
permanent secretariat, established by two or more states that are geographically close to one 
another and/or that share common problems, through an internationally recognized treaty to 
specifically perform duties related to safeguarding or promoting issues of common interest to 
the participating states through harmonization of their policies.  Examples of such 
organisations include the European Union (EU),  the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUR), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) to mention but a 
few.   
 
1.10.6 East African Community 
 
The East African Community is a regional intergovernmental organisation established by the 
Republics of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania for 
purposes of spearheading the region’s integration process.  The objective of the EAC as set 
out in Article 5 of the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC (EAC Secretariat, 2002:12-
13), is to develop policies aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner 
States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, 
security and legal and judicial affairs for the mutual benefit.  The EAC hopes to achieve this 
by a step by step process beginning with the establishment of a Customs Union, a Common 
Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation of the five EAC 
Partner States. 
 
Article 9 of the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC establishes seven main organs 
through which the EAC operates (EAC Secretariat, 2002:17-48).  These are: the Summit of 
Heads of State which consists of the Heads of State or Government of the EAC Partner 
States;  the Council of Ministers:  which consists of the Ministers responsible for EAC 
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Affairs of each Partner State and such other Ministers of the Partner States as each Partner 
State shall determine; the Co-ordination Committee which consists of the Permanent 
Secretaries responsible for EAC Affairs in each Partner States and such other Permanent 
Secretaries of the Partner States as each Partner State may determine; the Sectoral 
Committees composed of Senior Officials from the Partner States and established by the 
Council of Ministers which spell out their composition and functions; the East African Court 
of Justice which is the judicial arm of the EAC;  the East African Legislative Assembly 
which is the legislative arm of the EAC; and the Secretariat which is the executive organ of 
the Community headed by a Secretary General.    
 
 
1.11 SEQUENCE OF CHAPTERS 
 
In Chapter One, a general background on the establishment and performance of regional 
integration institutions (RIIs) is undertaken as well as what constitutes the central problem 
necessitating the study.  In this context, the statement of the research problem as well as the 
hypothesis that will guide the study are outlined.   The empirical approach that informs the 
entire study is also presented in this chapter. The scope of the study as well as the limitations 
experienced by the researcher are also highlighted. Further, the key concepts underlying the 
study are outlined to clarify their meanings and application and to bring out the broad 
dimensions of the study. The conceptualization also sets out the basis on which effectiveness 
of the RIIs is measured.   
 
A broad review of literature on RIIs is undertaken in Chapter Two with a view to establishing 
the reasons for their formation.  The main characteristics of RIIs are highlighted as well as an 
overview of the performance of selected RIIs in Africa.   
 
Chapter Three sets out a broad review of literature on the EAC.  The history of the EAC, its 
objectives, the fundamental and operational principles that govern its operations as well as 
the major organs through which it operate are highlighted.  Further, an overview of the 
performance of the EAC is carried out with a view to establish its successes and 
shortcomings.  A broad literature review on possible causes of the EAC’s shortcomings is 
also undertaken.  A literature review on how institutional frameworks can explain the 
shortcomings of RIIs like the EAC is also presented. 
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In Chapter Four, a broad examination of the concept of organisational effectiveness within 
the framework of organisational effectiveness theory is undertaken and contextualized within 
the area of study, that is, the organisational effectiveness of RIIs.  The main theoretical 
models of organisational effectiveness are highlighted.  Further, the determinants of 
organisational effectiveness that will guide the study are identified and briefly described in 
terms of what the ideal situation should be.   
 
The research findings are presented in Chapter Five.  Herein, the organisational effectiveness 
of the EAC is analysed vis-a-vis the determinants of organisational effectiveness identified.  
The chapter attempts to establish the extent to which the basic fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory are present in the EAC and how they have been replicated in EAC’s 
structures and decisions making processes.  A comparative overview of the European Union 
(regarded as the most advanced RII) is also presented with a view to determine whether the 
basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are embedded in its structures and 
processes and whether this accounts for its relatively successful regional integration process.  
In this regard, the views of the study population on organisational factors that contribute to 
and promote EAC’s effective integration process as well as factors which explain EAC’s 
shortfalls in performance are highlighted.  Further, information gathered from secondary data 
such as books, journal and newspapers on the structure and processes of the EAC as well as 
the EU will be highlighted.  
 
Chapter Six summarises the study as well as the research findings.  Recommendations on 
what can be done to enhance the EAC’s ability to effectively achieve its objectives are 
proposed on the basis of the determinants of organisational effectiveness which formed the 
basis on which the EAC was analysed.  Recommendations also cover factors that underlie 
effectiveness of RIIs that are replicable from the EU.  Areas for further study are also 
suggested.   
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Chapter Two 
 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION INSTITUTIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Regional integration is part of the present global economic order and is a trend which is now 
acknowledged as the future of the international scene.  The nation-state system, which has 
been the predominant pattern of international relations, is increasingly evolving towards a 
system in which regional groupings of states are becoming more important than sovereign 
states.  There is generally a powerful perception that the idea of the state and its sovereignty 
has been made irrelevant by processes that are taking place at both the global and local level.  
Lippman (2008:2) states, “the true constituent members of the international order of the 
future are communities of states”.  Groom and Taylor (1990:10) further capture this spirit by 
their observation that, “the process of going beyond adjustment to a rebuilding of the state 
system has been neither easy nor uncontroversial, but it is real in that the sovereignty of the 
units has been fundamentally adjusted, …, although not in such a way as to go altogether 
beyond the notion of a state system.  It is, in effect, a rebuilding of the state system into what 
are deemed to be more viable units”.   
 
In the light of the above, it can be agreed that the international system is now characterized 
by groups of states (often geographically close to each other and/or sharing common 
problems) that have come together for purposes of safeguarding or promoting issues of 
common interest.  In so doing, these states jointly come up with cohesive regional stances on 
policy issues which each participating state is required to implement.  It is between these two 
stages, namely policy determination and the execution of policy in the regional sphere that 
the role of RIIs, also known as RECs, manifests itself – they transform policy made at the 
regional level by implementing it.  Much of this policy execution revolves around 
coordinating, harmonizing and implementing policies aimed at increasing cooperation 
between the cooperating groups of states often with the objective of establishing a Free Trade 
Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market, an Economic Union and/or ultimately a Political 
Union.  Each of the above levels of integration requires their own distinct level of 
commitment and degree of harmonization of policies on the part of member countries of the 
RII.   
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The execution of policy occurs within organisational structures where the different steps are 
divided into specialized roles and functions.  At the national level, the relevant institution is 
the department of foreign affairs or any other department charged with regional integration 
matters.  At the regional/international level, it is the international governmental institution 
established by the member states which thus serves as the administrative agent of all member 
states (Auriacombe & De Giorgi, 2000:13). 
 
RIIs serve a useful function in channelling a portion of state interactions and in providing 
vehicles for increased co-operation.  Their main function is to make cooperation possible in 
virtually all spheres of life through international public administration.  Such cooperation 
could have specific advantages for states.  In many cases, RIIs are not only the place where a 
decision can be made, but also provide the administrative infrastructure to implement the 
decisions.  They further create channels of communication which states can utilize in their 
own and in the common interest.  In conflict situations, views can be aired and influence used 
in an attempt to avoid serious consequences.  Member states are free to take their disputes to 
the RII for discussion and for a ruling, and if a certain member state does not do so, fellow 
members can.  The decisions of the RIIs can be either accepted or rejected since RIIs can 
normally not enforce decisions on their own.  All in all RIIs have become indispensable 
instruments within the international system.   
 
 
2.2 RATIONALE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
According to Kebret (2000:3), irrespective of the type of integration established, all have the 
following common ultimate objectives:  they all seek to benefit from trade creation, 
economies of scale, product differentiation and efficiency gains through policy coordination 
that follow implementation of regional integration agreements.  Regional integration is also 
expected to reduce vulnerability to external shocks induced by fluctuations, instability and 
uncertainty in the rest of the world.  Such a process is motivated by the recognition that 
national economic welfare could be enhanced in a more efficient way through such 
partnership than by adopting unilateral policy at each country level.   
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Other non-economic objectives of regional integration, as outlined by Schiff and Winters 
(2003:6-9), include the desire by governments to bind themselves to better policies e.g. 
democracy, desire to help neighbouring countries stabilize and prosper to avoid spillovers of 
unrest and population, the fear of being left out while the rest of the world is swept into 
regionalism either because this would be actually harmful to the excluded countries or just 
because of the perception that “if everyone else is doing it, shouldn’t we?”   
 
In the specific case of regional integration in Africa, Kebret (2000:6) argues that there are 
several reasons that have propelled governments of African countries to establish RIIs.  These 
include the recognition that their respective economies were small in size, with poor 
infrastructure, vulnerable to external shocks and dependent on limited primary commodities 
for exports.   African countries thus see regional integration as a means for successful 
structural transformation of African economies.  Additionally, in recent years, the formation 
and reasonable success of many regional blocs in other parts of the world (in Asia, Europe 
North America and Latin American countries), the end of the cold war, the implementation of 
more liberal national economic policies across the continent and the rapid globalization of 
production, distribution and investment activities, have given further impetus to integration at 
the regional and continental levels.  This is widely seen as a way to avoid further economic 
marginalization of the African region.  Cultural ties and colonial heritage have also largely 
dictated the basis of the cooperation as in the case of the EAC in East Africa and SADC in 
Southern Africa.   
 
The UN Economic Commission for Africa (2006:2-6), on the other hand highlights four main 
reasons that have driven African countries to establish or strengthen RIIs.  Firstly, in the last 
twenty years there have been changes in the world trading system which has seen the general 
consensus that free trade is good for growth.  The transformation of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade into the World Trade Organisation also saw a significant reduction in 
tariff and non tariff barriers resulting in rich economies pursuing bilateral trade liberalization 
with poor ones.  These changes have resulted in greater integration of world markets and 
increased world trade.  Indeed, the Commission notes that since the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations in1995, world trade increased by 25%, twice as fast as production.  This rapid 
expansion has been facilitated by developments in information and communication 
technology, liberalization of financial markets and factor movements across national and 
regional borders.  Countries’ and regions’ responses to these new opportunities have to some 
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degree determined their share of the benefits.  Africa’s share has been relatively small; in the 
early 1960s Africa accounted for as much as 10% of world exports, by 2000 its share had 
declined to about 2%.   Among the factors contributing to this decline are restrictions in 
market access in the major economies, limited intra-African trade-a result of weak regional 
integration, small domestic markets that do not provide enough opportunities for firms to 
learn or enough cushion for the export sector during shocks in the international market.  The 
realization that a larger African market would provide opportunities for firms to compete 
effectively in the international arena led to appreciation for need for deeper regional 
integration and hence the establishment or strengthening of RIIs.  Further the nature of some 
WTO negotiations and their requirement that African countries negotiate as a group have 
promoted the establishment of RIIs. 
 
Secondly, there is globalization which is seen by African policymakers and leaders as 
increasingly marginalizing the African continent.  Globalization is characterized by an 
accelerated pace of interdependence and connectivity and aided by innovations in 
communication technology.  Cross-border movements of goods, services and finance are 
estimated the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to be over US$1.5 trillion 
worth of currency transactions per day, an amount equal to more than twice the total foreign 
exchange reserves of all governments (UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2006:4).  
These transactions greatly reduce the ability of governments to intervene in foreign exchange 
markets to stabilize their currencies, manage their economies and maintain fiscal autonomy.  
Weak African economies have fared very poorly under this new regime.  The renewed 
emphasis on regional integration reflects attempts by African leaders to stem this 
marginalization.   
 
Thirdly, the success of the European Union has also driven African governments to establish 
or strengthen RIIs.  The European Union today accounts for over 41% of world trade and is 
Africa’s largest trading Partner (UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2006:5).  Further the 
recent requirement by the European Union to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with regional integration communities is likely to have a significant impact on 
regional integration in Africa. 
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Fourthly, unilateral initiatives by the major economies are another recent development that 
has seen the establishment of RIIs in Africa.  The best known initiative is the United States 
(US) African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) whose objective is to provide African 
exports improved access to the US market on a nonreciprocal basis.    There are also several 
other new initiatives between Africa and its major trading partners that are likely to drive the 
continent’s integration agenda in the short to medium plan such as the plan to establish the 
United States and the Southern Africa Customs Union, negotiations between the European 
Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the free trade agreement 
negotiated between South Africa and the European Union, the Tokyo Initiative for 
Cooperation for Africa’s Development and the Chinese Africa Forum.  Some countries’ self 
interest is also driving regional integration.  South Africa for example has successfully 
negotiated a free trade agreement with the European Union and is negotiating similar 
arrangements with China, India and MERCOSUR. 
 
States are thus inclined to try to establish RIIs because they have to cooperate in so many 
fields at present, have to make adaptations, have to try to accommodate one another, must 
make compromises to promote their own and communal interests, must try to solve problems 
across boundaries and must try to avoid conflict.  As a result they will also try to make use of 
such institutions.  Indeed, Auriacombe and De Giorgi (2006:22), observe that because the 
world trend indicates a greater need for contact, and because problems will become more 
diverse and complex, it can be expected that the role of RIIs and consequently, also that of 
international public administration, will become more important rather than less so in future.   
 
 
2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION INSTITUTIONS 
 
Regional integration institutions (RIIs) are international governmental institutions that have 
been assigned the specific function of coordinating, harmonizing and implementing policies 
meant to increase the level of interactions among a group of countries with regard to 
economic, security, political and even socio-cultural issues often with the long term objective 
of establishing a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market, an Economic Union 
and/or ultimately a Political Union.   
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RIIs have specific distinct characteristics especially with regards to their formation (which is 
inter-state and voluntary), structure, autonomy, functions and nature of workforce among 
others. 
 
Interstate basis: RIIs are created on an international basis and therefore have governmental 
sanction.  They are created by way of multilateral agreements that normally result in a 
founding document, which usually describes the structure, functions and powers of the 
various organisational components and the mutual relations between the various components.  
Such document could have different names such as treaty, constitution, convention, articles 
of agreement, general agreement, statute, founding document or constituent agreement.  Thus 
in essence the membership of a RIIs must be derived from two or more sovereign states. 
 
Voluntary basis:  RIIs are established on a voluntary basis.  Only states which prefer to 
become members, do so, provided that their application for membership is accepted.  
Similarly, states can terminate the membership voluntarily – in fact, as Auriacombe and De 
Giorgi (2006:30) note, “they remain members only for so long as they wish”.  States, can 
however, also be suspended for various reasons usually stipulated in the founding document. 
 
Permanent Organisational Structure:  In order to function continuously, RIIs have a formal, 
fixed structure the nature of which may differ from one institution to another.  Provision for 
this is made in the founding document.  The organisational structure usually consists of a 
policy making organ, an executive organ and an administrative organ.  Some RIIs also have 
their own judicial organ. 
 
Autonomy:  The autonomy of RIIs arises from their power to make decisions and from their 
organisational structure.  According to Auriacombe and De Giorgi (2006:33), autonomy 
exists in the sense that decisions can be made which need not be identical to the sum total of 
the decisions of the individual member states.  This is possible because the member states 
either participate in the decision-making process or give to the RII a distinctive organisational 
component which enables it determine policy within its sphere of authority.  The autonomy 
of RIIs is however limited.  Normally, their functions are also demarcated.  Just as these 
institutions are created through voluntary cooperation, they also have to rely on voluntary 
cooperation to attain their objectives.  Where RIIs act directly, their authority (which is 
usually for strictly defined objectives) is derived from member states.  Because the 
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governments of member states have to accept the ultimate responsibility for the 
implementation of the decisions of RIIs, such governments tend to keep a very close eye on 
the decisions concerned.  The autonomy of RIIs is also limited when it comes to budget 
matters.  Often RIIs have few or no resources other than those that are made available by 
member states through annual contributions.  If members do not pay their contributions, they 
are often powerless although in some cases their founding documents provide for disciplinary 
action such as deprivation of the right to vote.  Thus as far as autonomy of RIIs is concerned, 
it can be said that the institution normally does not have a will of its own, and can thus, not 
enforce its decisions. 
 
Cooperative function:  The functions assigned to a RIIs are contained in its founding 
document, which indicate the RII’s powers and sphere of influence.  However, the 
fundamental mission of all RIIs is the administration of cooperation between member states 
in various spheres so that the functions laid down in its founding document can be performed 
with a view to the attainment of a common objective.  These objectives often vary from the 
establishment of a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market, Monetary Union 
and/or Political Federation of the member states.  In the process, the harmonization of 
policies of member states must be encouraged.  This involves the search for solutions to 
conflict situations which could arise in the economic, political, socio-cultural or even 
technical areas.  The operational activities by the RIIs themselves are undertaken in 
cooperation with the government of member states.   
 
Auriacombe and De Giorgi (2006:34), highlight the cooperative role of RIIs by observing 
that in many cases RIIs are not only the places where decisions to cooperate are made but 
they are also the institutions by means of which these decisions are implemented.  
Cooperation is further facilitated by the fact that RIIs can provide governments with many 
channels of communication through which to address problems which may arise.  In conflict 
situations, RIIs are the places where opinions can be expressed by the parties involved.  At 
the same time, they provide the other members with the opportunity to exercise their 
influence formally, and also informally, in an attempt to settle a dispute.  In other situations, 
where conflicts of interest do not really occur, as in the case of functional matters, 
cooperation is facilitated by the existence of RIIs.  Mutual agreements are reached which can 
be beneficial to all members.  Agreements in the fields of, for example, health and postal 
services can hardly be detrimental to any member. 
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Neutrality:  RIIs come into being for the purpose of pursuing the common interest of its 
members and are thus expected to be neutral.  Since their existence depends on retaining the 
support of an effective majority of member states, they run the risk of endangering their 
expected characteristic of neutrality if they identify with any state or group of states.  As a 
result, RIIs do not serve the express purpose of pursuing the interests of only one member.  
Staff of a RII, therefore have to give effect to the collective will of the majority of member 
states, as contained in decisions and resolutions.  They serve the community of states and 
must be loyal to all the member states and therefore to the RII and not to their homeland.   
 
Unique workforce:  According to Auriacombe and De Giorgi (2006:61-62), the staff of RIIs 
are international public servants and this bestows on them four unique characteristics.  
Firstly, the guideline of loyalty is regarded as a critical aspect.  The staff of RIIs must give up 
their national loyalty and must serve the interests of the RII only.  Associated with this is the 
fact that as international public officials, they may not receive any instructions from home 
governments or from any person or institution outside the RII or in any way try to represent 
the interests of their home governments.  Secondly, staff of RIIs are expected to be impartial.  
As international public officials they are supposed to be administrators and not politicians.  
Their function is to implement decisions conscientiously that were taken elsewhere, and, if 
possible, to avoid involvement in controversies that arise from the RII’s decisions.  They 
must be apolitical in the sense that they must voluntarily implement all decisions which have 
been taken by the political-organisational components of the RII.   
 
Thirdly, staff of a RII are independent.  The assumption is that, if an international public 
secretariat seeks to maintain its independence, it must consist of career public officials who 
have a high degree of occupational security.  They should be given work contracts of such a 
nature that they feel that, if they promote the interests of the institution, they will be protected 
against retribution or even dismissal arising out of political considerations.  It is thus common 
for staff of RIIs to be accorded diplomatic immunity in the course of their duties.  Fourthly, is 
the multinational nature of the workforce of RIIs.  This arises out of the requirement for 
geographical representation in the recruitment policies of all RIIs.  The rationale underlying 
the requirement of geographical representation is that the RIIs are a joint effort of member 
states and that citizens of all member states must be able to serve as international public 
officials.  
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2.4 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA 
 
The Abuja Treaty stipulates that African States must endeavour to strengthen the RIIs in 
particular by coordinating, harmonizing and progressively integrating their activities in order 
to attain the African Economic Community which would gradually be put in place during a 
thirty-four (34) year transition period subdivided into six (6) varying stages (UN Economic 
Commission for Africa, 1999:53).  At the end of the first stage, which ended in May 1999 
and which was characterized by the strengthening of the institutional framework of the 
existing RIIs and the creation of new ones where none existed, the Conference of Heads of 
States of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) selected eight (8) RIIs which, with 
coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration of activities, would in 2028 lead to 
the materialization of the African Common Market.  These eight RIIs are: (i) the East African 
Community (EAC); (ii) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); (iii) 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); (iv) the Common Market of 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); (v) the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD); (vi) the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); (vii) the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC); and (viii) the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).   
 
2.4.1 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  
 
ECOWAS is a regional group of 153 West African states that was founded by a Treaty 
establishing the Economic Community of West African States in 1975.  The main objectives 
of ECOWAS are to promote cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural 
activity, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through 
the total integration of the national economies of the member states (Department of 
Economic Affairs, African Union, 2008:6).  So far, ECOWAS has recorded several 
achievements in as far as regional integration is concerned.  These include the abolition of 
visas and entry permits for member state citizens, introduction of the ECOWAS passport, 
introduction of the Brown Card Motor Vehicle Insurance scheme to facilitate road transport 
within the ECOWAS region, the introduction of harmonized customs documents and the 
establishment of several institutions such as the Commission, the Community Parliament, 
                                                 
3 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.   
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Community Court of Justice as well as a host of other financial and specialized institutions 
such as the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), the West African 
Health Organisation (WAHO), the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) and the West 
African Monetary Institute (WAMI).   
 
Despite its achievements, ECOWAS has also experienced several shortcomings.  For 
example, though formed primarily as a regional trade pact, it has taken on an increasing 
regional security role with the emergence of failed states in West Africa.  During the 1990s, 
ECOWAS peacekeepers were deployed in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and were deployed 
again in Liberia in 2003 after the departure of President Charles Taylor.  According to 
Jonathan (2004:1), in the past decade, ECOWAS has been the African RII that has been most 
active - although not always most effective - in the field of conflict resolution.  Further 
despite its achievement in establishing certain institutions to aid the regional integration 
process, the Department of Economic Affairs, African Union (2008:10), notes that “the 
strength of these institutions are yet to be seen”. 
 
Ichim (2007:2-3), notes that ECOWAS was created with the purpose to become the most 
important international economic instrument for economic co-operation and development in 
West Africa.  Thus, it was envisioned to achieve elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
among member states and ultimately to form an economic union, of course after going 
through the important stages of economic integration, namely, Free-Trade Area, Customs 
Union, Common Market and Economic Union.  He notes further that the goal of a Monetary 
Union in ECOWAS has long been an objective of the organisation, being intended to 
accompany a broader integration process including enhanced regional trade and common 
institutions but that although there have been attempts to advance the agenda of ECOWAS 
monetary cooperation, political problems and other economic priorities have slowed down 
the process. 
 
Bach (1997), points out that the experience of ECOWAS’s first 20 years seems to indicate 
that ECOWAS has reached a state of paralysis in virtually every area of endeavour.  For 
example he observes that twenty years after the 16 member states of ECOWAS signed the 
Lagos Charter, official intraregional trade still represents an insignificant portion of total 
exports.  Also the plan, adopted in 1983, to create a single monetary union by 1994 had made 
no progress by July 1992, when the target was changed to the year 2000.  Likewise the 
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protocols on the freedom of movement, residency and rights of establishment for ECOWAS 
citizens have also suffered a series of setbacks since their implementation began in 1979.  By 
1992, the seven ratifications required to implement the final phase had still not been obtained, 
2 years after the deadline. 
 
2.4.2 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
SADC is a regional grouping of 154 Southern Africa states.  SADC had a security function 
from the beginning.  At the time it was founded in July 1979 (originally known as the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and later changing to 
SADC in 1992), apartheid South Africa was a participant in a number of regional conflicts, 
and the intent of SADC’s founders was to provide collective security as well as reducing 
economic dependence on South Africa.  It had its moments - for instance, when a Zimbabwe-
led intervention force halted the RENAMO offensive of 1986 - but wasn’t remarkably 
successful at either (Jonathan, 2004:1).  Since the end of the apartheid era, SADC has 
undergone a radical realignment, with South Africa becoming its de facto leader rather than 
its primary target.  Among the main objectives of SADC are to achieve development and 
economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of 
Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.  Other 
objectives include evolving common political values systems and institutions, promoting and 
defending peace and security; as well as strengthening and consolidating the long-standing 
historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region.   
 
With the major regional power South Africa on board, SADC’s security and economic 
functions have become somewhat more effective; the member states in 2007 established a 
standby peacekeeping force, and the organisation has had some success in mediating conflicts 
in the Comoros and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Further, more than two thirds of 
SADC protocols on regional integration have entered into force and most substantive 
provisions of the regional integration policy are in the various degrees under implementation.  
For example in terms of infrastructure, SADC has made achievements in the building and 
rehabilitation of transport link between its  members states, further with regard to trade, 
                                                 
4 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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SADC intends to achieve a Free Trade Area by end of 2008 as well as establish a SADC 
Customs Union by 2010 (Department of Economic Affairs, African Union, 2008:32-37).        
 
Despite its achievements, SADC also has its share of challenges.  For example, since it plans 
to have a Free Trade Area in the cause of this year, and a Customs Union in the year 2010, it 
must have a strategy in order to accomplish it on time.  Further, the Customs Union can only 
come into place only when there is a full Free Trade Area which is currently not the case.  It 
is important to note also that within SADC there is also SACU, which is at an advanced state 
of integration being already a Customs Union.  There is thus a need to get all the SADC 
member states to the level of that Customs Union.  Some SADC member states are also 
members of COMESA, which plans to have its own Customs Union in the year 2008.  WTO 
rules stipulate that countries cannot belong to more than one Customs Union at the same RII 
therefore posing a challenge to countries that are members of both SADC and COMESA as 
well as in the case of Tanzania which is already a member of the EAC Customs Union.   
 
Jonathan (2004:1), notes that with regard to its objective of ensuring peace in the region, 
SADC has been relatively timorous about flexing its political muscle; an example is the 
ongoing meltdown in Zimbabwe.  Further, the Xenophobic attacks in South Africa where 
black South Africans turned against foreigners from other parts of the world and particularly 
from fellow SADC member states of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, goes against the SADC 
objective of consolidating the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links 
among the people of the region. 
 
2.4.3 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
 
ECCAS is a regional grouping of 105 Central African states.  It was founded in 1983 with the 
main objective of achieving collective autonomy, raising the standard of living of its 
populations and maintaining economic stability through harmonious cooperation with the 
ultimate goal of establishing a Central African Common Market (Department of Economic 
Affairs, African Union, 2008:26).  ECCAS became operational in 1985 but was largely 
dormant until 1998 due to lack of funds and constant conflicts in its member states which 
handicapped it.  In the past few years, however, the ECCAS countries have begun to phase in 
                                                 
5 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Demoractic Republic of Congo, 
Equitorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe 
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free trade and have created a number of technical and development institutions.  A brigade-
strength standby force agreed to in 2001 has begun to get off the ground and is intended to 
reduce member states’ dependence on mercenaries and paramilitary forces (Jonathan, 
2004:1).   
 
Among the main achievements of ECCAS is the creation by its member states of the Council 
for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) with the aim of promoting, maintaining 
and consolidating peace and security in Central Africa.  COPAX entered into force in January 
2004.  The COPAX Protocol set up two important mechanisms: the Multinational Peace 
Keeping Force in Central Africa (FOMAC) and the Central African Early-Warning System 
(MARAC).  According to the Department of Economic Affairs, African Union (2008:27), 
however, both mechanisms have been largely ineffective.  Conflicts have continued 
uncontrollably among ECCAS member states, while funding to the organisation has shown 
little result.   
 
Despite the challenges facing ECCAS, the institution continues to pursue new projects.  One 
recent endeavour is a joint European Union (EU) and ECCAS project that is aimed at 
supporting the organisation’s Department of Human Integration, Peace, Stability and Security 
in fulfilling its role of detection, prevention and management of conflict within the Central 
African region.  Other programmes being pursued by ECCAS include trade liberalization, 
free movement of persons, goods and capital, infrastructure development in transport and 
communications.  Further ECCAS intends to establish a Customs Union in 2008. 
 
Among the shortcomings and challenges facing ECCAS are perennial conflicts in its member 
states and inadequate funding.  It is also left to be seen whether ECCAS’s objective of 
establishing a Customs Union by this year will materialize given that its member states have 
not yet harmonized their common external tariff nor have they removed non-tariff barriers or 
harmonized their customs documents.  Further, Rwanda, one of the founding member states 
quit ECCAS in June 2007 in favour of the EAC.  Like Rwanda, Burundi also joined the EAC, 
leaving is attachment to ECCAS in doubt.  The Democratic Republic of Congo, on the other 
hand is embracing membership of both ECCAS and the SADC.  Withdrawals and divided 
loyalties pose a significant threat to the viability of ECCAS.  
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2.4.4 Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CENSAD) 
 
CENSAD was created in 1998 and consists of 246 countries in the Maghreb, the Sahel and 
the horn of Africa.  The main objective of CENSAD is to create a comprehensive economic 
union of its member states.  Among CENSAD’s achievements include its Strategy developed 
in 2007 which covers food security, poverty eradication, water management and 
desertification.  In liaison with AMU and UEMOA, CENSAD has also designed a 
community-based programme to counteract desertification.  On peace and security, CENSAD 
played a key role in bringing Sudan and Chad together during the Sudan/Chad conflict.  
CENSAD has also launched the trade liberalization process as well as the process for the free 
movement of people; in this regard it has developed draft conventions in Free Trade Area and 
convention on Common Market on Agriculture sector (Department of Economic Affairs, 
African Union, 2008:55-57). 
 
With Nigeria and Egypt as members, CENSAD contains two heavyweights and is a potential 
bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.  According to Jonathan (2004:1), in 
practice, however, neither Egypt nor Nigeria has been an active participant, and such 
programs as CENSAD has instituted have primarily been vehicles for Libyan hegemony.  
The CENSAD Development Bank and the organisation itself are headquartered in Tripoli, 
and the pact’s sole regional security operation to date has been a widely criticized Libyan-led 
mission in the Central African Republic.   
 
2.4.5 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 
COMESA was initially established in 1981 as the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (PTA).  The PTA was transformed into COMESA in 1994 with the main 
objective of creating a full free trade area guaranteeing the free movement of goods and 
services produced within COMESA and the removal of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers with 
the ultimate objective of creating an economic community.  With 197 member countries with 
a total population of US$400 million covering an area of 12.89 million Km and a GDP of 
                                                 
6 Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Togo and Tunisia. 
 
7 Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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US$230 billion, COMESA is the largest of the regional groupings in Africa (Department of 
Economic Affairs, African Union, 2008:18). 
  
Among the achievements of COMESA are elimination of tariffs among COMESA countries 
which has resulted in the growth of intra-COMESA trade from US$3.1 billion in 2000 to 
US$6.8 billion in 2006 – an increase of 119.4 %.  Further, the focus of COMESA in year 
2008 is the launch of the Customs Union in December.  This will be yet another step in the 
integration agenda after the region attained Free Trade Area status in October 2000.  The Free 
Trade Area that initially started with nine member states has expanded to include fourteen of 
the nineteen member states.  Of the key steps towards the establishment of the Customs 
Union, COMESA has finalised the elaboration of a Common Tariff nomenclature, adopted a 
common customs valuation system, elaborated a common commercial policy including 
common customs rules and procedures, elaborated a common external tariff and established a 
legal framework and administrative structure for the management of the Customs Union. 
 
Despite its achievements, COMESA is faced with the challenge of ensuring that all its 
member states that are not yet participating in the Free Trade Area (FTA) join the FTA before 
the launch of the COMESA Customs Union in December 2008.  Other challenges are 
highlighted by Elsawie (2000:2), who notes that despite the COMESA Charter and signed 
agreements stating that member states were to eliminate all tariffs between themselves by 
October 1, 2000, progress reports show that only Egypt, Kenya and Madagascar have made 
90% reductions so far.  Other countries have not introduced any kind of tariff reductions.  
Further, the Secretariat of COMESA has also pointed out that gross violations by member 
states have occurred especially against Article 46 of the Charter, which states that no member 
country shall raise its tariffs on inter-trade with COMESA member states.  In reality however, 
many countries have raised their tariffs substantially in their trade with fellow COMESA 
member states.  Evidently, economic cooperation and integration between the COMESA 
member states will not be an easy task.   
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2.4.6 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
 
IGAD is a regional grouping of six8 countries in the Horn of Africa that was created in 1996 
to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that 
was founded in 1986.  Though IGADD was originally established for the main purpose of 
developing a regional approach for drought control in the region, the revitalised IGAD that 
was launched in 1996 was given expanded objectives of regional cooperation.  Among the 
main objectives of IGAD include promotion of joint strategies and harmonization of macro-
economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields, 
harmonization of policies in trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture and 
natural resources, promotion of free movement of goods, services and people within the 
region, creating an enabling environment for foreign, cross border and domestic trade and 
investment, development of coordinated and complementary infrastructure in the areas of 
transport, telecommunications and energy in the region, promotion of peace and stability in 
the region and achieving regional food security (Department of Economic Affairs, African 
Union, 2008:42). 
  
Since its establishment, IGAD has recorded several achievements the main ones being 
establishment of effective and efficient mechanisms networks, processes, specialized 
institutions and partnerships for the execution of its regional activities.  For example 
specialized institutions established include the Conflict Early Warning and Response 
Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD Business Forum, East Africa Standby Brigade and the IGAD 
Climate Predication and Application Centre for Monitoring and Forecasting (ICPAC) 
(Department of Economic Affairs, African Union, 2008:42).  
 
Among the shortcomings of IGAD is that it has failed to achieve food security for the peoples 
of the horn of Africa.  This can be attributed to insufficient agricultural technology, lack of 
low level infrastructure and lack of proper storage facilities for produce all of which are 
challenges that IGAD needs to work on.  Further, IGAD’s objective of peace and stability in 
the region seems to be a mirage due to the intra-state conflicts in its member states of Sudan, 
Uganda and Somali and inter-state conflict between its member states such as that between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.  IGAD needs to sort out these conflicts as they derail the growth of the 
                                                 
8 Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. 
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economies of IGAD member states.  Further members of IGAD also belong to COMESA 
hence here is need of coherence and avoidance of duplication of objectives. 
 
2.4.7 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
 
AMU is a regional grouping of five9 Arab countries in northern Africa that was established in 
1989.  AMU was originally formed principally to enable its members to negotiate with the 
EU when it declared a single European Market and to encourage trade and economic 
cooperation by allowing freedom of movement across frontiers.  The main objectives of the 
AMU treaty are to strengthen all forms of ties among member states. As well as to gradually 
introduce free circulation of goods, services and factors of production among them.  The 
union proclamation states that the creation of the bloc was a step towards the eventual unity 
of all Arab states (Department of Economic Affairs, African Union, 2008:38-39). 
 
Among the achievements of AMU include electricity inter-connection among the five 
member states, establishment of a joint groundwater monitoring system for the Sahara, the 
Albian Aquiver Systems shared by three member states (Algeria, Libya and Tunisia) and the 
establishment of a Union of Maghrebine Banks in Tunis.   
 
The main shortcomings and challenges of AMU include an absence of harmonization of 
standards which hampers the establishment of the proposed Free Trade Area.  Further, 
AMU’s objective to have free movement of factors of production and goods within an 
economic space may be difficult to achieve as the region has not harmonised its social, 
cultural and environmental policies.   There is also tendency for some member states to be 
willing to sign agreements outside the same region but find it difficult to sign similar 
agreement amongst themselves.  For example Morocco signed a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) with the US in 2004 and has also signed several agreements with the European Union 
on economic cooperation and one establishing a free trade zone for industrial goods 
(Department of Economic Affairs, African Union, 2008:40). 
 
 
                                                 
9 Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. 
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The above overview of RIIs in Africa shows that all RIIs have made some achievements, 
however, it also reveals that all the RIIs have not effectively achieved their objectives and the 
speed in terms of the implementation of their programmes is still very slow.   This is further 
collaborated by several studies that have been carried out to assess the performance of 
regional blocks in Africa.  Among such studies are those of Foroutan and Pritchett (1993); 
Ogunkola (1994); Elbadawi (1997); and Lyakurwa et al. (1997).  Though the results of the 
studies slightly vary, the general conclusion seems to be similar; that the experience of RIIs 
in Africa has been a failure in achieving their objectives.  Fouroutan and Pritchett (1993) for 
example observe that despite the proliferation of RIIs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the past 
two decades many of which were specifically created to boost trade among the countries in 
the region, intra SSA trade is still very limited and has hardly grown over time. 
 
Asante (1995:53-54), further captures these sentiments by arguing that although RIIs which 
have been established in Africa are expected to play a vital role in the socio-economic 
transformation of the African economies and help alleviate poverty through sustained 
recovery and growth, there is the striking contradiction between general emphasis on the need 
for economic integration in Africa and the scanty evidence of practical success.  Indeed, in 
his view, evidence tends to suggest that to date none of the economic groupings has made any 
appreciable progress towards the all-engaging objective of creating a sub-regional economic 
market, let alone an economic community, despite the human and financial resources 
deployed.  For example, no significant progress has as yet been made on industrial and fiscal 
harmonization which is an important objective of the treaties establishing these institutions.   
 
Further, the main objectives set out in the Final Act of Lagos in 1980 in the field of 
promotion of cooperation at the sectoral level are yet to be achieved.  There is also generally 
a lack of harmonization of sectoral policies in agriculture, industry, transport, energy etc., and 
more basic studies for the formulation of such policies are urgently required.  Besides, much 
more still needs to be done in designing and elaborating agricultural and industrial 
programming policies in many of the African integration groupings.  Common rules 
governing foreign direct investment such as those concerning investment incentives are 
maters still under discussion (Asante, 1995: 53-54).   
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In effect, Asante (1995:53), argues that the necessary policy guidelines and programmes for 
sub-regional industrial development have not been put in place.  As a result, most integration 
groupings in Africa have not been able to successfully promote the establishment of major 
multinational industrial projects, for example.  Asante thus concludes that despite great 
expectations, the existing regional integration schemes have still not been able to make 
positive steps towards achieving their pre-established goals.   
 
The objectives that RIIs in Africa have been mandated to achieve are noble objectives which 
if properly implemented have the potential of transforming the African continent into a 
economic and political powerhouse.  It is thus imperative to establish the reasons behind the 
ineffectiveness of RIIs in achieving their objectives. 
 
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
 
In summary, RIIs are international governmental institutions established by groups of states 
(often geographically close to each other and/or sharing common problems) for purposes of 
safeguarding or promoting issues of common interest to the states concerned.  The key 
reasons for the formation of RIIs is the desire by states to benefit from trade creation, 
economies of scale, product differentiation and efficiency gains through policy coordination 
that follow implementation of regional integration agreements.  Other reasons include desire 
to reduce vulnerability to external shocks induced by fluctuations, instability and uncertainty 
in the rest of the world, the desire by governments to bind themselves to better policies e.g. 
democratic policy making, desire to help neighbouring countries stabilize and prosper to 
avoid spillovers of unrest and population and the fear of being left out while the rest of the 
world is swept into regionalism. 
 
RIIs have got several unique characteristics: they are created by way of multilateral 
agreements; thus in essence the membership of a RII must be derived from two or more 
sovereign states.  Further, their establishment is voluntary in that only states which prefer to 
become members, do so; similarly, states can terminate the membership if they wish.  RIIs 
also have a formal and fixed structure.  They also have limited autonomy in that they have to 
rely on voluntary cooperation to attain their objectives.  Where RIIs act directly, their 
authority (which is usually for strictly defined objectives) is derived from member states.  
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Another unique characteristic is in their fundamental mission which is the administration of 
cooperation between member states in various spheres.  RIIs are also neutral; they come into 
being for the purpose of pursuing the common interest of all members and thus do not 
identify with the interests of only one member or group of members.  Lastly RIIs have a 
unique multi-national workforce who are required to give up their national loyalty and only 
serve the interests of the RII.   
 
Several RIIs have been established in Africa, the main ones being: the EAC; ECOWAS; 
ECCAS; COMESA; CEN-SAD; IGAD; SADC; and the AMU.  All these RIIs are working 
towards some form of economic, social, cultural and political integration of their respective 
member states. Whereas an overview of RIIs in Africa shows that all RIIs have made some 
achievements, it also reveals that all the RIIs have not effectively achieved their objectives 
and the speed in terms of the implementation of their programmes is still very slow.   The 
general conclusion by most scholars is that the experience of RIIs in Africa has been a failure 
in achieving their objectives. This is certainly a cause for concern.  The objectives that RIIs in 
Africa have been mandated to achieve are noble objectives which if properly implemented 
have the potential of transforming the African continent into an economic and political 
powerhouse.  It is thus imperative to establish the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of RIIs 
in achieving their objectives and possibly come up with recommendations on how they can 
be able to undertake their mandate effectively. 
 
In the next chapter, an overview of the EAC is undertaken.  This includes a brief history of 
the EAC, its objectives, fundamental and operational principles as well as the organs and 
institutions that make up the institution.  An overview of the EAC’s performance since its 
establishment is also undertaken.  In this regard, the EAC’s achievements and shortcomings 
are highlighted as well as possible reasons for the institution’s shortcomings.   
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Chapter Three 
 
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The East African Community is a regional intergovernmental organisation having its 
headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania with the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda 
and the United Republic of Tanzania as Partner States.  The Treaty for the Establishment of 
the EAC was signed by the founder three Partner States: Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania on 30th 
November 1999 and entered into force on 7th July 2000 following its ratification by the three 
states.  The Republics of Rwanda and Burundi were granted full membership of the EAC on 
1st July 2007 after signing the treaty of accession thereby bringing the total number of Partner 
States in the EAC to five.  The EAC’s mandate is to spearhead regional integration in the 
EAC region (East African Community, 2009:1).   
 
Figure 1: Map of East African Community Partner States 
 
 
 
Source:  East Africa Map at http://www.computers4africa.org/impact/eastafrica.htm  
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3.2 HISTORY OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY  
 
Regional integration is not a new phenomenon in East Africa; rather the original EAC 
countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have had a long history of cooperation dating back 
to the pre-independence era. For example Kenya and Uganda established a Customs Union in 
1917 which the then Tanganyika joined in 1927.  The three States thereafter established the 
East African High Commission (1948-1961), the East African Common Services 
Organisation (1961-1967) and the East African Community (1967-1977).   The East African 
Community created in 1967 was a showcase not only in Africa but also in the entire world.  
At the height of its performance, the East African Community was recognized as one of the 
world’s models of regional integration.  There was unprecedented interaction among the 
people of the region.  The Community operated common services such as airline; postal and 
telecommunications; power, railways and harbours; several research organisations and a 
literary development centre; among others (Kategaya, 2000:12).  
 
Unfortunately, this success story was not to last and in 1977 the East African Community 
broke up owing largely to political and ideological differences between the Heads of State.  
With that break up, the East African states lost over sixty years of cooperation, notably the 
benefits of constructing economies based on the exploitation of benefits of shared resources, 
economies of scale and leverage in negotiations of trade deals at global level.  Following the 
break up of the Community, each Partner State embarked, at great cost and at lower 
efficiency, upon the establishment of services and industries that had previously been 
provided at the Community level.     
 
Scholars on East African integration (Mugyenyi & Zeija, 2006; Kibua & Tostensen, 2005) 
widely attribute the collapse of the Community in 1977 to three main factors:  
 
(a) The inequitable distribution of costs and benefits among the Partner States. Kenya as 
a result of her strategic location, was more industrialized than the rest, she therefore 
continued to export to other economies of the Community more than Uganda and 
Tanzania.  Kenya dominated the export sector by 90% and Uganda and Tanzania were 
sharing a meagre 10% of the inter country trade.  It is a result of this inequitable 
distribution of benefits that made Tanzania and Uganda to continue viewing the East 
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African Community project as a project by Kenya to “employ” Uganda and Tanzania 
as her trade “agents” for a small “commission” (Mugyenyi & Zeija, 2006: 4). 
 
(b)  The ideological differences between the Partner States. Tanzania adopted socialism as 
a strategy for economic development.  Uganda attempted a mixed ideology of 
socialism and capitalism.  Kenya, because of the influence of white settlers and 
European entrepreneurial influence adopted capitalism as its development ideology.  
It has to be appreciated that this was the period of the cold war and thus the 
ideological conflict was a key factor in the relations of the three states (Kibua & 
Tostensen, 2005:2).   
 
(c)  The personality clashes between the Heads of State of the Partner States after Idi 
Amin’s 1971 military coup in Uganda.  President Nyerere refused to recognize Amin 
as the President of Uganda.  He refused to sit at the same table with Idi Amin whom 
he regarded as a ‘treacherous army leader’ (Kibua & Tostensen, 2005:2).  In 
retaliation, Amin chased away all Tanzanians that were employed in Uganda under 
the EAC.  From then onwards, the EAC Authority, consisting of the three Heads of 
State, never met.  This was disastrous for the Community, since under the EAC 
Treaty of that time, all authority was vested in the Summit in contrast to the current 
Treaty where exclusive authority is largely vested with the Council of Ministers.  This 
incapacitation of the EAC’s decision making Authority eventually led to its collapse.   
 
Following the collapse of the Community in 1977, the three East African countries travelled 
different ways but all arrived at the same destination: that regional integration would benefit 
all the countries.  Therefore, after a several year hiatus, moves were made to revive the 
erstwhile cooperative venture, leading at first to the Nairobi Communiqué of 1991, and two 
years later, to an Agreement re-establishing the EAC Secretariat in 1996.  In November 1999, 
the Heads of States of the EAC Partner States formally re-launched the Treaty establishing 
the East African Community.  This Treaty was subsequently ratified by the three Partner 
States and entered into force in July 2000 (Kibua & Tostensen, 2005:2).  In November 2006, 
the EAC Heads of State granted full membership of the EAC to the Republics of Burundi and 
Rwanda.  The two Republics were officially integrated into the EAC on 1st July 2007 after 
they signed the treaty of accession.   
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The new Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC is intended to provide an appropriate form 
of regional arrangement which should avoid the pitfalls of the previous initiatives.  For 
example, the policy making role has been removed from the Heads of State and given to the 
Council of Ministers.  Also, withdrawal from Membership of the EAC has been made more 
difficult by the requirement in Article 145 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC 
which states that such a proposal must be supported by not less than two-thirds majority of all 
the Members of that Partner State’s National Assemblies.  The running of the EAC is now 
also based on two fundamental principles; namely people-centred and market driven.    
 
The Treaty establishing the EAC was a more serious commitment to the integration process 
and laid the basis for negotiations of a complete trade regime through a Protocol for the 
establishment of a Customs Union whereby all taxes on goods between the EAC Partner 
States were to be removed and a Common External Tariff established.  It also spelt out the 
vision and process for deeper integration through establishment of a Common Market 
whereby full movement of persons, labour, services, capital and the right of residence in the 
Community were to be achieved, subsequently, a Monetary Union whereby Partner States 
would have same macroeconomic policies and use a common currency and eventually a 
Political Federation with common foreign and security policies. 
 
 
3.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
The main objective of the EAC according to Article 5(1) of the Treaty for the Establishment 
of the EAC, is to widen and deepen cooperation among the Partner States in among other 
areas, political, economic, social, cultural, health, education, science and technology, 
defence, security, legal and judicial affairs for their mutual benefit (EAC 2002:12). The 
vision of the EAC is to achieve these objectives through a step by step process beginning 
with the establishment of a Customs Union (which commenced in January 2005 and will 
reach its pinnacle in December 2009), followed by a Common Market, subsequently a 
Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation of the East African states.   
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Figure 2: Key elements of the EAC regional integration process 
 
 
 
Customs Union  Common Market Monetary Union Political Federation 
(Source:  Researcher’s presentation as cited in the text) 
 
To this end, Article 5(3) of the Treaty stipulates the following: 
 
“The Community shall ensure:  
 
a) the attainment of sustainable growth and development of the Partner States by promoting 
a more balanced and harmonious development of the Partner States;  
b) the strengthening and consolidation of co-operation in agreed fields that would lead to 
equitable economic development within and between the Partner States and which would 
in turn, raise the standard of living and improve the quality of life of their populations;  
c) the promotion of sustainable utilization of the natural resource base in the region while 
taking measures that would effectively protect the natural environment of the Partner 
States;  
d) the strengthening and consolidation of the long standing political, economic, social, 
cultural and traditional ties and associations between the peoples of the Partner States so 
as to promote a people-centred mutual development of these ties and associations;  
e) the mainstreaming of gender in all its endeavours and the enhancement of the role of 
women in cultural, social, political, economic and technological development;  
f) the promotion of peace, security and stability within, and good neighbourliness among the 
Partner States;  
g) the enhancement and strengthening of partnerships with the private sector and civil 
society in order to achieve sustainable socio-economic and political development; and 
h) the undertaking of such other activities calculated to further the objectives of the 
Community, as the Partner States may from time to time decide to undertake in common” 
(EAC Secretariat, 2002:13). 
 
Areas of cooperation earmarked by the EAC Treaty include: Trade Liberalization and 
Development; Investment and Industrial Development; Standardization, Quality Assurance, 
Meteorology and Testing; Monetary and Financial Co-operation; Infrastructure and Services; 
 58
Development of Human Resources, Science and Technology; Free Movement of Persons, 
Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence; Agriculture and Food Security; 
Environment and Natural Resource Management; Tourism and Wildlife Management; 
Health, Social and Cultural Activities; Enhancing the Role of Women in Socio-economic 
Development; Political Matters; Legal and Judicial Affairs; the Private Sector and Civil 
Society; and Relations with other Regional and International Institutions and Development 
Partners (EAC Secretariat, 2002:50-99).  
 
 
3.4 FUNDAMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE EAST  
 AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
Closely related to the objectives of the EAC are the fundamental and operational principles 
that are meant to guide the achievement of the objectives.  
 
Article 6 of the Treaty establishing the EAC stipulates that the fundamental principals that 
shall govern the achievement of the objectives of the EAC by the Partner States shall include 
mutual trust, political will and sovereign equality; peaceful co-existence and good 
neighbourliness, peaceful settlement of disputes; good governance including adherence to the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal 
opportunities, gender equality as well as the recognition, promotion and protection of human 
and people’s rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1981); equitable distribution of benefits; and cooperation for mutual benefit 
(EAC Secretariat, 2002:14). 
 
Further, Article 7 of the Treaty establishing the EAC highlights the following operational 
principles as those that shall govern the practical achievement of the objectives of the EAC: 
 
a) People-centred and market-driven cooperation; 
b) Provision by the Partner States of an adequate and appropriate enabling environment, 
such as conducive policies and basic infrastructure;  
c) Establishment of an export oriented economy for the Partner States in which there 
shall be free movement of goods, persons, labour, services, capital, information and 
technology; 
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d) The principle of subsidiarity with emphasis on multi-level participation and the 
involvement of a wide range of stake-holders in the process of integration; 
e) The principle of variable geometry which allows for progression in cooperation 
among groups within the Community for wider integration schemes in various fields 
and at different speeds;  
f) Equitable distribution of benefits accruing to be derived from the operations of the 
Community and measures to address economic imbalances that may arise from such 
operations; 
g) The principle of complementarity; and  
h) The principle of asymmetry (EAC Secretariat, 2002:14). 
 
 
3.5 ORGANS OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
In order to enable it achieve its objectives, Article 9 of the Treaty for the establishment of the 
EAC establishes seven main organs through which the EAC operates. These are: 
 
 The Summit of Heads of State:  This consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 
EAC Partner States.  The Summit’s main function is to give general political direction and 
impetus to the development and achievement of the objectives of the EAC.  The decisions of 
the Summit are based on consensus (Article 12 (3)). 
 
The Council of Ministers:  This is the policy organ of the Community and thus the key 
decision making body of the EAC.  Its decisions are also arrived at on the basis of consensus 
(Article 15 (4)).  What remains unclear is where the Council fails to reach consensus, do the 
gridlocked issues get referred to the Summit?  It consists of the Ministers responsible for 
EAC Affairs of each Partner State and such other Ministers of the Partner States as each 
Partner State shall determine.   Among its functions, the Council promotes, monitors and 
keeps under constant review the implementation of the programmes of the EAC and ensures 
the proper functioning of the regional organisation in accordance with the Treaty.   
 
 The Co-ordination Committee:  This consists of the Permanent Secretaries responsible for 
East African Community Affairs in each Partner States and such other Permanent Secretaries 
of the Partner States as each Partner State may determine.  The Co-ordination Committee’s 
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main function is to submit reports and recommendations on the implementation of the Treaty 
to the Council of Ministers.   
  
Sectoral Committees:  These are established by the Council of Ministers on the basis of the 
recommendations of the Co-ordination Committee which spell out their composition and 
functions.  The Sectoral Committee prepares comprehensive implementation programmes, 
setting out priorities with respect to the various EAC sectors as well as monitors their 
implementation.  The Committee reports to the Coordination Committee. 
  
The East African Court of Justice:  This is the judicial arm of the EAC which ensures the 
adherence to law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty establishing the EAC. 
  
The East African Legislative Assembly:  This is the legislative organ of the EAC.  It consists 
of 9 elected members from each Partner State plus 7 ex-officio members consisting of 
Ministers responsible for EAC Affairs from each Partner State, the Secretary General of the 
EAC and the EAC’s Counsel.  Among its functions, it debates and approves the budget of the 
EAC, enacts legislations, plays oversight role by debating and making recommendations on 
Annual Audit reports on the EAC by the EAC Audit Commission and finally considers 
EAC’s annual reports. 
 
The Secretariat:  This is the executive organ of the Community.  It is headed by a Secretary 
General who is assisted by three Deputy Secretaries General (all of them appointed by the 
Summit); a Director General of Customs and Trade and includes such other officers as may 
be deemed necessary and appointed by the Council.  Among its key functions are 
administration of the implementation of the Treaty which includes implementation of 
programmes for the most appropriate, expeditious and efficient ways of achieving the 
objectives of the EAC; the strategic planning, management and monitoring of programmes 
for the development of the EAC; the coordination and harmonization of the policies and 
strategies relating to the development of the Community and the implementation of decisions 
of the Summit and the Council  (EAC Secretariat, 2002:17-48).   
 
It is also important to note the existing institutions within the EAC framework.  Article 9 
(1)(h) and 9 (2) of the Treaty empower the Summit to establish other organs and institutions 
of the Community.  Institutions of the Community that have so far been established are: the 
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Lake Victoria Basin Commission, the East African Science and Technology Commission, the 
East African Civil Aviation Safety and Oversight Agency, the East African Kiswahili 
Commission and the East African Health Research Commission.  The East African 
Development Bank, the Lake Victoria Fisheries organisations and the Inter University 
Council for East Africa are also, by virtue of Article 9 (3), deemed to be institutions of the 
EAC though their functioning is guided by separate charters and conventions.  However, 
legislation is in the offing to bring the Inter University Council for East Africa directly under 
the realm of the EAC. 
 
From the foregoing information it can be deduced that the organs of the EAC which have 
been given the most important roles in as far as advancing the regional integration process are 
the Summit of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers, since these have a decision 
making role.  The Coordination Committee also plays a crucial role since it is the one which 
submits recommendations on the regional integration process.  These three organs ideally 
represent national interests as they are made up of representatives of the EAC’s Partner 
States.  Incidentally, the EAC Secretariat which is the executive organ and which represents 
regional interests has no decision making power nor can it submit recommendations on the 
regional integration process.  Instead its role is subordinated to implementing regional 
integration projects and programmes as well as implementing decisions of the Summit of 
Heads of State and the Council of Ministers.  Such a structure may not be very ideal for 
enabling effective achievement of the EAC’s goals as it places greater importance on national 
rather than regional interests. 
 
 
3.6 OVERVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY 
  
The re-establishment of the EAC in 1999 was marked with pomp and glitz.  This is not 
surprising since by establishing the EAC, the leaders of the region made a statement that they 
were for a greater ideal – a regional bloc that stood to deliver far much more than their 
nations states could offer individually.  Almost ten years down the line, a fair assessment of 
the performance of the EAC shows that the EAC has performed relatively well in as far as 
meeting some of its key objectives.        
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3.6.1 Achievements of the East African Community 
 
With regard to its objective of widening and deepening economic cooperation among the 
Partner States, trade statistics show that the macro-economic performance of the EAC region 
has truly been remarkable, especially in the past five years.  The EAC Partner States have 
averaged GDP growth of 6% p.a. and this is expected to be higher during fiscal year 
2007/2008.  The EAC Partner States have also achieved macro-economic convergence 
reflected in low inflation levels, stable exchange rates, convertibility of currencies, low 
budget deficits and reasonable reserves   (EAC Secretariat, 2006:5). 
 
Perhaps the most conspicuous achievement of the EAC is the completion of negotiations of 
the Customs Union Protocol, which was signed on 2nd March 2004 and came into effect on 1st 
January 2005.  The EAC thus boasts of a functioning Customs Union.  On the basis of a 
phased-down tariff implementation programme, this Customs Union will culminate into a 
full-fledged zero-rated internal tariff regime in January 2010.  Apart from the South African 
Customs Union, the EAC Customs Union is the only other one in Africa.   
 
Further, because of the Customs Union, intra-EAC trade has increased from US$786.9 
million in 2002 to US$1.46 billion in 2006 hence a growth of 86% in a period of 4 years 
(EAC Secretariat, 2008a:6).  This growth is expected to rise further given the World 
Bank/ADB funded Trade and Transport Facilitation Project that will bring about One-Stop 
Border Posts, juxtapositioning of cross border agencies and joint border operations and 
interconnectivity in the EAC region.  This facility will reduce cross-border transport 
bottlenecks and transaction costs.  
 
The EAC has also been able, as a Customs Union, to agree with the European Union on a 
partial Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) for market access and a development 
component. Similarly, in July 2008, the EAC signed a Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement with the United States of America; a move that could eventually lead to greater 
access to the two sides’ respective markets.   
 
Further, the EAC has commenced on negotiations for the establishment of a Common 
Market, which will be the only one of its kind in the whole of Africa, and the time line for its 
realization is January 2010.  Every effort is currently being put towards the successful 
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completion of negotiations of an EAC Common Market Protocol, the completion of which is 
expected to increase investment in the region as investors will be assured of a single market, 
with free movement of all factors of production and embracing, by then, some 130 million 
consumers with a projected GDP of US$50 billion.   
 
With regard to social and cultural integration of the East African people, the EAC has taken 
several steps for example through the introduction of the East African passport, the Annual 
EAC Schools Essay Writing Competition, unveiling of the EAC flag and organizing some 
regional sporting competitions.  Plans for the introduction of an EAC national anthem are 
also at an advanced stage.  All these steps are contributing in invoking the feeling of East 
African-ness among the peoples of the EAC Partner States. 
 
But what is more crucial to note, is that, because of its performance, the World Trade 
Organisation pronounced, in October 2006, that the EAC is the best illustration of successful 
regional integration on the African continent (EAC Information and Public Relations Office, 
2006:1).   
 
3.6.2 Shortcomings of the East African Community 
 
In spite of the above notable successes that have been achieved since the adoption of the 
Treaty for its establishment in November 1999, a number of shortcomings also broadly stand 
out.  For example, the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Customs Union Protocol 
revealed serious negotiating capacity weaknesses within the EAC Partner States as well as in 
the EAC Secretariat in relation to the complexities of regional trade issues (Chande, 2007:21-
22).  As the EAC engages on new negotiations for the establishment of a Common Market, 
slated for January 2010, the problems caused by negotiating capacity weaknesses within the 
EAC Partner States as well as in the EAC Secretariat are again emerging. 
 
From a broader perspective, the EAC is yet to realize many of its grand objectives as outlined 
in its Treaty.  For example, almost ten years since the adoption of the Treaty establishing the 
EAC, the EAC has yet to develop harmonized policies and laws in a number of areas most 
notably in negotiating as a bloc, establishing a Development Fund to support the promotion 
of infrastructure development, reducing reliance on donor funding, eradicating non-tariff 
barriers in order to make the Customs Union more effective, harmonizing domestic tax laws, 
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implementing strategic infrastructure projects in the areas of roads, railways and energy, 
establishing a Civil Society forum, enhancing the role of women in development, 
development a robust statistical database that captures various economic indicators such as 
intra-EAC trade, to mention a few of the more important shortcomings.   
 
Further, whereas one of the objectives of the EAC is the promotion of peace, security and 
stability with the EAC region, there seems to be a consensus in the print media and in normal 
social discourse that the EAC failed one of its most recent acid tests – the post election 
political crisis in Kenya in which more than 1200 people were killed and 350,000 others 
displaced from their homes over the disputed presidential election results.  The EAC was 
outdone by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) which quickly stepped in to 
find ways to end the violence and seek peace.  The efforts of the two bodies culminated in the 
signing of a Power Sharing National Accord on February 28, 2008 which has resulted in 
relative peace returning to Kenya.  It is important to note that efforts by then EAC 
Chairperson of the Summit, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda did not bear fruit amid 
claims that Ugandan soldiers had helped Kenyan police to quell the violence near the 
common border (Daily Nation, 2008:14). 
 
It is important to note that the unrest in Kenya did not just lead to violence; it also adversely 
affected Kenya’s economy and those of other countries in the EAC region.  For example in 
Uganda the price of petroleum products shot up because supplies could not reach the country.  
Tanzania reported a drastic fall in revenue collection at the Namanga border post.  Rwanda 
too was adversely affected.  Indeed, President Paul Kagame visited Dar-es-Salaam with a 
view to exploring an alternative route through which his country could import goods.  Also 
affected were Burundi, Southern Sudan and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, after rail 
and road transport was partially paralysed by demonstrators who uprooted a section of the 
railway line in Nairobi while others barricaded roads in the Rift Valley.  The crisis in Kenya 
resulted in a general economic decline not only in Kenya but in the other EAC Partner States 
as well as the wider East African region.  It back-tracked gains made in economic 
development which is one of the objectives of the EAC.   
 
Another specific and significant shortcoming is the multiplicity of memberships of the 
Partner States in RIIs.  Four members of the EAC (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda) are 
members of COMESA while one, Tanzania, is a member of SADC.  This is one of the 
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reasons why the EAC has failed to negotiate as a bloc and to garner a more concerted 
political will in support of EAC objectives.  In this context, therefore, the EAC’s integration 
process has suffered.   
 
And precisely because of some of these shortcomings, the EAC Summit of Heads of State 
that met in Nairobi in August 2004 raised concern that the EAC integration was proceeding at 
too slow a pace (Wako Committee, 2004: 1).   
 
 
3.7 EXPLANATIONS ON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY 
 
The highlighted EAC shortcomings and the concerns that have been raised are both indicative 
of the reality that the EAC, as an institution, is not effectively achieving the objectives 
mandated to it.  Several scholars have attempted to analyse the reasons behind the EAC’s 
ineffectiveness in achieving its objectives.  Their findings can be broadly grouped into four 
main categories: economic, socio-cultural, political and geo-political factors.  These are 
briefly discussed below: 
 
3.7.1 Economic factors 
  
The economic challenges facing East African integration are perhaps best captured in the 
Wako Committee Report (2004: 82-84), which highlights some fears expressed by various 
stakeholders in the EAC region regarding integration.  One such fear is the fear of loss of 
investment and employment whereby there is a dominant perception, especially in Tanzania, 
that the country faces potential loss of investment and employment with deepening East 
African integration through possibility of industries and other economic activities, clustering 
in Kenya which has better enabling environment for business in terms of better infrastructure, 
bigger middle class, stronger economy and is more self reliant versus Tanzania and Uganda 
that are more donor dependent;  and potential that free movement of labour may negatively 
impact on employment, especially in Tanzania where educational standards have not kept 
pace with skill needs particularly in the services and hospitality industries.  There is thus the 
fear that jobs in these sectors will be taken up by Kenyans.    
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These fears over economic imbalances have the potential of hindering the EAC’s ability to 
achieve its objectives.  The Ministry of East African Community-Kenya (2005:5), for 
example, notes that perceived economic imbalances between the EAC Partner States which, 
in reality, are at the same level of development dominate and often cripple negotiations under 
the EAC while the same issues take a back seat for these countries in negotiations under the 
wider arrangements like COMESA and SADC.   
 
Another economic factor which acts as a drawback to EAC’s effective achievement of goals 
is lack of adequate financial resources.  Kamala (2006:15), notes that not only does the 
Partner States’ contribution to the EAC budget arrive late, but the contributions also fall far 
short of EAC’s demands.   He further notes that even where there is donor funding for 
regional integration, contributions do not only come with strings attached but also take too 
long to access and are inflexible for short term requirements of the Community.   
 
3.7.2 Legal factors 
 
Some scholars (Kaahwa, 2003:38; Wako, 2004:82) felt that legal factors pose the greatest 
challenge to the EAC’s ability to effectively achieve its objectives.  Kaahwa (2003:38-44), 
for example argues that the EAC Partner States are obliged to ensure not only the ratification 
of the Treaty but also its domestication within their respective municipal laws as well as 
domestication of laws passed by the EALA.  This, has however, been a challenge for the 
original three Partner States whose legal systems, though sharing a common source in 
received English law, are different.  Harmonization of the law has thus so far been hampered 
by the sheer magnitude of the exercise, intricacies of conflict of laws, the differences in legal 
systems and (before the formal establishment of the East African Legislative Assembly) lack 
of legislative basis.   
 
Another legal challenge identified is in the legal document (Treaty)  establishing the EAC 
which some scholars felt gives no executive authority to the EAC Secretariat despite it being 
the executive organ of the Community thereby rendering it almost impossible for this 
“executive” organ to effectively implement decisions of the policy-making organs of the 
EAC  (Wako Committee, 2004: 82).    
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3.7.3 Socio-cultural factors 
 
Socio-cultural factors are also seen to have great influence on the EAC’s regional integration 
initiatives.  According to Kibua and Tostensen (2005:2), the long history of collaboration 
between the original three East African states with its ups and downs has left a legacy – for 
good and bad.  This legacy has a bearing on the contemporary dynamics of collaboration in 
two respects:  the processes and experiences leading up to the collapse of the Community in 
1977 still linger in the minds of politicians and civil servants.  Further, a certain amount of 
scepticism remains on the part of Tanzania and Uganda, vis-a-vis Kenya, on account of the 
widespread perception that Kenya benefited disproportionately from regional cooperation at 
the expense of the other partners.  Whilst it does not matter much whether these perceptions 
reflect reality or whether they are a figment of the imagination of the individuals holding 
them, perceptions take on a reality of their own, on the basis of which people continue to 
think and act.  To the extent that the perceptions are unfounded they impact negatively on the 
EAC’s integration efforts and need to be dispelled through better confidence building 
measures.   
 
The EAC’s integration efforts are also viewed to bring about resistance, at the social-cultural 
level, by some stakeholders in the region who feel that the opening of borders will lead to 
social emigration.  According to the Wako Committee (2004:86),  people move with their 
lifestyles, ideas and values and this process can result in social conflict and cultural shocks 
affecting lifestyles, differences in social beliefs and value systems and consumption and 
saving habits among other social aspects.  For example, there is fear in Tanzania, which is a 
relatively detribalized country with a low crime rate, that, once borders are opened the 
rampant tribalism and high crime rate prevalent in Kenya will find its way into their country. 
This is made worse by the fact that cases of violent robberies and murders involving Kenyans 
in Tanzania have increased over the past few years leading to mistrust between Tanzania 
authorities and Kenyans living and working in Tanzania.  The Tanzanian Internal Security 
Minister, Mr. Bakari Mwapachu is in fact on record as describing as worrying the increase of 
robberies by Kenyans in Tanzania saying it was a threat to the EAC (The Standard, 2007a:9).  
 
Straubhaar (2002:37) cautions that if the cultural upheaval of integration becomes too great 
and if people begin to feel that their national identity is threatened, they may raise their 
mental defences and take refuge in negative defensive reflexes.  Xenophobic organisations 
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then become more prominent, foreigners are kept out and nationalist movements increase all 
of which are detrimental to integration.   
 
Mwapachu (2005:76) highlights the general ethos in Tanzania against the role of foreigners 
in the Tanzanian economy.  He notes that there is a strong thrust about indigenization of the 
Tanzanian economy, namely empowering indigenous Tanzanians to become the major 
owners of the economy.  This attitude, he asserts, has emerged from the opening up of the 
Tanzanian economy which has led to the economy being dominated by foreigners especially 
South Africans to the discomfort of many Tanzanians. The result has been a resentful attitude 
expressed towards South Africans.  With the establishment of the EAC which proposes, 
among other things, to collapse borders between the East African States, the resentful attitude 
held by Tanzanians towards South Africans is now increasingly being directed at Kenyans 
which could prove detrimental to deepening the integration of the EAC.  
 
 
 (The Standard, 2007b:6) 
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3.7.4 Political factors 
 
Whereas expectation of economic gains and a distinctive way of life constitute the important 
conditions for integration, some scholars argue that it is the political aspect that forms the 
most important basis for integration.  This is because any kind of integration requires a direct 
surrender of some powers to a central authority.  Therefore, for any integration to be 
established and sustained there has to be a sense of political will, that is, a readiness to be 
joined in a supranational organisation.   
 
However, in East Africa there appears to be fear of loss of sovereignty by the political elite 
which has the potential to adversely influence integration initiatives.  According to the Wako 
Committee (2004:81), there is a fear in the minds of some members of the political elite in 
East Africa that as a result of regional integration, the nation states would cease to have any 
meaningful powers and would be relegated to mere provinces within an integrated East 
Africa.  This fear is manifested in a number of ways, including, among others: loss of power 
at political level; loss of decision making and loss of flexibility in exercising power at 
national level.  The Ministry of East African Community-Kenya (2005:4), blames the fear of 
loss of sovereignty on the mistrust and suspicion held by political elite in the EAC Partner 
States following the fall of the Community and the bitter circumstances surrounding it which 
left a whole mess of mistrust and suspicion among the three East African States.  Each one of 
them was to lay blame on the other and propaganda machinery was used to connect that 
hatred at least for the period up to the 1980s.  Although suspicions among the three countries 
have rapidly diminished with time since the revival of the EAC, the Partner States are still yet 
to fully recover from uncertainties which have played part in the slow integration.     
 
Another political factor identified is inadequate political will exemplified by slow decision 
making on critical issues which delays the integration process.  Where decisions have been 
made and programmes and projects are adopted, implementation has been slow or non-
existent in some cases.  This, according to Ministry of EAC-Kenya (2005:5), could be 
attributed to deficiencies in Partner States arising from either of the following:  lack of 
commitment towards implementation of agreed decisions, failure of agreed decisions 
reaching stakeholders on the ground for timely implementation, lack of the necessary 
capacity to follow up the implementation and bureaucracies in Government institutions.  The 
Ministry cites the Protocol on the establishment of the EAC Customs Union, during which 
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Partner States agreed to remove with immediate effect all existing non-tariff barriers.  
However, as of now private sector and other citizens of East Africa are still reporting 
occurrences of non-tariff barriers.   
 
Inadequate political will is also manifested in the multiple memberships of the EAC Partner 
States in RIIs.  It is worth noting that the membership of a regional integration arrangement, 
although backed by economic, social, cultural and technological reasons, is ultimately a 
political choice of any one country.  In the EAC region, four of the EAC Partner States are 
also Members of COMESA, one is also a Member of SADC and Burundi is a Member of 
three RIIs.  Overlapping membership poses several difficulties such as having several RIIs 
pursuing essentially identical mandate and objectives, leading to wasteful duplication of 
effort and counterproductive competition among countries and institutions.  The overlap 
among RIIs also adds to the burdens of members states.  A country belonging to two or more 
RII not only faces multiple financial obligations, but must cope with different meetings, 
policy decisions, instruments, procedures and schedules.  Customs officials have to deal with 
different tariff reduction rates, rules of origin, trade documentation and statistical 
nomenclatures (UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2004: 41).    
 
The failure by the political elite to involve the ordinary people in the integration agenda has 
also been identified as a hindrance to regional integration in East Africa as it makes the 
implementation of integration which lacks grassroots support at the national level difficult.  
The Horn of Africa Democracy and Development International Lobby (2005:2), observes that 
in many African countries the idea of forming or joining a regional integration arrangement 
was not derived from the wishes of the people or in response to the felt needs of the 
leadership but rather from ideas instigated by a donor country or countries.  Whereas in the 
case of East Africa there was wide involvement of various stakeholders in the formation of 
the EAC Treaty, there is little involvement of the citizens of East Africa in what the 
Community is doing.  Leaders have also failed to explain fully to the people the reasons for 
their participating in integration arrangements and the advantages which accrue to the 
majority.  To the extent that cooperation arrangements are (or were) adopted and function 
without the full participation and knowledge of the population, their stability and success of 
implementation of programmes will be difficult to guarantee.  Kituo cha Katiba (2000:5), 
supports this view by observing that whereas the establishment of the EAC was intended to 
be people-driven, whenever the people of East Africa are asked whether they are adequately 
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involved in the formation of the EAC policies, the answer remains a resounding ‘No’; instead 
the establishment and functioning of the EAC has largely been a top-down process involving 
the governments of the region, with the grassroots communities barely informed, educated or 
consulted about the process; or where they have been consulted, it has often been on issues 
they have not been adequately informed or educated about.    
 
3.7.5 Geo-political factors 
 
The geopolitical environment is also seen as likely to impact on the EAC’s regional 
integration efforts.  There is concern over the likely reaction of the rest of the world to a 
Federation of East Africa, which is the ultimate aim of the EAC.  According to the Wako 
Committee (2004: 87-88), the potential fear on the part of the rest of the world was classified 
into three: first, the fear of the political impact of an East African Federation where it was felt 
that the political federation of East Africa will increase her power and influence in the world 
affairs and reduce the power of bigger nations to manipulate the East African region to serve 
their own interests.   
 
Second, fear of economic impact where it was felt that some industrial countries might see it 
as an attempt to reduce their economic exploitation and influence and third, fear of the 
geopolitical impact where it was felt that the creation of a new and bigger African nation of 
about 100 million people is likely to have military implications.  The balance of power, at 
least on the African continent and possibly beyond is almost certain to change.  In terms of 
population, this new nation would now fall among the top nations in the world and would be 
second only to Nigeria in Africa.  It would have a surface area of 1,778,547 square kilometres 
with 116,647 square kilometres of fresh water including the 2nd largest reservoir of fresh 
water in the world, Lake Victoria.  With the immense natural resources at its disposal, the 
new bloc’s military strength may be seen by some as a real or future threat (Wako 
Committee, 2004: 87-88).   
 
It was felt that if such fears actually surface they may lead to external interference in the 
processes towards the EAC’s integration efforts which may take many forms such as funding 
of political parties, non-governmental organisations, media groups and individuals to 
campaign against and ridicule the idea of East African Federation as an impractical and 
hapless dream.   
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3.8 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AS A FACTOR IN EXPLAINING THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
  
Important as the above factors are in explaining the EAC’s inability to effectively achieve its 
objectives, they ignore or simply gloss over another important factor which underpins the 
ability of the regional integration institutions (RIIs) to effectively achieve their objectives, 
notably the manner in which these institutions are organised; in other words, the institutional 
framework of the institution charged with the responsibility of spearheading the regional 
integration process.  In contrast, there are various analyses of the European Union (EU), an 
institution considered to be the most advanced example of regional integration in the world, 
which reveal that the positive advancements made by the EU have crucially been aided by the 
presence of effective supranational institutions, notably the European Commission (EC)   
(Babarinde, 1996:11; Patten, 2005:122-141).     
 
It is apparent that for RIIs to succeed in achieving their objectives effectively, the 
institutional framework under which they operate must be conducive to successful 
integration.  Unfortunately there is a paucity of study on the institutional framework of RIIs 
in the developing world and the EAC in particular.  The few scholars who have noted the 
important role played by institutional frameworks in enhancing or hampering successful 
regional integration have focused their attention on RIIs in Africa in general without specific 
attention to any RII.   
 
Kennes (1997:2-7), notes that inadequate institutional design is the key reason behind the 
lacklustre performance of RIIs in developing countries.  He argues that if countries say they 
want to form a Customs Union or Free Trade area, it is simply taken for granted that they can 
do it, provided only that they devise a workable scheme on paper.  However, the actual 
implementation is a delicate process covering the setting of realistic targets, negotiation, 
implementation, control and resolution of disputes.  It is conditioned by the nature of the 
decision making process which can be intergovernmental, supranational or mixed.  He notes 
that since its origin, the EU has been following a supranational approach on economic 
integration (recently complemented by an intergovernmental approach for the two new pillars 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty: foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs 
but that for various reasons developing countries are not keen on supranationalism, which 
would imply the sharing of sovereignty only recently acquired.  The result, in almost all 
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cases, is the creation of regional institutions with weak secretariats and little or no authority.  
These bodies are invariably hampered by lack of resources and political interference in 
personnel management.  They are not able to ensure adequate preparation, implementation 
and control of agreed integration policies.  And in some cases they have become over 
dependent on donor funding, even for their day-to-day functioning.   
 
It is further noted that an important aspect of institutional design is to achieve an efficient 
distribution of labour between different regional organisations. However, in some cases there 
are overlaps in memberships and contradictory objectives.  The resulting rivalry between 
regional organisations sometimes contributed to failures in implementation of agreed policies 
(Kennes, 1997:7). 
 
Jonathan (2004:2), points out the example of the European Union, which has turned one of 
the world’s most warlike continents into perhaps the most peaceful, and argues that it shows 
that regionalism has considerable potential as a means of peaceful development.  He goes 
further to reiterate that strong supranational institutions can result in a de-emphasis on 
national borders and a consequent reduction in border-driven conflicts.  They can also assist 
in the creation of regional economies, reduce customs barriers in a continent with too many 
small nations, facilitate export trade for landlocked countries (of which Africa has more – 14 
– than any other continent), permit economies of scale in infrastructure and public health, 
provide effective dispute resolution mechanisms and establish a regional security force for 
the instances when such mechanisms fail.  He argues that for the most part African RIIs have 
not done this observing that although supranational institutions have scored some conflict 
resolution and peacekeeping successes, these pale beside the number of conflicts that have 
proven intractable; while in the economic sphere, there is little difference in standard of 
living between the countries that are part of a regional trade pact and those that are not.   
 
The question is thus posed, why hasn’t regionalism succeeded in Africa to the extent that it 
has in Europe?  Jonathan (2004:2-3), believes this could be due to the fact that regional 
integration is much newer in Africa meaning that African RIIs are only now getting the tools 
to fulfil their goals.  Nevertheless he also notes that there are systemic problems such as lack 
of adequate funding, political constraints evidenced by an entrenched and corrupt political 
class that is resistant to any attempts to reduce its authority, differences between the legal 
landscape of integration and the facts on the ground,  poor infrastructure connectivity 
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between African states and the fact that many of the African RIIs overlap in jurisdiction and 
provide redundant services, in some cases leading to conflict.   
 
Rugumamu (2004:7), on the other hand observes that the Abuja Treaty recognizes RIIs as the 
pillars of the future continental community.  RIIs are expected to restructure the 
organisations, rationalize and harmonize policies, and coordinate joint programs in such a 
way that they are in conformity with the objectives, principles and priorities of the African 
Economic Commission Treaty.  In practice, however, the process of establishing and 
consolidating the RIIs as pillars of the continental community is fraught with fundamental 
institutional, administrative and policy problems.  For example, African political leaders 
jealously guard their sovereignty and are unwilling to transfer any of it to supra-national 
bodies, yet the transfer of authority to elected supra-national bodies has the potential of 
enhancing their ability to plan, strategize, coordinate, monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of collective projects and programs.  It is thus necessary that new and 
imaginative visions, long-term policies and predictable institutions will have to be created, 
developed and nurtured, if regional integration in Africa is to reach a new frontier 
(Rugumamu, 2004:3).   
 
It is noted further that the inability of African RIIs to effectively achieve their objectives is as 
a result of their setting rigid timetables for the long-term development objective.  Rugumamu 
(2004:3), singles out the Treaty establishing the African Economic Commission which 
specifies the time frame of each phase up to the year 2025, which is totally impractical and 
argues that the process of programming and planning the African Union continental project is 
likely to be very difficult at best and almost impossible in the uncertain African context of 
frequent civil wars, disintegration tendencies within states and societies, persistent structural 
disequilibria, pervasive poverty and crippling debt.  Going by past experience, the ambitious 
objectives of the Treaty seem to be far beyond the capabilities of the African continent.  The 
requisite institutional capacities, as well as human and financial resources are simply non-
existent.  According to the implementation schedule of the Treaty, by 1999 the first stage was 
supposed to have given way to the second stage.  However, without the courtesy and 
formality of a prior rigorous assessment of the progress already made, the African Heads of 
State meeting in Sirte, Libya in 1999, decided to establish the African Union.  More 
specifically, Point 8 of the Sirte Declaration (herewith attached as Appendix B) called for the 
stepping up of the implementation process of the Abuja Treaty through the reduction of the 
 75
original time frame of 34 years.  It also called for the immediate establishment of all 
institutions provided for under the Treaty. The institutions in question are the African Central 
Bank, the African Monetary Fund, the Court of Justice and the African-Pan-African 
Parliament.  If almost all the RECs are still standing on very shaky ground, it is difficult to 
see how the previous, already unrealistic time frame could be shortened. 
 
Rugumamu (2004:8) further notes, that many African states seek concurrent membership in 
more than one RII.  Thus the majority of COMESA member states are also members of 
SADC and EAC and most IGAD members are also members of COMESA.  Ultimately, 
multiple memberships in RIIs make the task of horizontal coordination difficult, since the 
same country will be progressing toward economic integration at different paces in the 
different RIIs to which it belongs.  Likewise, the cost of membership rises with the increase 
in the number of organisations that countries choose to join.  Furthermore, financing and 
management difficulties increase with the number of regional institutions and with shifting 
membership, rendering the RIIs unsustainable.   
 
The FAO Technical Cooperation Department (2005) identifies institutional weaknesses as a 
key factor in the ineffectiveness of RIIs in Africa.  These weaknesses include the existence of 
too many regional organisations, a tendency towards top-heavy structures with too many 
political appointments, failures by governments to meet their financial obligations to regional 
organisations, poor preparation before meetings and lack of follow up by sectoral ministries 
on decisions taken at regional meetings by Heads of States. They further note that integration 
is hampered by the existence of weak states and political opposition to sharing sovereignty.  
As such, integration arrangements are not characterized by strong supranational bodies and 
virtually all integration institutions in Africa are intergovernmental.  
 
Further, the Global Coalition for Africa (1995:37-40), notes that the institutional framework 
of African RIIs has not been conducive to successful integration and identifies the major 
problems in this area as including the multiplicity of institutions which leads to duplication of 
activities as well spreading of scarce resources particularly finance and manpower between 
the multiple institutions preventing any of them from adequately fulfilling their mandates; 
inadequate political commitment which leads to measures agreed on in the regional fora 
rarely being incorporated into national policies, plans and laws of member countries;  no 
concept of supranationality and subsidiarity which forces most RIIs to function on the basis 
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of intergovernmentalism which in principle requires unanimity for decisions; consensus 
decision-making which invariably implies compromise and results in second or third best 
solution and often causes retardation of regional integration programmes as the RII is forced 
to move at the pace of the slowest moving member state; and inadequate involvement of the 
private sector and civil society which has resulted in apathy amongst the very people who 
stand to benefit from regional integration.   
 
Others include managerial weaknesses which include lack of strong, adequately trained and 
independent management, absence of transparent procedures and effective management 
systems, recruitment of personnel on the basis of national quotas, political appointments, 
protectionist feeling amongst members states which makes it almost impossible to dismiss 
staff even though they may be incompetent, lack of coordination between different 
departments within the same RII; financial weakness which is caused by member states 
having inadequate financial resources to meet their commitments to the RIIs.   
 
Likewise RIIs have failed to adequately develop their own sources of revenue.  This has led 
many institutions to become highly dependent on donor funding which is not self-sustaining 
in the long run.  The financial weakness also means that the administrative infrastructure at 
the secretariats is rarely adequate.  Modern office equipment such as computers, printers and 
photocopiers, and telecommunication equipment such as telephones and fax may be lacking 
or inadequate.  Financial difficulties also mean RIIs have been unable to attract adequate 
Professional Staff; and programming weaknesses characterized by the fact that most RIIs in 
Africa lack a long term strategic plan.  Consequently they fail to have a clear orientation 
about objectives.  A piecemeal approach to programmes tends to be taken, with decisions 
being based on a number of non-rational factors such as which country is chairing the 
organisation at the time.  There is also a tendency for RIIs to expand their spheres of activity 
beyond their original mandate and beyond their competence, rather than concentrating on a 
limited and more feasible agenda.  This leads to inadequate implementation.   
 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the manner in which RIIs are organized has a critical 
bearing on their ability to effectively achieve their objectives.  Financial dependence on 
member states’ contributions, consensus decision making, multiple memberships in RIIs 
pursuing similar objectives, poor planning, unclear objectives, poor remuneration, inadequate 
administrative resources, poor management, poor coordination and recruitment on the basis 
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of national quotas are just some of the pitfalls of the institutional framework of RIIs in 
Africa.  Clearly, much needs to be done to improve the manner in which these institutions 
carry out their operations.   
 
 
3.9 SUMMARY 
 
The EAC is the regional intergovernmental organisation of the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania with its Headquarters in Arusha, 
Tanzania. The main objective of the EAC is to widen and deepen cooperation among the 
Partner States for their mutual benefit. The vision of the EAC is to achieve these objectives 
through a step by step process beginning with the establishment of a Customs Union), 
followed by a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political 
Federation of the East African states.   
 
The EAC has in place fundamental and operational principles that are meant to guide the 
achievement of its objectives. The fundamental principles include: mutual trust, political will 
and sovereign equality; peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness, peaceful settlement 
of disputes; good governance; equitable distribution of benefits; and cooperation for mutual 
benefit. The operational principles include: people-centred and market-driven cooperation; 
provision of an enabling environment; establishment of an export oriented economy; 
subsidiarity; variable geometry; equitable distribution of benefits; complementarity; and 
asymmetry. 
 
The EAC operates through seven main organs each of which has unique roles bestowed upon 
it.  These are: the Summit of Heads of State, whose main function is to give general direction 
and impetus to the development and achievement of the objectives of the EAC;  the Council 
of Ministers which is the policy organ of the Community and thus the key decision making 
body of the EAC;  the Co-ordination Committee whose main function is to submit reports 
and recommendations on the implementation of the Treaty to the Council of Ministers; 
Sectoral Committees whose main function is to prepare comprehensive implementation 
programmes, with respect to the various EAC sectors as well as monitor their 
implementation; the EACJ which is the judicial arm of the EAC that ensures the adherence to 
law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty establishing the EAC; the EALA which 
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is the legislative organ of the EAC that debates and approves the budget of the EAC, enacts 
legislations and plays an oversight role; and the Secretariat which is the executive organ of 
the Community charged with the role of administering the implementation of the Treaty.  
 
Since its establishment in 1999, the EAC has performed relatively well in as far as meeting 
some of its key objectives.  Some of the key achievements include establishment of the EAC 
Customs Union leading to increased intra-EAC trade; commencement on negotiations for the 
establishment of a Common Market; joint negotiation of a partial EPA with the EU; 
remarkable macro-economic performance of the EAC region for instance, regional average 
GDP growth of 6% p.a., stable exchange rates and convertibility of currencies; increased 
economic cooperation for instance, harmonized pre- and post-budget consultations of the 
region’s Finance Ministries and reading of budget statements on the same day; increased 
social and cultural integration through introduction of the East African passport, the Annual 
EAC Schools Essay Writing Competition, unveiling of the EAC flag, organizing some 
regional sporting competitions and advanced plans for an EAC national anthem; joint efforts 
to link the EAC Partner States’ road network;  establishment of  several specialized 
institutions; marketing the EAC region as a single tourism destination; foreign policy and 
collaboration in diplomatic and consular activities; development of an EAC Agriculture and 
Rural Development Policy and Strategy as well as an East African Power Master Plan among 
many other achievements. 
 
In spite of the EAC’s notable successes, a number of shortcomings also broadly stand out.  
The EAC is yet to realize many of its grand objectives as outlined in its Treaty such as 
inability to harmonize policies and laws in a number of key areas most notably in negotiating 
as a bloc, establishing a Development Fund, reducing reliance on donor funding, eradicating 
non-tariff barriers, harmonizing domestic tax laws, implementing strategic infrastructure 
projects in the areas of roads, railways and energy and establishing a civil society forum just 
to mention a few of the more important shortcomings.  The EAC was also outdone by the AU 
and the UN to bring about peace following the post-election violence in Kenya.  Another 
shortcoming can be seen in the multiplicity of membership of the EAC Partner States.   
 
Most scholars who have attempted to analyse the reasons behind the EAC’s shortcomings 
mainly attribute it to economic, socio-cultural, legal, political and geo-political factors.  
Important as these factors are, this author believes that the manner in which the EAC is 
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organised, that is, its institutional framework, underpins its ability to effectively achieve its 
objectives.  This view is supported by various analyses of the European Union, an institution 
considered to be the most advanced example of regional integration in the world, which 
reveal that the positive advancements made by the EU have crucially been aided by the 
presence of effective supranational institutions. There is however, paucity of analysis of the 
EAC’s institutional framework.   
 
The few scholars who have noted the role played by deficient institutional frameworks in 
hampering successful regional integration have focused their attention on RIIs in Africa in 
general and identified the following institutional deficiencies: the creation of regional 
institutions with weak secretariats and little or no authority; critical lack of resources both 
human and financial; political interference in personnel management; overlaps in 
memberships; contradictory objectives, political constraints evidenced by an entrenched and 
corrupt political class that is resistant to any attempts to reduce its authority, political leaders 
jealously guarding their sovereignty and unwilling to transfer any of it to supra-national 
bodies, setting of ambitious goals based on rigid and unrealistic timetables; consensus 
decision-making; inadequate involvement of the private sector and civil society; managerial 
weaknesses, failure by RIIs to adequately develop their own sources of revenue; inadequate 
administrative resources such as computers, printers and photocopiers; and lack of strategic 
planning to mention but a few. 
  
Evidently, the way in which RIIs in Africa are structured to carry out their processes, has an 
important bearing on their ability to successful achieve their objectives.  It is therefore 
worthwhile to establish whether the EAC’s institutional framework contributes to its 
lacklustre performance and if so, how its structure and organisational processes can be 
improved to enable effective performance. 
 
In the next chapter, a broad examination of the concept of organisational effectiveness within 
the framework of organisational effectiveness theory is undertaken and contextualized within 
the area of study, that is, the organisational effectiveness of RIIs.  The main theoretical 
models of organisational effectiveness are highlighted.  Further, the determinants of 
organisational effectiveness that will guide the study are identified and briefly described in 
terms of what the ideal situation should be.   
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Chapter Four 
 
 
ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS:  AN OVERVIEW 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In his article entitled The Study of Administration Woodrow Wilson (1887) addressed the 
question of whether there was an ideal structure on which to model government institutions.  
He believed that “it is the objective of administrative study to discover, first, what 
government can properly and successfully do, and, second, how it can do these proper things 
with the utmost possible efficiency and the least possible cost either of money or of energy” It 
is the first concern that is of significance to this study.  Wilson’s concern was how best to 
structure government to be able to achieve intended outcomes.  In simpler terms he was 
basically concerned about the organisational effectiveness of governmental institutions 
(Agarwal, 1996:56).   
 
Since Wilson’s thought provoking query on the need to improve the organisation and 
methods of governmental institutions, many best selling management books have been 
written which centre squarely on explanations of what makes some institutions excellent, of 
high quality, productive, efficient, healthy or possessing vitality – all proxies for the concept 
of organisational effectiveness as used in the organisational sciences literature.  Evidently, 
RIIs, as intergovernmental institutions can benefit a lot from these writings. 
 
Despite the prominent place of organisational effectiveness in modern organisational 
literature, confusion and ambiguity still characterize scholarly writing on the subject.  
Problems of definition, circumscription and criteria identification plague most authors’ work.  
However, despite the ambiguity and confusion surrounding it, the construct of organisational 
effectiveness is central to the organisational sciences and cannot be ignored in theory and 
research.  Basically all writings on organisational effectiveness rely on some theoretical 
conception of the differences between high quality (effective) performance and poor quality 
(ineffective) performance.  Hence, effectiveness is inherently tied to all theory on 
organisations.   
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4.2 ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS THEORY 
 
 
For purposes of this study, it is important to examine how the theory and practice of 
organisational effectiveness has evolved over time.  Extensive research both primary and 
secondary does not yield a universal definition of organisational effectiveness, a situation that 
lends credence to the fact that such a ubiquitous definition might not be in existence.  There is 
however little uncertainty that when we reminisce about organisational effectiveness we 
vaguely appreciate what we mean.  We know organisations that are effective and we can 
name them.  Magazines such as the Fortune, Business Week and other business journals rank 
the best and the worst organisations on a variety of criteria not limited to such benchmarks as 
organisational effectiveness.  Perceptive administrators recognize that effectiveness in an 
organisation is a concept that keeps on changing without necessarily corresponding to other 
organisational dynamics.  To keep pace all manner of organisational effectiveness approaches 
such as training of staff, restructuring, strategic planning, teambuilding and blue-sky sessions, 
cost-cutting, head-hunting management gurus etc are all put into play.  Despite these efforts, 
there are a number of enduring models and theories that underpin organisational effectiveness 
that we examine in this study. 
 
Firstly, we have the closed rational organisation/bureaucratic control-oriented model which 
argues that organisational effectiveness is attainable by institutions setting specific goals, 
prescribing the behavioural expectations of organisational participants through formalization 
of rules and roles and monitoring conformance to those expectations (Baker and Branch, 
2002:3).   This model explains why RIIs such as the EAC are founded on the basis of 
Treaties, rules and regulations demarcating responsibilities and boundaries of authority.  The 
model dominated the organisational scene from approximately 1900-1930 and originated in 
the works of Max Weber, Frederick Taylor and Herbert Simon.   Weber (1946 translation), 
for example argued that bureaucracy was the most effective and efficient organisational form 
because the bureaucratic rational-legal structure provided the basis for stable and predictable 
behaviour on the part of both subordinates and superiors.  His concept of management control 
was expounded by Frederick Taylor’s (1911) notion of Scientific Management, which 
consisted of rationalizing organisational behaviour through extensive and detailed task 
analysis, systematisations and routinisation.   
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Herbert Simon (1957; 1979), on the other hand emphasized a more subtle form of control, 
referred to as administrative control, in which the role of management was to eliminate 
complexity by simplifying decisions and developing systems to support organisational 
participants in making the decisions each needed to make.  Simon’s form of administrative 
control is a somewhat less obtrusive form of bureaucratic control than scientific management.  
Simon is also well known for introducing the concept of bounded rationality.   
 
Existing literature on the closed rational organisation/bureaucratic control-oriented model 
indicates that early organisational theory literature also assumed that organisations were 
fairly generic (Barnard, 1938; Dessler, 1982; Drucker, 1985a; Stoner, 1978).  Drucker 
(1985a:17) described management as “a generic function, which faces the same basic tasks in 
every country and, essentially, in every society.” Although there is some variation in the 
functional task identified by the different management theories, all assumed a core set of 
management functions applicable to all organisations, which when applied would result in 
organisational effectiveness.  These generic functions include: defining mission and 
establishing purpose and goals; leading and motivating; scrutinizing and planning; 
structuring, organizing and designing; controlling and establishing roles and authorities.  
Other functions include setting performance standards and value expectations; staffing, 
developing and managing human resources; budgeting and allocating resources; evaluating, 
learning and improving; and managing external relations.   
 
Secondly, we have the natural systems or human relations model.  This model emerged in the 
late 1920s when organisational theorists started to question the fundamental premise of 
increasing system rationality through promotion of stable patterns of behaviour and reduction 
in the scope of decision making authority.  Excessive emphasis on internal control and 
stability came to be seen as irrational, and the attempt to programme in advance, the 
behaviour and decisions of organisational participants came to be viewed as misguided, even 
foolhardy.  It was argued that such rigid programming could easily become maladaptive, 
giving rise to a trained incapacity which, in turn, would contribute to both ineffective and 
inefficient organisational performance (Baker and Branch, 2002:4-5).   
 
The natural systems or human relations model was the dominant model from the 1930s 
through the 1950s. In contrast to the rational system perspective, the natural system 
perspective views organisations as first and foremost social collectivities whose primary 
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interest is the survival of the system.  This model emphasizes that for an organisation to be 
effective, it has to harness the minds and hearts of its participants.  It underscores the 
importance of informal social relations over formal structures (Likert, 1961; Weick, 1999).  
Thus, organisational effectiveness was gradually moving away from an emphasis on 
command control to an emphasis on engaging the hearts and minds of the organisational 
participants.  The human relations perspectives, initially associated with Mayo, initiated this 
view.  Mayo (1945), is best known for the pivotal studies, triggered by the famous Hawthorne 
Effect, that demonstrated that commitment and loyalty were often more important than self-
interest and formal sanctions in determining the behaviour of organisational participants.   
 
This human relations school gave rise to a large body of work directed at informal, normative 
structures; organisational cooperation, organisational culture, motivation, morale and later 
teamwork (Barnard, 1938; Goffman, 1961; 1974 and Peters & Waterman, 1982).   This 
perspective has since been expanded to include efforts to engage not only the hearts and 
minds of organisational participants but also those of the organisation’s customers and 
external stakeholders (Porter, 1985; Powell, 1990).   These newer efforts contributed to the 
development of the literature on team work, organisational alliances and partnerships, 
participative management and leadership. 
 
Thirdly, we have the open systems model which focused greater attention on the 
organisation’s interaction with its external environment.  This perspective became prominent 
in the early 1960s (Scott, 1987:115; Blau & Scott, 1962).  It basically perceives an 
organisation as an open system that self-maintains on the basis of throughputs taken from and 
given back to the environment.  It argues that as the environment confronting organisations 
becomes more complex, varied and rapidly changing, organisations need to become 
increasingly flexible and adaptive.  The model led to increased consideration of 
organisational design and the idea that an appropriate organisational design was one that 
enabled “an organisation to execute better, learn faster and change more easily” (Mohrman 
et al. 1995:7).  An organisation’s design was further seen as comprising multiple, interrelated 
elements, frequently categorized as structure, people, processes, rewards and tasks or work 
system that together can create unique organisational capabilities that provide competitive 
advantage (Quinn et al. 1997; Galbraith, 1973; 1994; 1995).   
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Under the open systems approach management science gradually moved away from the view 
that management’s role was to manage critical generic organisational functions toward the 
idea that managers needed to be leaders whose real added value was the provision of vision 
and direction that engaged the hearts and minds of employees, and, subsequently, customers 
and external stakeholders (Hesselbein et al. 1996). As this viewpoint matured, the central role 
of management was increasingly defined as encouraging motivational practices, facilitating 
creativity and innovation on the part of its employees, customers and stakeholders and 
ensuring the development of leaders throughout the organisation.  In other words, 
management’s role was to unleash creativity and passion and harness these forces to promote 
the success of the organisation (Kotter, 1996: Deming, 1994).  This shifted the primary focus 
of management from the creation and implementation of organisation structures to ensuring 
and leading organisational coordination, flexibility and agility (Peters & Waterman, 1982; 
Kotter & Heskett, 1992).   
 
Ultimately we review the contingency model.  This model put emphasis on developing more 
specific models of organisational effectiveness for particular organisations or for the most 
critical components of a given organisation.  It argues for models of organisational 
effectiveness that are more tailored to the specific requirements and objectives of a particular 
organisation.  Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) coined the label contingency theory to capture 
this notion that different environmental contexts place different requirements on 
organisations.  Such differing requirements, combined with the fact that social systems are 
loosely coupled with their environment, mean that there is no one best way to organize to 
respond to the environment – even if not all ways of organizing are equally effective.  
 
In as far as RIIs are concerned, this study observes that the unique environmental context 
under which these institutions operate is the fact that they are institutions voluntarily 
established by sovereign states to safeguard or promote issues of common interest through 
harmonization of their respective policies. For these institutions to be effective, the sovereign 
states must be willing to cede some of their sovereignty.  In this regard, political will is 
crucial for the effectiveness of RIIs.  The recommendations of the contingency theory will 
inform this study based on information borrowed from two regional integration theories, that 
is, intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.  These theories offer insight on the best way 
in which RIIs as intergovernmental institutions can be organized to respond to their unique 
environment.  Intergovernmentalism argues that for RIIs to be effective, governments should 
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continue to exert their full sovereignty; meaning, regional institutions should only act as a 
Secretariat that prepares and implements integration policies.  Supranationalism on the other 
hand, advocates that for RIIs to be effective, governments should share jointly, through 
common institutions, some specific aspects of sovereignty.  Under supranationalism, the legal 
provisions for integration take precedence over national laws, and these provisions are 
enforceable through the courts if necessary.  In this case the budget to carry out integration 
policies is determined implemented and controlled by common institutions (EC Paper, 
1995:23).   
 
Most regional integration theorists (Haas, 1958; Nugent, 2003) have a leaning towards 
supranationalism which they believe is more likely to lead to RIIs achieving their mandate.  
There is however, broad consensus that what is at issue is not whether RIIs should be 
supranational or intergovernmental, but that whichever approach is taken, the governments of 
the participating countries must display adequate political will (EC Paper, 1995; Best, 2006).  
This entails creation of institutions that have a realistic mandate, adequate human and 
financial resources to fulfil this mandate, capacity to formulate and implement regional 
policies, no conflict or overlapping membership between the mandates of different 
institutions and ability to operationalise the principles of subsidiarity and variable geometry. 
 
 
4.3 DETERMINANTS OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Having regard to the theories reviewed above, one may discern that there is no single theory 
that builds consensus on the definition or measurement of organisational effectiveness.  
Indeed, management guru Cameron (1986:541) asserts that no single model or criteria set 
exists for organisational effectiveness and thus there cannot be a single theory about 
effectiveness.  To him, debates about which model of effectiveness is best or right are largely 
beside the point, because models are more likely to complement one another than supplant 
one another. 
   
As pointed out earlier, organisations make effective decisions when they for instance recruit 
well qualified personnel, conduct internal restructuring, carry out strategic planning, head 
hunt for management gurus just to mention but a few.  We know too well when we encounter 
effectiveness and when we do not.  We for example, believe in the use of expedited service, 
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genial and courteous staff, hygienic environment, value and quality performance etc – all 
these are attributes we can judge as efficacious or not.   
 
From the theories of organisational effectiveness reviewed, this study has identified and will 
further situate and investigate through literature review and primary inquiries the following 
variables often cited as determinants of organisational effectiveness: 
 
 clarity of purpose, that is, clearly spelt out goals and objectives in terms of their 
clarity, prioritization and capacity for implementation; 
 facilitative organisational culture; 
 rational organisation structure;  
 rational organisation processes; 
 ability to acquire resources (financial, human); 
 internal harmony;  
 satisfaction of strategic constituencies both internal and external; 
 ability to adjust and respond to dynamic changes and requirements of and in the 
environment;  
 transformational leadership; and 
 political will, on the basis of the intergovernmental nature of RIIs. 
 
4.3.1 Clarity of purpose   
 
Clarity of purpose is important to the success of any organisation.  Having clear goals and 
strategic direction will help provide a sense of where the organisation is and where it is 
going.  Goals are conceptions of desired ends.  Most organisational scholars advise that 
organisations will be better placed to effectively achieve their intended outcomes if they set 
goals that are Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timely also referred to as 
SMART.  A goal is specific if it lays down what is to be done, why and how.  Measurable 
means it should be possible to see indicators of goal achievement.  Attainable means the 
attitudes, abilities, skills and financial capacity necessary to achieve the goals are available.  
Realistic means the goal should be do-able, that is, the skills needed to do the work should be 
available and the project should fit with the overall strategy and goals of the organisation.  
Timely means there should be an end point on the goal which gives organisational 
participants a clear target to work towards (Nikitina, 2008:1).   
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Literature on organisational effectiveness draws a link between SMART goals and 
performance management. Performance Management refers to how the individual within the 
company is performing and contributing. Performance management is key to the success of 
any organisation.  If the goals of an organisation are not SMART, its employees are left 
without a sense of direction which leads to poor performance. SMART goals contribute to 
improved employee performance in several ways. Specific goals enable employees to know 
how their individual and work unit plans align with their company’s vision, mission and 
values.  This increases motivation and enhances performance. Measurable goals enable 
employees to evaluate their performance, identify gaps in their skills or performance, and 
develop goals and plans for improvement. It focuses on continuous improvement.  Attainable 
goals enable employees to know what is required to achieve a goal in terms of skills and 
resources. Realistic and time bound goals enable employees learn how to align their personal 
work plan with work unit plans and goals.  SMART goals therefore provide individuals 
within an organisation with a clear sense of direction which leads to organisational 
effectiveness (Centre for Organisational Effectiveness, 2008:1).   
 
Organisational effectiveness theories further draw a link between SMART goals and well 
defined organisational vision and mission statements.  Indeed, as Myatt (1988) observes, 
vision dictates mission which determines strategy, which surfaces goals that frame objectives, 
which in turn drives the tactics that tell an organisation what resources, infrastructure and 
processes are needed to support a certainty of execution.  Myatt (1988) further warns that 
organisations should not get caught up in attempting to develop catchy visions and missions 
to be encapsulated within a piece of framed artwork that hangs in their reception yet are never 
put into practice, rather it is more important that the vision and mission are understood by 
employees and translated into the actions.  
 
4.3.2 Facilitative organisational culture  
 
While well formulated organisational goals are important, it is an organisation’s culture that 
gives life to its goals and helps make their realization possible.  According to International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) (2006:8), culture is the sum total of the values, beliefs, 
customs, traditions and meanings related to goal fulfilment and developed over the history of 
an organisation that make it unique, govern its character and drive the organisation.  
Organisational culture can be a powerful motivating force which through embodying the 
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values sanctioned by the organisation, frames the boundaries of acceptable attitudes and 
behaviour and creates a shared ethos.  Culture can thus help determine the extent to which 
members of an organisation will – and are expected – to extend themselves to fulfil tasks.  
Indeed, culture can cause individuals to push their very limits of organisational capacity.  
Cultural values express what people believe the organisation wants to happen.  When 
individuals join an organisation, besides learning about its formal aspects, they spend much 
of their time being socialized into the “informal organisation”, namely, the culture.  It takes 
time to absorb the organisational culture, for it generally cannot be spelled out in a document 
or directive (IDRC, 2006:8-9). 
 
According to Harris and Brannick (1999), an organisation’s culture is defined by its core 
value.  They identify four core values crucial for organisational effectiveness – customer 
service, innovation, operation excellence and spirit.  This view is further expounded by Fyock 
and Brannick (2002:1-6), who identify moderate degree of hierarchy,  a high degree of 
urgency, strong people orientation,  efficiency, customer service, hospitality, and leading 
edge as core values which support facilitative organisational culture. 
 
4.3.3 Rational organisation structure  
 
It is difficult to get a proper definition of the term rationality as the concept can be applied to 
many different elements in human life.  According to Wessels and Pauw (2003:6-11), the 
concept of rationality can be applied to persons, beliefs, decisions and procedures.  In this 
light, a person is said to be rational when he takes decisions that promote the achievement of 
his goals; a belief is said to be rational if there is good reason to hold on to it or believe it; a 
decision is said to be rational if it contributes to the goals of the person(s) making it; and a 
procedure is said to be rational if it consistently contributes to the sought after results.  Thus 
rationality when seen in terms of the four different scenarios above can be seen to refer to 
reasoning strategies that are effective for accomplishing goals.  A rational organisational 
structure thus refers to a structure which is capable of accomplishing the goals the 
organisation seeks to accomplish. 
 
The task of creating appropriate organisational structures has challenged managers and 
students of organisational development for decades.  What has now been realized is that the 
“ideal” structure is the one that best fits the situation (IDRC, 2006:13).  At issue is that the 
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organisational structure should support the capacity of an organisation to perform its work.  
Departments or other groupings should understand their roles in the organisation, have the 
authority to carry out their roles and be accountable for their work.  Further, there should be 
effective coordination through linking specialized activities of individuals or groups so that 
they can and will work toward common ends.   
 
Another important structural consideration is the manner in which authority is shared.  
Natural systems’ scholars point out that too much formalization and centralization places 
intolerable burdens on those responsible for the management of an organisation and can 
easily lead to trained incapacity (Merton, 1957:197-200).  They note that formal 
arrangements that curtail individual problem solving and the use of discretion undermine 
participants’ initiatives and self-confidence, causing them to become alienated and apathetic.  
Such restrictive arrangements not only damage participants’ self-esteem and mental health 
but prevent them from effectively exercising their talents and energies to the larger enterprise 
(Argyris, 1957; McGregor, 1960).   
 
4.3.4 Rational organisation processes   
 
Organisational process are the internal management systems – the many mechanisms that 
guide interactions among people to ensure that ongoing work is accomplished rather than 
hindered or blocked.  These include planning, problem-solving/decision-making, 
communication, monitoring and evaluation (IDRC, 2006:22).  Organisational experts often 
emphasize the link between effective planning and organisational effectiveness.  In this 
regard, strategic planning in organisations is deemed to be critical as it sets the overall 
directions and, at operational levels, the process by which the organisational goal is translated 
into specific objectives and methodologies to accomplish goals.   
 
Problem-solving and decision-making are two interacting and mutually reinforcing processes 
that must function well at every level of an organisation.  Organisations must have the ability 
to define important problems, gather the data to frame the issue, create a set of alternatives to 
deal with the problem, decide on solutions, create the conditions to carry out decisions and 
monitor these decisions and their progress (IDRC, 2006:24).  Timeliness is a key element in 
this process.  An organisation must thus be able to identify important problematic issues and 
act in a timely manner.   
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Effective communication evidenced by exchange of information and realization of shared 
understanding among members of an organisation is also essential for a rational internal 
process.  The IDRC (2006:23) observes that internal communications can serve as the glue 
holding an organisation together; alternatively, they can break it apart – for both information 
and misinformation constantly flow in organisations.  Accurate information is vital to keep 
employees informed as well as motivated:  besides the focused information needed to carry 
out work, organisational participants also need information that makes them feel part of an 
important effort and a wider purpose.   
 
Also critical are the processes of monitoring and evaluation10 through which comparison of 
what has actually happened with what was planned and with the organisation’s overall goals 
can be undertaken.  Organisational scholars recommend that as organisations become more 
and more concerned about how individuals and the organisation as a whole can improve and 
grow in knowledge monitoring and evaluation become increasingly important and hence 
organisations should have in place effective policies and procedures to guide these processes 
(IDRC, 2006:23).   
 
4.3.5 Ability to acquire resources   
 
Crucial to effective achievement of goals is the ability to acquire and manage resources.  
Cameron (1980:67-68), for example argues that the more of the needed resources an 
organisation can obtain from its external environment, the more it is able to be effective in 
achieving its goals.  Resources include staff, finance-money, and administrative resources 
(infrastructure and technology).  Scott (1998:172), however, argues that of all the many 
resources required by organisations, the most vital are the contributions of its staff.  Not only 
are these contributions themselves of infinite variety, they are also the ultimate means by 
which all other resources are acquired. It is thus important that an organisation is able to 
attract the right and best people to enable it achieve its objectives. This in essence means that 
it has to provide good terms and conditions of service relative to similar organisations in its 
environment. Further, it is important that an organisation strictly recruits qualified people.  
                                                 
10 Monitoring is the ongoing process of gathering, analyzing and reporting data on how an organisation, 
department or project is doing for the purpose of managing and identifying problems at an early state.  
Evaluation is typically a more comprehensive, summative process. It identifies factors that facilitate or 
hampered achievement of results and may trace the contribution of these results to broader objectives.  It 
involves making judgments about the merit or worth of an activity at a given time, during or after 
implementation and answers questions of relevance, effectiveness and impact (IDRC, 2006:25).   
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Scott (1998:187), for example argues that since organisations exist to pursue given goals, 
participants should be recruited only if they possess extra-organisational characteristics 
viewed as valuable to this end.   
 
Having obtained the right staff members, it is important that an organisation optimally 
utilizes them.  This calls for an effective human resource management system.  Managing 
human resources requires forecasting the demand and supply of staff needed to carry out the 
activities of the organisations, keeping records of human resources so as to permit the 
creation of a more equitable employment system, recruiting and hiring the best people 
possible, creating an assessment system that rewards people and helps keep them in the 
organisation and providing for the ongoing learning and career development of employees 
(IDRC, 2006:28). 
 
Scholars such as Hanlan, Seidner and Zietlow (1998:75) are in agreement over the critical 
role played by financial resources in ensuring the ability of an organisation to achieve its 
objectives.  They rightly observe that financial resources allow organisations to accomplish 
their missions and achieve their goals.  They are needed to raise funds, hire and reward 
people, acquire property and equipment and fund many types of expenses incurred in pursuit 
of an organisation’s mission.   Thus, it is important for an organisation to secure adequate and 
reliable levels of funding to carry out its mission and activities.  It is also important that these 
resources be effectively utilized and managed.  This calls for sound financial management 
practices, which has at its core a well formulated strategic plan, a corresponding budget and 
an evaluative financial report (Hanlan, Seidner & Zietlow 1998:147).  The IDRC (2006:32) 
further recommends that important organisational goals should be supported by the budget.  
This means that there should be evidence of funds allocated in the budget for whatever is an 
organisational priority and all activities required to support this prioritized goal. 
 
Infrastructure resources refer to the basic environmental conditions which enable work to 
transpire – for example, reasonable space in a building equipped with adequate lighting, clean 
water, a dependable supply of electricity etc.  Inadequate infrastructure is likely to interfere 
with the function or the potential function of an organisation.  The IDRC (2006:27), notes 
that although most of the time, deficiencies in one or more elements of infrastructure do not 
interfere with day-to-day work, at some point, work will be impacted.  Typically, the crux of 
the infrastructure issue is maintenance, which suffers due to the lack of recurrent budgets 
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providing for upkeep.  It is thus important for an organisation to have adequate maintenance 
systems and procedures that are supported by a maintenance budget.   
 
Closely related to infrastructure is technology.  The technological resources of an institution 
encompass all of the equipment, machinery and systems, including library information 
system hardware and software, which are essential to the smooth performance of duties by 
organisational participants.  These include scanners, computers, photocopiers, record 
management software like TRIM etc.  It is important that technology is adequate and well 
maintained (IDRC, 2006:30). 
 
4.3.6 Internal harmony 
 
According to Cameron (1980:67-68), effective organisations are those with an absence of 
internal strain, whose members are highly integrated into the system, whose internal 
functioning is smooth and typified by trust and benevolence toward individuals, where 
information flows smoothly both vertically and horizontally, and so on.  This scenario 
portrays an absence of conflict.  Organisational experts admit that conflict is normal and part 
of everyday organisational life.  However, although conflict can stretch our minds to see in 
new ways and create new solutions to vexing problems, it is also capable of producing 
chronic ineffectiveness in organisations if handled poorly.  Indeed, Common Ground 
Associates (1998:1), assert that when confronted with conflict an organisation has two 
choices, it can use the conflict to grow and learn, or the conflict will use it to grow and 
destroy.   They further observe that the problem is that many experts offer that conflict should 
be managed and caution that by its very nature conflict cannot be managed – it is either 
resolved or it continues to fester and boil beneath the surface like an infection and will either 
leave scar tissue or will explode to the surface with renewed energy.   
 
The above view is shared by Bragg (2001:1-3), who observes that most organisations do not 
handle internal conflict very well as seen in the three main approaches used to deal with 
conflict in the workplace.  The first approach is avoiding conflict.  This approach is based 
upon the belief that conflict is bad or that it is a sign of a dysfunctional group.  Organisations 
that use this approach may try to create structures to prevent conflict.  Avoidance is often a 
sign of denial that conflict exists.  Non-action is a prime strategy for conflict avoiders.  In the 
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worst case, the avoiders don’t even recognize the symptoms that conflict is occurring.  
Consequently, conflicts smoulder and fester until they erupt or explode.     
 
The second approach is suppressing conflict.  This approach is based upon the belief that you 
can squelch or eliminate conflict.  A common suppression strategy is to lay down the law, to 
set strict limits, to require people to work together or to force them to cooperate.  Another 
suppression strategy is to stall resolution by having meetings or creating administrative 
procedures to address the conflict.  A third suppression strategy is to try to resolve the 
conflict secretly – to work behind the scenes – so you resolve the conflict without anyone 
knowing it existed.  Bragg (2001:2), points out that a common mistake is believing that 
having a meeting or just getting the disputing parties together will resolve the conflict.  It 
doesn’t.  When handled poorly, getting the disputants together makes matters worse.  Another 
mistake is believing that the conflict is merely a personality clash.  Managers sometimes 
lament that if they just had good employees all the conflict in their organisation would 
disappear.  This is usually not true.  Often organisational systems cause conflicts despite the 
people working within those systems.  This is why replacing the people does not necessarily 
solve the conflict.  Suppressing conflict does not work it merely drives the conflict 
underground, so on the surface everything looks merry.   
 
The third approach to solving conflict and which Bragg (2001:3), highly recommends is 
turning conflict into positive outcomes.  This involves seeing the positive side of conflict.  
One way to do this is to view conflict as feedback.  Conflict is information about your 
relationship or about what is going on.  It tells an organisation that something is not working 
or that people believe that they are not getting their needs met.  Conflict is a signal that the 
organisation may want to do things differently or to think about things differently.  Conflict 
thus provides an organisation with an opportunity to be creative and to change something 
affecting its relationships.  Learning from conflict is thus the only approach that works.  The 
key to learning from conflict is asking the right questions, and then searching together for the 
answers.  Important questions to reflect on when using conflict as feedback include: What 
can we learn from this?  How can we use this conflict to improve our relationship? How can 
we work together to do this better? What perceptions or misperceptions are driving this 
conflict? How do the perceptions of the disputants differ? and What are the real issues of the 
conflict and what are superficial issues?  These are questions that have to be answered jointly 
by the conflicting parties (Bragg, 2001:3).   
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4.3.7 Satisfaction of strategic constituencies both internal and external 
 
An organisation is more likely to be effective in achieving its objectives if all of its strategic 
constituencies are at least minimally satisfied (Cameron, 1980:67-68).  A strategic 
constituency is any group of individuals who have some stake in an organisation.  They could 
be internal for example employees, policy organs and Board of Directors or external, that is, 
those powerful groups outside the organisation that have a significant impact on its 
functioning, for example shareholders and other stakeholders. 
  
With regard to employees, organisational analysts are in agreement that an organisation’s 
ability to effectively achieve its objectives depends in part on its ability to create an 
environment that motivates and stimulates its personnel.  Organisations are thus encouraged 
to continuously seek ways to keep their staff motivated.  One such way is through incentives 
which can range from appropriate remuneration, recognition, capacity building to career 
structures that effectively enable communication within the organisation and guarantee 
employee growth and career advancement (IDRC, 2006:9). 
 
Early organisational theorists, Barnard (1938) and Simon (1976) stressed the importance of 
an organisation’s ability to motivate participants to continue to make contributions of time, 
resources, effort – to it rather than to some competing system.  They argued that each 
participant and each group of participants receives from the organisation inducements in 
return for which he makes contributions to the organisation.  As such, each participant will 
continue his participation in an organisation only so long as the inducements offered him are 
as great as or greater (measured in terms of his values and in terms of the alternatives open to 
him) than the contributions he is asked to make.  
 
External strategic constituencies or stakeholders consists of those people and organisations 
external to the institution who are directly concerned with the institution and its performance.  
Examples include potential target groups of the institution’s activities, shareholders, donors, 
clients, suppliers, other institutions doing similar or complementary work and the public at 
large.  According to IDRC (2006:3), influences from external stakeholders can become major 
facilitating or constricting forces on an organisation as it works to accomplish its mission.  In 
the extreme, these forces can keep an organisation alive artificially, conversely, they can 
thwart organisational survival. An organisation must therefore, identify its external 
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stakeholders in order to assess their potential impact on the organisation.  In particular, 
strategic decision makers in the organisation must understand the specific demands that each 
external stakeholder group is making on the organisation.    
 
The Minnesota Council of Nonprofits (2005:18) observes for example, that the effectiveness 
of an organisation, especially non profit organisations like RIIs, depends on successful 
relationships with other similar institutions.  Regardless of form – partnership, collaboration, 
cooperation or coordination – these relationships, or strategic alliances, can serve a variety of 
purposes, including resource sharing, policy influence and improved operational efficiency.    
They strengthen both the capacity of individual organisations and the sector as a whole. 
Organisations should thus be open to strategic alliances, and when appropriate should partner 
with other organisations to strengthen their capability to achieve desired results.  They should 
initiate and promote cooperation and coordination between a variety of entities to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of services and to maximize the resources available to the 
communities they serve.   
 
4.3.8 Adaptability to change 
 
Several scholars, especially those who prescribe to the open system perspective (Weick, 
1977; Nickols, 2000; Berger, Sikora &. Berger, 1994), stress the importance of adaptability 
and flexibility to environmental changes as core criteria of organisational effectiveness. 
Weick (1977:193-194), emphasizes this dimension when he insists that effective 
organisations are characterized by a diversity of linguistic forms, techniques for breaking out 
of normal cognitive and normative constraints, structural units that are loosely articulated so 
as to maximize sensitivity to the environment and diversity of response.  In other words, 
institutions should not be too rigid if they wish to prosper in a volatile, uncertain, complex 
and ambiguous environment.  
 
In order for an organisation to be able to adapt to change, it must have in place effective 
procedures for managing change.  Berger, Sikora and Berger D.R. (1994), note that managing 
change is a continuous process of aligning an organisation with its environment thus enabling 
it to be more efficient and effective and continuously collecting feedback from within the 
organisation.  Change management examines external and internal conditions affecting an 
organisation and uses skills, knowledge and strategies to effectively plan and implement 
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change as well as support continuous improvement following change.  Nickols (2000:1), 
observes that there are two common triggers that prompt organisations with the task of 
managing change.  Firstly, an organisation may choose to implement a new method or system 
in a planned and managed or systematic fashion.  This is an “anticipative or proactive 
response” change.  Either internal events within the organisation of the external environment 
triggers the shift in change.  Secondly, an organisation may be forced to make changes or 
implement a new system based on the external factors such as laws, societal issues or 
competitors.  This is known as a “knee-jerk or reactive response” change.  The organisation 
has little or no control and must change in order to stay competitive and in business.   
 
Change management is thus about making alterations to the organisation’s purpose, culture, 
structure and processes in response to seen or anticipated changes in the environment.  It 
starts with the detection of a change trigger and ends with the implementation of a new 
strategy within the organisation.  Effective organisations are those that identify and embed 
those changes that will ensure the long-term survival of the organisation (Collett, 2003:3). 
 
Beinhocker (2006:5-7), proposes three methods of increasing an organisation’s effective 
adaptation to change, that is, reducing hierarchy, increasing autonomy and encouraging 
diversity.  He further proposes that in order for these three models to be effective, they must 
be supported by facilitative organisational norms, that is, cooperating norms that encourage 
trust, reciprocity and shared purpose; performing norms that create strong expectations from 
individual performance, so that employees will go the extra mile, take the initiative, be honest 
and transparent and believe that success will be rewarded;  and innovating norms which 
include the belief that facts matter more than hierarchy, that good ideas can come from 
anywhere and that good enough never is. 
 
4.3.9 Transformational leadership  
 
The subject of leadership has been in vogue for several years.  It has emerged in the context 
of how organisations are best able to face and cope with environments of rapid change, 
complexity and uncertainty.  The thesis has been that management with its dominant focus on 
doing things effectively rather than doing the right things cannot achieve results (Bennis & 
Nunus, 1985:21)  The distinction between leadership and management has been given further 
thorough interpretation by Professor John Kotter (1990:4-5).  He distinguishes managers 
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from leaders by asserting that managers seek to provide consistency and order in 
organisations irrespective of environmental complexity.  On the other hand, leaders establish 
direction, align people behind the direction or vision and inspire and motivate people to 
achieve results.  It is in this context of the foregoing distinction of managers and leaders that 
the attribute of transformational leadership arises. 
 
According to Etzioni (1965:690-91), leadership is a special form of power, one that involves 
the ability, based on the personal qualities of the leader, to elicit the followers’ voluntary 
compliance in a broad range of matters.  Leadership is distinguished from the concept of 
power in that it entails influence, that is, change of preferences, while power implies only that 
subjects’ preferences are held in abeyance.  Leadership thus entails motivating followers to 
achieve the outcomes that the leader seeks, and effectively, this requires them to adopt 
preferences for those outcomes.   
 
The vast majority of studies of leadership have focused on persons who have been assigned a 
leadership position in an organisation, that is, who have some authority by virtue of their 
position.  This is not surprising given that several studies have shown that top leadership has 
the potential for drastic impacts on the operations and performance of an organisation (Guest, 
1962; Gouldner, 1950; 1954).  Top leaders are expected to be transformational if 
organisational effectiveness is to be achieved.  Yukl (1994:271), defines transformational 
leadership as the process of influencing major changes in the attitudes and assumptions of 
organisational members and building commitment for the organisation’s mission, objectives 
and strategies.   
 
In order to be transformational, Selznick (1957:55-63), specifies four major functions of top 
leaders.  The first is to define the institutional (organisational) mission and role.  The second 
task entails the institutional embodiment of purpose, which involves choosing the means to 
achieve the ends desired or ensuring that the structure reflects and is designed to accomplish 
the mission effectively.  The third task is to defend the organisation’s integrity.  The final 
leadership task is the ordering of internal conflict.   
 
Other activities associated with top level leadership include:  determining the intent of the 
mission, making strategic decisions, developing key competencies and capabilities, 
developing organisational structures, processes and controls, selecting and developing the 
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next generation of leaders, sustaining an effective organisational culture and creating and 
communicating a vision of the future (Hickman, 1998; Hunt, 1991;  Zaccaro, 1996).  Clearly, 
these functions are very relevant to leaders at the highest level of an organisation.  Top 
leadership therefore need to understand the broader political, economic, socio-cultural, 
technological and informational environment in order to envision future goals or end-states.  
At the highest level, senior leaders “must conceptualize and construct robust organisations 
that can withstand the rigours of yet unknown events” (Hammond, 1998:7).   
 
Leadership theories also emphasize the role of a leader as an agent or initiator of change  
(Reeves, Duncan & Ginter, 2000).   In the current, turbulent environment, change may be 
viewed as a continuous and vision-governed adaptation to external changes and emerging 
conditions (Styhre, 2002:343).  Consequently, successful leaders need to be versatile in order 
to respond appropriately in different organisational scenarios.  Aiken and Keller (2007:1-6), 
suggest four key functions which collectively define a successful role for an organisation’s 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in managing change.  Firstly, a CEO must make the change 
meaningful.  People will go to extraordinary lengths for causes they believe in, and a 
powerful transformation story will create and reinforce their commitment.  They for example 
observe that CEOs who take time to personalize the story of the transformation can unlock 
significantly more energy for it than those who dutifully present the PowerPoint slides that 
their working teams created for them.  Other means of making the transformation meaningful 
include engaging others openly and spotlighting successes as they emerge.   
 
Secondly, a CEO must role model desired mind-sets and behaviour. Whether leaders realize 
it or not, they seem to be in front of the cameras when they speak or act.  Every move they 
make, everything they say, is visible to all.  Therefore the best approach is to lead by 
example.  Aiken and Keller (2007:4), note that employees expect the CEO to live up to 
Mahatma Gandhi’s famous edict, “For things to change, first I must change.”  The CEO is 
the organisation’s chief role model.  The quickest way to send shock waves through an 
organisation is to conceive and execute a series of symbolic acts signalling to employees that 
they should behave in ways appropriate to a transformation and support these types of 
behaviour in others.   
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Thirdly, a CEO must build a strong and committed top team.  A CEO can do this through 
assessing the ability of individual members of the team and acting swiftly on the results.  
Many CEOs find it useful to map team members on a matrix, with “business performance” on 
one axis and “role-modelling the desired behaviour” on the other.  Those in the top-right box 
(desired behaviour, high performance) are the organisation’s stars, and those in the bottom-
left box (undesired behaviour, low performance) should be motivated, developed or 
dismissed.  The greatest potential for sending signals involves the employees in the box of 
“undesired behaviour, high performance.”  When clear action is taken to improve or remove 
these managers, the team’s members know that role-modelling and teamwork matter.  This 
means that if necessary, CEOs have to get rid of those individuals, even the talented ones, 
who quarrel and cannot work together or those who everyone knows are not carrying their 
load (Aiken & Keller, 2007:4). 
 
The CEO can also build a strong and committed top team through effective dialogue. CEOs 
have to realize that even with the right team in place, it takes time for a group of highly 
intelligent, ambitious and independent people to align themselves in a clear direction.  The 
CEO has therefore to agree with members on what they can achieve as a team (not as 
individuals), how often the team should meet, what transformation issues should be discussed 
and what behaviour the team expects and/or will not tolerate (Aiken & Keller, 2007:4). 
 
Fourthly, a CEO can bring about successful transformation by relentlessly pursuing impact.  
There is no substitute for a CEO directing his or her personal energy toward ensuring that an 
organisation’s efforts have an impact.  Aiken and Keller (2007:5), recommend that initiatives 
with a significant financial or symbolic value require the CEO’s personal involvement for 
maximum impact.  An Executive must be willing to roll up his sleeve, leave the executive 
suite and help resolve difficult operations issues.  This has several beneficial effects, key 
among them being that it ensures that important decisions are made quickly (without 
sacrificing the value of collective debate) and sows the seeds of a culture of candour and 
decisiveness.   
 
Another way of relentlessly pursuing impact is through holding leaders accountable.  
Successful CEOs never lose sight of their management responsibility to chair review forums.  
Through these, they compare the results of the transformation program with the original plan, 
identify the root causes of any deviations, celebrate successes, help fix problems and hold 
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leaders accountable for keeping the transformation on track both in activities (are people 
doing what they said they would?) and impact (will the program create the value we 
anticipated?).  A central role for the CEO during these review forums is to ensure that 
decision making stays grounded in facts not emotion (Aiken & Keller, 2007:5-6). 
 
4.3.10 Political will 
 
The contingency model argues that different environmental contexts place different 
requirements on organisations.  As such, the institutional design of an organisation should be 
tailored to the specific requirements and objectives of a particular organisation.  This study 
observes that the unique environmental context under which RIIs operate is that they are 
institutions established by sovereign states to safeguard or promote issues of common interest 
through harmonization of their respective policies. This entails ceding of some sovereignty 
and hence an enormous amount of political will by the governments of countries participating 
in an integration scheme.   
 
Political will is a term that is often used but rarely defined.  Hornby (1995:1365) defines 
‘will’ as: trying to make something happen or a strong desire or determination. Hornby 
(1995:893) further defines ‘political’ as pertaining to the state or government.  When we 
combine the two words to form the term ‘political will’ it can be deemed to refer to a strong 
desire or determination on the part of the government or state to make something happen.  
Political will in the context of this study would therefore refer to a strong desire or 
determination on the part of the government to advance regional integration.  It implies the 
government moving beyond concepts and talk about regional integration to taking action that 
actually advances integration.  
 
In as far as RIIs are concerned, governments have used two basic alternative approaches to 
secure an institutional framework for regional integration.  These are: supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism.  According to EC Paper (1995:23), intergovernmentalism means that 
governments continue to exert their full sovereignty: institutions are only created to act as a 
Secretariat, preparing and implementing integration policies.  Supranationalism, on the other 
hand, means that governments decide to share jointly, through an institution, some specific 
aspects of sovereignty. Under supranationalism the legal provisions for integration take 
precedence over national laws, and these provisions are enforceable through the courts if 
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necessary.  In this case the budget to carry out integration policies is determine, implemented 
and controlled by common institutions.  Under intergovernmentalism, states agree on certain 
matters that become part of their national legislations, but there is no body of common law.   
 
Given the unique environment of RIIs, there has been debate about which of these models is 
best suited to make RIIs effective.  According to Haas (1958:29), for integration to be 
successful, two things are crucial: a central government which stands apart from those of the 
member states, that is, supranational institutions have to be created and a collective 
consciousness has to be developed.  He thus argues for the centrality of supranational 
institutions as potential agents of integration.  Nugent (2003) seems to support this view.  He 
notes that in intergovernmentalism, states, in situations and conditions they can control, 
cooperate with one another on matters of common interest.  The existence of control, which 
allows all participating states to decide the extent and nature of this cooperation means that 
national sovereignty is not directly undermined.  Supranationalism on the other hand involves 
states working with one another in a manner that does not allow them to retain complete 
control over developments.  This means, states may be obliged to do things against their 
preferences and their will because they do not have the power to stop decisions.  
Supranationalism thus takes inter-state relations beyond cooperation into integration and 
involves some loss of national sovereignty.  Evidently, Supranationalism entails more 
political will. 
 
The EU which is considered to be the world’s most successful RII utilises a blend of 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in its integration process.  Virtually all other RIIs 
are almost fully intergovernmental.  According to EU Paper (1995:23), the lesson to be learnt 
in relation to the design of RIIs is not that institutions should be supranational or 
intergovernmental, but that whichever approach is taken the institutions should have a 
realistic mandate.  They should also have available adequate resources to fulfil this mandate.  
It helps if own resources are generated automatically. The complexity of integration calls for 
institutions that are capable of formulating and implementing regional policies.  Human and 
financial resources should be in line with the objectives.  There should be no conflict or 
overlapping membership between the mandates of different institutions as this leads to 
inefficiency and waste of resources. Further the principals of subsidiarity and variable 
geometry should be operationalised.  All these are possible only if there is adequate political 
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will.  The organisational effectiveness of RIIs is thus dependent on the goodwill of the 
governments of participating countries.     
 
Best (2006:8-9), shares the above view.  He argues that supranational institutions should not 
be understood simply as common organs with some kind of formal powers at a higher level.  
They are better seen as being a set of rules and instruments involving some form of sharing of 
sovereignty, which may be combined in different ways with more intergovernmental 
practices of regional cooperation.  He notes that supranationalism may be employed in 
decision making, monitoring and enforcement and recommends two kinds of supranational 
arrangements.  One concerns the interaction between the governments (with or without other 
autonomous institutions) and can be summarized as the pooling of sovereignty.  Sovereignty 
is pooled when governments take decisions by voting procedures other than unanimity; 
and/or when governments agree to act either jointly or not at all (exclusive competence), even 
if by unanimity.   
The other refers to delegation of powers to autonomous institutions which are created by the 
member states.  When it comes to decision making powers, these include in a rough 
descending order of degrees of autonomous power: 
 
 the right to adopt normative decisions, that is, general rules, directly on the basis of 
the Treaty and without the need for approval by the Partner States; 
 the need to agree with the members states in adopting normative decisions; 
 the exclusive right of initiative for the adoption of normative decisions by the member 
states;  
 the autonomous right to adopt binding implementing acts; and 
 the exclusive right to adopt binding implementing acts with the approval of the 
Partner States (Best, 2006:8-9).   
 
When it comes to applying the rules, these tasks may include:  
 
 judicial review of union acts by a Court; 
 authoritative right of interpretation by a Court; 
 legal action before a Court to ensure fulfilment of obligations; and 
 direct inspection by centralized agencies (Best, 2006:8-9). 
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Best (2006:9), further notes that discussions of supranationalism have tended to focus on the 
role of states and state created institutions in the adoption and application of rules.  He 
cautions that there are several other important dimensions of supranationalism, which deserve 
mention.  The first is the question of funding.  One of the nightmares of most integration 
schemes has been lack of funding even for the basic institutions, far less for common policies 
or compensatory mechanisms.  Finding an alternative to dependence on national quotas 
requires some form of automatic mechanisms to establish a system of ‘own resources’.  
Unless this were to take the shape of a parallel self-commitment in each country’s 
constitution, some form of ‘supranational’ exercise is inevitably involved, such as pooled 
customs revenues in a customs union, a levy on certain kinds of transactions or a share of 
indirect taxation.   
 
 
The second is the role of political bodies which are formally supranational by virtue, not of 
their creation by governments, but of their direct election by citizens: in other worlds, a 
directly-elected common assembly.  Such a body may be supranational both by its nature and 
by its role.  Best (2006:10), observes that EU experience shows that by virtue of its direct 
election since 1979, the EU Parliament has acquired a number of supranational powers in 
decision making, budgetary control and appointments. 
 
 
4.4 SUMMARY   
 
In summary organisational effectiveness denotes the ability of an organisation to be effective 
in achieving its intended outcomes.  Extensive scholarly work has been carried out to 
determine what increases an organisation’s ability to achieve its goals.  These works fall into 
four main theoretical frameworks: the rational perspective which stresses on formalization of 
rules and roles and monitoring conformance to those rules; the natural systems perspective 
which stresses on harnessing the hearts and minds of organisational participants as well as 
external stakeholders; the open systems perspective which stresses on effective adaptation of 
an organisation to its environment, including among other things transformational leadership 
and the contingency model which advocates for models of organisational effectiveness that 
are more tailored to the specific requirements and objectives of a particular organisation.  
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Based on the different perspectives of organisational effectiveness, one may discern that there 
is no single theory that builds consensus on the definition or measurement of organisational 
effectiveness.  Indeed, leading management gurus point out that there cannot be a single 
theory about effectiveness because the various models are more likely to complement one 
another than supplant one another.  Thus, from the theories of organisational effectiveness 
reviewed, the following variables are identified as determinants of organisational 
effectiveness: clarity of purpose; facilitative organisational culture; rational organisational 
structure; rational organisational processes; ability to acquire and manage resources; internal 
harmony; satisfaction of strategic constituencies both internal and external; ability to adapt to 
change; transformational leadership and political will (in as far as public sector institutions 
are concerned). 
 
Different scholars recommend various ideal situations with regards to the determinants of 
organisational effectiveness identified. With regard to clarity of purpose, organisations are 
encouraged to develop well defined and specific goals.  The construction of clear mission 
statements is underscored in this regard.  With regard to organisational culture, organisations 
are encouraged to develop internal norms that focus on customer service, innovation, 
operation excellence and team spirit.  With regard to structure, demarcation of roles should 
enable effective achievement of goals.  Further, departments or organs should understand 
their roles in the organisation, have the authority to carry out their roles and be accountable 
for their work.  There should also be effective coordination between the various organs or 
departments.  With regard to processes, organisations are encouraged to develop smooth 
internal management systems in terms of effective strategic planning, rational and quick 
problem-solving and decision-making, quick and accurate exchange of information and 
effective monitoring and evaluation. 
 
In the area of resource acquisition and management, organisations are encouraged to offer 
attractive terms and conditions of service in order to attract the right and best people to enable 
achievement of goals. Further, it is underscored that recruitment of staff should be based on 
qualifications.  An effective human resource management system to make optimal use of the 
human resource is also encouraged.  Organisations are also encouraged to establish reliable 
source of financial resources and manage these resources through effective financial 
management systems. Further, they should provide basic infrastructural conditions which 
enable work to transpire – for example, reasonable space in a building equipped with 
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adequate lighting, clean water, a dependable supply of electricity etc.   Provision of adequate 
technological resources such as scanners, computers, photocopiers and record management 
software is also encouraged.  With regard to internal operations, organisations are encouraged 
to resolve rather than manage or suppress internal conflict.   
 
With regard to satisfaction of internal strategic constituencies, organisations are encouraged 
to create an environment that motivates and stimulates their personnel through use of 
incentives.  For external strategic constituencies, organisations are encouraged to identify all 
their external stakeholders in order to assess their potential impact (positive and negative) on 
the organisation and take appropriate measures.  In the area of adaptability to change, 
organisational experts advise that organisations should understand that the environment is 
volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous; as such they should be adaptable and flexible 
enough to cope with environmental changes.  An effective change management system is 
important in this regard.   
 
In as far as leadership is concerned, the importance of transformational leadership, especially 
leadership at the top of the organisation, in enabling an organisation to effectively achieve its 
objectives is underscored.  Activities associated with transformational leadership include:  
determining the intent of the mission, making strategic decisions, developing key 
competencies and capabilities, developing organisational structures, processes and controls, 
selecting and developing the next generation of leaders, sustaining an effective organisational 
culture; creating and communicating a vision of the future and being an effective agent or 
initiator of change.   
 
Ultimately, political will is identified as crucial for the effectiveness of public sector 
institutions like the RIIs.  This means governments should create regional institutions with 
realistic mandate, equip them with adequate human and financial resources to fulfil this 
mandate and give them the capacity to formulate and implement regional policies. 
 
The theories of organisational effectiveness represent reliable scientifically proven 
knowledge, as established by experts in the field of organisational effectiveness, on what it 
takes for an institution to effectively achieve its goals.  If RIIs such as the EAC intend to be 
effective in achieving their mandate, it is crucial that they embrace, in their organisational 
systems, processes and structure the recommendations advocated by these theories.   
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In the next chapter, the research findings are presented.  The organisational effectiveness of 
the EAC is analysed vis-a-vis the determinants of organisational effectiveness identified.  The 
chapter attempts to establish the extent to which the basic fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory are present in the EAC and how they have been replicated in EAC’s 
structures and decisions making processes.  A comparative overview of the European Union 
(regarded as the most advanced RII) is also presented with a view to determine whether the 
basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are embedded in the EU’s 
structures and processes and whether this accounts for its relatively successful regional 
integration process.   
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Chapter Five 
 
ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a strong temptation, when engaging in institutional evaluations, to over-generalize 
the conclusions; for example that “an institution should do such and such…” or to prescribe, 
in a blanket-style fashion, the latest models of the day. Such an approach is fundamentally 
flawed because, whilst there are generic characteristics of effective institutions, there are also 
specific and unique characteristics of institutions that flow from environmental, historical and 
even cultural circumstances. In other words, organisations are not homogeneous. Moreover, 
the missions of institutions differ and this may affect the form an institution takes. However, 
the uniqueness of an institution, in itself, does not invalidate some generalisations about 
structure, systems and processes.  
 
The late Harvard historian, Alfred Chandler (1962), in his magisterial work, Strategy and 
Structure-Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, argued that organisational 
forms were primarily a derivative of strategy.  Despite the validity of Chandler’s work, it is 
still important to undertake an analytical study of each institution’s mission, culture and 
environmental contexts to determine how they impact performance. We learn from Gary 
Hamel’s latest book, The Future of Management, that unlike physics, the laws of 
management are neither foreordained nor eternal. “Whiplash change, fleeting advantages, 
technological disruptions, seditious competitors, fractured markets, omnipotent consumers, 
rebellious shareholders - these 21St century challenges are testing the design limits of 
organisations around the world and are exposing the limitations of a management model that 
has failed to keep pace with the times.” (Hamel, 2007:x).  This means, as IDRC (2006:9) 
observes, the ideas and concepts dealt with in an institutional evaluation should flow from 
and reflect the institution’s own ideas and its approach to those ideas – indeed the 
institution’s own way of knowing about itself.    
 
In the specific case of the EAC, there has not been, to-date, a scientific analysis to determine 
its effectiveness in the realization of the objectives set for it under the Treaty establishing it.  
Most of the organisational reviews that have so far been undertaken on the EAC have largely 
 108
focused on two areas. First, to determine EAC’s capacity to absorb donor funding from the 
European Union and from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID).  These studies have focused on the efficacy of EAC’s internal financial controls and 
project monitoring and evaluation systems. They have not examined EAC’s organisation 
structure, resource mobilisation capacity, staff behavioural patterns, including organisational 
culture and decision making systems, to determine capacity to better deliver the mandate 
vested on the organisation. Second, the reviews have centred on gauging how effectively 
decisions made by the EAC Summit of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers have 
been implemented.   
 
These reviews fall short of an objective determination or evaluation of the institution’s ability 
to effectively achieve its broad objectives.  This lacuna raises the fundamental question 
whether the EAC deserves to enjoy the confidence of its shareholders, the five Partner States, 
which annually contribute significant sums of money to fund its budget.  Concomitantly, it 
raises the question whether the EAC should be given additional mandates as well as 
additional decision making powers.  Answers to these questions necessarily revolve around 
the determination of EAC’s effectiveness as an institution.  This chapter sought to respond to 
these questions by analysing the EAC from the organisational theory perspective of 
organisational effectiveness.  
 
5.1.1 Overview of selected factors of organisational effectiveness  
 
As described in chapter four, the dominant public administration theoretical models that 
underpin organisational theory suggest diverse factors used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
organisations.  These include clarity of an organisation’s purpose; state of organisational 
culture; the rationality of structure and processes; how effectively the organisation is able to 
acquire and manage resources; whether there is internal harmony in operations; how satisfied 
the strategic constituencies are; whether the leadership is transformational; how effectively  
the organisation adapts to change; and, in the case of public sector organisations, whether 
there is adequate political will to implement programmes that result in effective 
organisational performance. 
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The choice of the evaluation criteria is informed by the foregoing factors.  In greater detail, 
the evaluation centres on the following factors:  
 
a) The clarity and purposefulness of the EAC’s vision, mission as well as goals and how 
effective the goals are in delivering the vision and mission.  The effectiveness in this 
regard is examined and benchmarked on the SMART11 acronym;  
 
b) The nature of EAC organisational culture; that is, whether the values and work ethics 
that presently exist make the organisation more functional whilst inculcating a sense 
of shared purpose supportive of attainment of critical EAC objectives;   
 
c) The extent to which the organisation structure fits the goals and objectives of the 
institution; that is, whether the structure adequately responds to the mandates and the 
strategies adopted; whether there is a clarified distribution of roles and responsibilities 
within the organs and in the context of the relations between the organs; how 
effectively personnel are deployed across the core functions; and how the current 
structure constrains or promotes EAC’s effectiveness.  
 
d) The nature and effectiveness of the decision making process; the channels of 
communication and how the institution monitors and evaluates its performance; 
 
e) The ability of the EAC to acquire critical resources to support the realisation of its 
goals. Issues related to funding and budgets, staffing, competencies, technology and 
administrative support are focused upon; 
 
f) The responsiveness of the EAC to expectations of its strategic constituencies. Of 
importance is whether the institution effectively outreaches the citizens of all walks of 
life within the EAC region to inform and involve them on what it is doing, achieving 
and the challenges it faces; whether it is building trust and confidence in the political 
                                                 
11 SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timely.  A goal is specific if it lays down 
what is to be done, why and how.  Measurable means it should be possible to see indicators of goal 
achievement.  Attainable means the attitudes, abilities, skills and financial capacity necessary to achieve the 
goals are available.  Realistic means the goal should be do-able, that is, the skills needed to do the work should 
be available and the project should fit with the overall strategy and goals of the organisation.  Timely means 
there should be an end point on the goal which gives organisational participants a clear target to work towards. 
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and bureaucratic leadership of the Partner States on attainment of tangible benefits 
from the integration process; and whether the EAC staff feel part of the ownership of 
the integration agenda and are motivated to play a fuller part in its implementation.  
 
g) The state of internal harmony between and among the organs and institutions of the 
EAC, the various functional departments and the staff in different job groups; 
 
h) The capacity of the EAC to adapt to and accept change without compromising quality 
and performance;  
 
i) The ability of the EAC’s top leadership, specifically, the Secretary General, to be 
transformational; and  
 
j) The degree of political commitment to the EAC’s integration process.   
 
The research findings on how these various factors, determining organisational effectiveness, 
have played out in the EAC are based on: my own intense and critical observations; 
following up the course of meetings of the different policy organs of the EAC including 
studying the minutes and reports of these organs; reading the exchange of letters and 
memoranda inside the organisation and between the Partner States and the EAC, oral 
discussions I have had with staff of different levels in the organisation, literature review and 
results from the Questionnaire.  
 
The research findings have also been supported by a comparative analysis of other 
organisations that are also inter-governmental. This comparative approach is premised on 
Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) remark that “We can never learn either our own weaknesses or 
our own virtues by comparing ourselves with ourselves” (Maheshwari, 2002:521).  In this 
regard, the research findings have benefited from a comparative analysis of the organisational 
effectiveness of the EU, an institution considered to be the world’s most successful regional 
integration institution. 
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5.2 ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY 
 
In the context of this study, organisational effectiveness was defined in chapter one as the 
ability of an institution to effectively achieve the objectives for which it was established.  
Effective, in this regard, denotes not simply the achievement of results but their effectiveness 
in terms of cost, quality and timeliness.  
 
To recapitulate, the EAC is established by way of a Treaty which outlines the objectives and 
goals of the institution.  Though broad in nature, the objectives focus on how the EAC 
Partner States can become integrated economically, socially and politically through 
progressive stages of integration. In the ensuing paragraphs, an examination is done of EAC’s 
achievements as well as shortcomings.  As a start, a broad sweep of achievements and 
challenges is done followed by a more rational analysis based on the identified factors that 
underlie organisational effectiveness. 
 
It could be easily said, that a major achievement of the EAC at the political front is the 
integration of Rwanda and Burundi into the EAC from July, 2007.  It is easy to think that 
such integration is a mere political proclamation. On the contrary, it flows from serious 
efforts of an organisational character over time.  The EAC had to undertake review missions 
to determine the readiness and efficacy of the two countries joining the EAC including their 
capabilities to jump on a train that was already on a high speed in terms of the integration 
process.  Moreover, the EAC had to determine how the two countries would be enabled to 
feel ownership of the integration agenda, enjoy political visibility in the management 
structure of the EAC and nominate members to the EALA and Judges to the EACJ.  The fact 
that this enlargement has not met with any failures is a clear pointer to EAC’s organisational 
effectiveness. 
 
On the economic front, available data on the EAC’s performance shows that the EAC has 
achieved some of its objectives.  For instance, economic cooperation among the Partner 
States has been widened and deepened.  Trade statistics show that the EAC Partner States 
have averaged GDP growth of 6% p.a. as well as achieved macro-economic convergence 
reflected in low inflation levels, stable exchange rates, convertibility of currencies, low 
budget deficits and reasonable reserves (EAC Secretariat, 2006:5).  In March 2004, the EAC 
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successfully completed negotiations of the Customs Union Protocol leading to the 
establishment of the EAC Customs Union. Because of the Customs Union, intra-EAC trade 
has increased from US$786.9 million in 2002 to US$1.46 billion in 2006; a growth of 86% in 
a period of 4 years (EAC Secretariat, 2008a:6). Further, the EAC has commenced on 
negotiations for the establishment of a Common Market, which will be the only one of its 
kind in the whole of Africa, with the time line for its realization as January 2010.  There are 
also serious steps underway towards realising a Monetary Union with a single currency by 
2012.  
 
The EAC has also taken several steps to socially and culturally integrate the people of East 
Africa.  Achievements in this area include the introduction of the East African Passport, the 
Annual EAC Schools Essay Writing Competition, unveiling of the EAC flag and organizing 
regional sporting competitions involving the Armed Forces and Secondary Schools.  Plans 
for the launch of an EAC national anthem are also at an advanced stage.  
 
Through close collaboration with the East African Business Council (EABC), which has 
observer status in the EAC, the EAC has also been able to realise its objective of being 
market-driven.  For instance, in June, 2008, the EAC and EABC jointly organised the 1st East 
African Investment Conference in Kigali. And since 2007, the two organisations have jointly 
organised Annual East African Media Summits as a strategy to reach out to East Africans on 
what is happening in the integration process. The EAC has also made remarkable effort to 
realise its people-centred objective by working closely with various civil society 
organisations such as the East African Farmers Federation, the East African Law Society, 
Kituo cha Katiba and the East African Local Government Association.  
  
Despite the foregoing achievements, however, research findings based on 70% of the 
respondents interviewed reveal that the achievements of the EAC were not effective. A 
number of examples are cited:  
 
First, it was observed, that whilst the EAC prides itself of having established a Customs 
Union in January, 2005, the same is not yet fully functional and is often plagued by problems 
of non-tariff barriers as well as blatant breach of the provisions of the Customs Union by the 
Partner States.  A cited case is the 2006 controversial decision of the Tanzania government to 
allow a local textile miller – Nida Textile Mill (T) Ltd – exemption from the EAC Common 
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External Tariff (CET) as an incentive to the Mill to manufacture textiles for export. The 
decision was viewed as unilateral contrary to the EAC Customs Management Act. The Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers and the Uganda Manufacturers Association joined the EABC 
and the Confederation of Tanzania Industries in petitioning the EAC not to enforce the 
exemption. It was felt that the exemption would create unfair competition and dumping and 
ultimately lead to a break-up of the EAC Customs Union (The East African, 2006:2). 
 
Secondly, whilst also recognising that progress had been made towards coordinating policies 
of the EAC Partner States, it was noted, at the same time, that progress was lacking in 
harmonising legal and regulatory frameworks to give them enforceable effect with the result 
that Partner States exploit gaps to delay implementation or to vary policies by implementing 
what fosters their national interests.     
 
Thirdly, although the EAC had developed working alliances with the private sector and the 
civil society, it was observed that these associations were fundamentally weak 
organisationally and were poorly coordinated. Respondents argued that the erstwhile EAC 
collapsed in 1977 mainly because it was a politically driven organisation and thus did not 
give due regard to the private sector, civil society and public interests generally.  For the EAC 
to be adequately ‘people-driven’, more emphasis had to be given to bolstering the capacities 
of private sector lobby organisations and civil society institutions to enable them to influence 
regional public policies more effectively.  This also includes having the Partner States 
aligning their national and regional economic policies towards greater private sector and civil 
society orientation.  
 
However, the translation of this objective into practical implementation faces a number of 
challenges, key being the lack of formalised legal and institutional arrangements to 
mainstream private sector and civil society interests in the EAC.  Whereas the EABC has 
observer status in the EAC, its contributions can only be noted and not taken into account by 
the EAC’s policy making system. For the EABC itself, it faces legitimacy issues since its 
membership presently excludes small enterprises, which form the bulk of enterprises in East 
Africa. Moreover, EABC’s present institutional structure is weak and lacks capacity. 
Financially, it is solely dependent on member subscriptions thus making it vulnerable to 
pressure to articulate the interests of influential members. Yet, EAC’s effectiveness 
ultimately also hinges on how it works more closely and collaboratively with the EABC.  Put 
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differently, the EAC will need to support the EABC in terms of capacity if its effectiveness to 
become market-driven is to be realised. 
 
Fourthly, despite attempts to evoke feelings of East African-ness among the people of the 
region through social and cultural integration, most respondents observed that strong 
xenophobic sentiments still prevail in certain EAC Partner States.  It was observed, for 
example, that the results of the national consultations on the idea of fast tracking the political 
federation of East Africa clearly pointed out the dominance of anti-Kenyans sentiments in 
Tanzania.  Tanzanians suffer from an abiding feeling that Kenyans would take their land and 
jobs were East Africa to integrate politically or even were freedom of persons and labour be 
allowed under the Common Market framework. How the EAC can effectively move forward 
towards the realisation of the next stages of integration seems undermined by these strong 
nationalistic sentiments. 
 
In order to undertake a broader objective review of EAC’s effectiveness so far, recourse 
needs to be had on the implementation of the Second EAC Development Strategy (2001-
2005), since this constituted the first strategy after the legal establishment of the EAC12.  The 
advantage we have is that the 3rd EAC Development Strategy (2006-2010) covers an 
evaluation of the 2nd Development Strategy.  The importance of this review is to point out the 
organisational factors that contributed to the achievements made and the failures as well as 
challenges faced.  This review also sets the crucial stage of the critical analysis of the present 
organisational environment of the EAC and what needs to be done to improve it for realising 
greater effectiveness. 
 
The overall assessment of the 2nd EAC Development Strategy (2001-2005) as observed in the 
3rd Development Strategy (2006-2010), indicates that it was an extremely ambitious strategy, 
covering a broad range of areas and activities (trade liberalisation, infrastructure and human 
resource development, peace, security and defence, mainstreaming gender, private sector and 
civil society into EAC integration, developing relations with other regional and international 
organisations and developing institutional arrangements at the level of Partner Sates and the 
EAC Secretariat, just to mention but a few).  The level of achievements is described as 
‘commendable’ as manifested in the level of cooperation and political good will that is 
                                                 
12 The 1st EAC Development Strategy (1997-2000) guided the operations of the Tripartite Commission that 
spearheaded the present EAC (EAC Secretariat, 2005:1-2). 
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enjoyed by the EAC.  However, it is also observed that in many cases, the implementation of 
the various programmes and projects in the action matrix lagged behind the prescribed time 
frame.  
 
A number of challenges are highlighted as having contributed to the lacklustre achievements 
of the 2nd EAC Development Strategy.  These include: governance and institutional 
constraints, budgetary constraints, inadequacy of enforcement machinery and sanction 
mechanisms, lengthy decision-making processes, legal and administrative handicaps, 
shortfalls in statistics and information and capacity constraints (EAC Secretariat, 2005:14-
15).   
 
Following the above broad review, the study proceeds to examine the EAC’s effectiveness 
based on the identified factors which underline organisational effectiveness. 
 
5.2.1 Clarity of purpose   
 
There is broad consensus amongst scholars and theorists of organisational effectiveness that 
effectiveness can be better achieved if an organisation has clearly spelt out goals and 
objectives.  In the context of the EAC, Article 5(1) and (2) of the Treaty for the 
Establishment of the EAC stipulates that the overall objective of the institution is to widen 
and deepen cooperation among the Partner States in among other areas, political, economic, 
social, cultural, health, education, science and technology, defence, security, legal and 
judicial affairs for their mutual benefit. The vision of the EAC is to achieve these objectives 
through a step by step process beginning with the establishment of a Customs Union followed 
by a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation 
of the East African states (EAC Secretariat, 2002:13).   
 
The EAC also operates on the basis of 5-year Development Strategies which identify 
strategic priority goals for a given period.  For example, the 3rd Development Strategy 
currently in operation, has identified the following priority areas for the period 2006-2010: 
cooperation in political matters, defence and security; completion of the implementation of 
the Customs Union Protocol; establishment of the East African Common Market; laying the 
foundation for the East African Monetary Union; laying the foundation for establishing an 
East African federation; macro-economic convergence; capital markets development; 
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development of Lake Victoria and its basin; human resource development, combating HIV 
and AIDs pandemic; promoting participation, publicity and marketing; enhancing agriculture 
and food security, promoting industrialisation; maximising benefits of tourism and wildlife; 
sustainable utilisation of environmental and natural resources; provision of adequate and 
reliable supporting infrastructure; institutional capacity development of organs and 
institutions of the EAC; and development of East African policies laws and standards (EAC 
Secretariat, 2005:32-50). 
 
The above goals and objectives as set out in the EAC Treaty and the Development Strategies, 
to the extent that they set out what the EAC should realize, can be deemed to be clear. 
However, clarity of purpose in an organisation goes beyond simply stating clear goals.  
Organisational theorists posit that clarity of purpose also entails having goals and objectives 
that are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time bound. In the case of the EAC, 
research findings point to an overwhelming contrary picture. Over 80% of the respondents 
articulated the view that EAC lacks clarity of purpose. Specific examples were outlined as 
follows:- 
 
Unspecific goals:  Respondents observed that although the vision and the mission of the EAC 
are contained in the EAC Development Strategy and hang on the EAC corridors and 
displayed in EAC documents, they are neither well articulated nor understood by most EAC 
staff, officials of the Partner States and external stakeholders. The general view was that the 
vision and the mission of the EAC were too ‘wordy’ and failed to provide the institution’s 
key stakeholders with a clear sense of direction. The vision of the EAC asserts: ‘A 
prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically united East Africa’ while the mission 
is ‘To widen and deepen economic, political, social and culture integration in order to 
improve the quality of life of the people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, 
value added production, trade and investment’ (EAC Secretariat, 2005:1).  The researcher 
observed, for example, that most of the EAC staff, officials of the Partner States and external 
stakeholders could not coherently recite the EAC vision and mission.   
 
Immeasurable goals:  Respondents noted that the goals and objectives of the EAC lack good 
operational plans and indicators of goal achievement making it difficult for implementers to 
know their exact roles and how to monitor and evaluate them. An illustration based on 
reading EAC documents confirms this.  Among the goals of the EAC as set out in Article 
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5(3) of the Treaty is ‘mainstreaming of gender in all the EAC’s endeavours and the 
enhancement of the role of women in cultural, social, political, economic and technological 
development’ (EAC Secretariat, 2002:13).  However, such a Treaty pronouncement lacks 
concrete strategies and plans upon which evaluation can be undertaken.  EAC only recruited 
a Gender Specialist in early 2008, over seven years after EAC’s establishment.  This, itself, is 
an indicator of lack of commitment to addressing gender issues in the integration agenda. On 
a positive note, however, respondents noted that the 3rd EAC Development Strategy (2006-
2010) had generally tried to overcome the lack of measurable goals as it highlights the 
implementation and coordination framework of priority goals, identifies the indicators of 
performance as well as the monitoring and evaluation framework. 
 
Unattainable goals: Respondents discerned a clear mismatch between organisational goals 
and objectives, on the one hand, and availability of resources (human and financial) for their 
attainment on the other. The EAC has broad goals and objectives which require huge 
amounts of financial resources as well as a huge human capacity to effectively plan, manage 
and oversee implementation.  It was however, observed that the EAC is organisationally thin 
on the ground. Key sectoral programmes such as agriculture, industry, environment, gender, 
labour, trade, education, international relations and political affairs, which feature 
prominently in the EAC’s goals and objectives as set out in the Treaty, are grossly under-
staffed and under-funded. These shortfalls gravely impact the effectiveness of the EAC in 
fulfilling its mandate.  
 
Unrealistic goals: The EAC goals and objectives were seen as being too ambitious and 
unrealistic. It was observed that the organisation was pursuing too many goals instead of 
being focused on a few attainable ones. Almost concurrently, the EAC is seeking to 
implement a Customs Union, establish a Common Market, establish a Monetary Union whilst 
undertaking several programmes like negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement with 
the European Union, craft an industrial and investment strategy, formulate a legal and 
regulatory framework for a regional financial markets framework, develop a policy and law 
on piracy and counterfeits, harmonise commercial laws that underpin a Common Market 
regime and undertake an organisational study of the EAC to fit its planned  transformations    
over the next five to seven years. Respondents expressed specific concern that the EAC was 
rushing to the 2nd and 3rd stages of integration, that is, the Common Market and the Monetary 
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Union before carrying out an objective assessment of how the 1st stage of integration, the 
Customs Union, had performed and how the EAC Partner State had benefited.   
 
Goals that are not time-bound:  It was noted that the goals and objectives of the EAC lacked 
clearly laid down timeframes. For example, the Treaty states that in pursuit of its objectives, 
the EAC Partner States will establish among themselves a Customs Union, followed by a 
Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation of the 
EAC States (EAC Secretariat, 2002:13). Other than the Customs Union whose time frame 
was given as four years from the date the EAC Treaty was signed, the time-frame for the 
other stages of integration were left hanging.  This has resulted in the EAC having unclear 
targets to work towards and sometimes having to set unrealistic targets based on political 
whims as evidenced in the setting of dates for the Common Market and the Monetary Union 
in 2010 and 2012 respectively.  A politically driven date for the realisation of a political 
federation had also been set up as 2013 and this proved disastrous as the East Africans 
consulted on it retorted that it amounted to putting the cart before the horse. They quizzed, 
“how the people could be led to a date even before they discussed the plausibility of the idea 
itself”?  
 
5.2.2 Organisational culture  
 
Positive organisational culture has been cited in theories of organisational effectiveness as 
being linked to increased staff alignment, heightened consensus regarding strategic direction, 
increased employee productivity and advanced levels of employee commitment.  Cognisant 
of this, at a staff retreat held in Jinja, Uganda, in 2007, the EAC adopted professionalism, 
accountability, teamwork, mutual respect and allegiance to the EAC as its core values.  The 
move was meant to instil and ingrain positive values and work ethics in the EAC in order to 
realise a more functional organisational environment that promotes a shared sense of purpose 
and collective pursuit of organisational goals for effectiveness.   
 
However, when asked whether they believed the prevailing organisational culture in the EAC 
facilitates effective achievement of its goals and objectives, over 80% of the respondents 
responded in the negative. They cited individualism, poor team work, unnecessary travel, 
poor time management, indifference and ‘don’t care attitude’, laxity, lack of sense of urgency 
and nepotism as dominant features of the EAC’s organisational culture.  Specifically, 
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individualism manifested as a ‘territorial mentality’ where individual officers and respective 
directorates function like self-sufficient islands giving rise to poor organisation-wide team 
work.  On travel, it was observed that although the nature of the EAC’s work involves many 
meetings both within and outside the duty station, there is considerable unnecessary travel by 
Executive and Professional Staff at the great expense of the organisation.  Unnecessary travel 
was evidenced in Executive Staff travelling for technical meetings in which technical officers 
could effectively represent the institution, officers collecting per diem for travel yet never 
turning up for meetings or only making technical appearances, failure to present back-to-
office reports of missions made, abrupt, uncoordinated travel which disrupts work and 
officers leaving urgent work pending on their desks in order to travel while they could easily 
have turned down the trip or delegated the same to less busier officers.  
  
Majority of the respondents were concerned about the indifference/don’t care attitude 
especially among Support Staff in the secretarial, accounts and registry cadres.  It was noted, 
for example, that despite knowing the urgency of timely despatch of letters convening 
meetings, many secretaries have the tendency of not faxing/scanning letters preferring the 
easier option of dumping them in the registry for posting.  This has resulted in EAC Partner 
States failing to receive documents on crucial meetings on time.  Staff in the Accounts 
department were also perceived as being indifferent especially with regard to preparation of 
payments for staff travelling on missions. Despite lodging claims weeks in advance, it has 
now become a norm for officers to travel on official duty using their personal money simply 
because the accounts staff  were too slow in preparing their payments.   
 
Overall, this negative organisational culture in the EAC was attributed to lack of a staff code 
of conduct and ethics.  In most institutions, employees have a document they can pick and 
read to know how to conduct themselves.  Organisation culture can improve or deteriorate 
based on something that is known to everybody.  If an employee behaves badly, someone 
should be able to tell him/her, according to the laid down code of conduct that the behaviour 
reflected is wrong.  In the EAC this formal sanction is non-existent.  
 
Discrimination in terms of benefits applicable to employees was also seen to be contributing 
to a negative organisational culture especially among the Support Staff who spend a 
considerable amount of their time lamenting about the benefits they are denied.  Such 
benefits include settlement allowance and home leave.  In terms of settlement allowance for 
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example, Rule 44 of the EAC staff rules and regulations clearly stipulates that on first 
appointment, an Executive or Professional member of staff shall receive, for himself or 
herself, spouse and four dependents accompanying him or her, a settlement allowance to 
meet extra-ordinary living expenses upon reporting on duty (EAC Secretariat, 2006:27).  The 
regulation excludes staff recruited at Support Staff level. This is despite the fact that a 
significant number of Support Staff are regionally recruited and hence find themselves having 
to relocate to duty stations outside their countries of origin.  The fact that they are left to 
struggle to settle themselves and their families at their own expense has led to resentment and 
low morale ensuing among this category of staff.  This may account for the general apathy 
they display towards their work. 
 
5.2.3 Organisation structure 
 
The effectiveness of an institution can partly be gauged from how its organisation structure 
supports the realisation of goals and objectives.  But there is no panacea about which 
structure is best.  The best structure is one that fits the task in certain conditions and in certain 
periods. Organisation structure hinges on identification and delineation of roles and 
responsibilities in an organisation. There are two key purposes to this process.  First, it is to 
ensure effectiveness and efficiency of operations.  Second, is to produce and implement 
power and authority.  The EAC’s organisation structure can be analysed from two 
perspectives.  Structure based on organs of the EAC and structure based on the functional 
units of the executive organ of the EAC, that is, the Secretariat.   
 
Structure based on organs:  In the EAC, the organisation structure fundamentally designs the 
process of decision making by ensuring that executive power principally resides in the 
Partner States through the authority of the Council of Ministers.  The authority of the East 
African Court of Justice is proscribed by its being limited to interpreting the Treaty 
establishing the EAC.  And whilst it has so far contributed some celebrated jurisprudence on 
issues related to the rule of law and governance, this limited jurisdiction does not open it to a 
bigger role in promoting the integration agenda.  In contrast, the East African Legislative 
Assembly has played a more signal role in nudging the EAC Secretariat to become a more 
effective agency of integration through its thoroughness in debating and approving the EAC 
budget, in undertaking a thorough review of the audits of EAC’s finances and projects and in 
taking a highly critical stance over legislation tabled before it.  Of course, how these three 
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organs, the Secretariat, the Court and the Assembly work together whilst respecting their 
clear mandates, remains a challenge because the Treaty is quite ambivalent and even silent in 
few key areas that relate to inter-organ relations and the scope of roles over finances, budgets 
and employment.    
 
What is more fundamental about the EAC organisation structure is the lack of decision 
making authority on the part of the Secretariat.  A close reading of the EAC Treaty reveals 
that the structure vests all decision making powers on the Council of Ministers. Article 
14(3)(a) states that the Council shall make policy decisions for the efficient and harmonious 
functioning and development of the Community (EAC Secretariat, 2002:21).  Similarly, the 
role of submitting reports and recommendations on the implementation of the EAC Treaty is 
vested in the Coordination Committee as seen in Article 18(a) of the EAC Treaty (EAC 
Secretariat, 2002:24).  Even more surprising, going by Article 21(a) of the Treaty, the role of 
preparing implementation programmes and setting out of priorities for the EAC is the 
preserve of the Sectoral Committees.   
 
The Council of Ministers, the Coordination Committee and the Sectoral Committees are 
made up, respectively, of Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and Senior Officials from the 
EAC Partner States who in practice and going by experience represent national interests.  On 
the other hand, the EAC Secretariat, which is deemed to represent regional interests, has been 
given the role of administering the implementation of Treaty provisions which includes 
implementation of programmes for the most appropriate, expeditious and efficient ways of 
achieving the objectives of the EAC as well as implementation of decisions of the Summit 
and the Council.  
 
Despite this apparent crucial role, the structure does not assign the Secretariat any decision 
making authority. Above all, even over what are deemed as regional projects, which the 
Secretariat promotes from conception to analysis to mobilisation of funding thereof, their 
execution is mandated to the Partner States.  This amorphous structure of project planning 
and implementation has often led to delays and uncoordinated implementation leading to cost 
overruns, re-tendering processes and poor image on the part of the EAC that gets seen in the 
eyes of the people as inefficient. A case in point is the manner in which the Tanzania 
Government mishandled the tendering process for the construction of the regional Arusha-
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Namanga-Athi River Road that connects the northern border of Tanzania with Kenya.  Kenya 
commenced construction on its side of the border six months before the Tanzanian side. 
 
Figure 3:  The EAC’s decision making tree 
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(Source:  Researcher’s presentation as cited in the text) 
 
The research findings based on the views of the respondents were in tandem to my findings. 
Over 70% of the respondents were of the view that the demarcation of roles based on the 
organs of the EAC was not conducive to effective achievement of the institution’s goals and 
objectives. The respondents wondered how the EAC Secretariat could be expected to 
effectively implement regional integration programmes when it lacked teeth to make even 
mundane decisions.  The overarching conclusion was that the EAC structure assigns the most 
critical roles for effective achievement of EAC’s objectives to the Summit of Heads of State 
and the Council of Ministers.  These organs cannot realistically achieve the EAC objectives 
 123
due to pressing national commitments and the shortage of time spent examining EAC issues.  
The Council of Ministers, which is the executing arm of the Summit, by the very nature of 
how the Treaty structures the pyramid of decision making, commencing with the Sectoral 
Committee meetings of Senior Officials, then the Co-ordination Committee of Permanent 
Secretaries, overly relies on what these lower organs recommend to them for decisions.  
Regrettably, it is these technocrats from the Partner States who tend to over-exercise zero 
sum game13 at its worst level when it comes to issues of a regional character or matters 
related to improving EAC’s capacity, organisationally and resources-wise (human and 
financial), for achieving greater effectiveness.  
 
The Finance and Administration Committee made up of officials from the EAC Partner 
States was pointed out as a good example of an organ that undermines EAC’s delivery of 
results. Due to delegation of duties by the Council of Ministers, this Committee has become 
so powerful to the extent that it determines the terms and conditions of service of EAC staff, 
draws and determines the EAC Budget, decides which staff positions are necessary to enable 
the EAC achieve its objectives and generally has a firm grip on all administrative and 
financial affairs of the EAC. 
 
Structure based on functional units of the EAC Secretariat:  In mid 2006, an organisation 
structure review of the EAC was undertaken with the aim to   bring about a better fit between 
the structure and the growing mandate of the EAC.  With the onset of the 3rd EAC 
Development Strategy, it was realised that the structure that existed then did not correspond 
to the new demands imposed on the organisation.  The 3rd EAC Development Strategy is a 
highly ambitious one comprising several programmes and projects whose effective 
implementation demanded the creation of new posts and better alignment of responsibilities. 
The new structure is shown as Table 6 below.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Zero sum game refers to a situation or interaction in which one participant's gains result only from another's 
equivalent losses. 
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Figure 4: Organisation structure of the EAC functional units 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
   
    
    
 
 
 
     
   
    
    
 
 
(Source: EAC Secretariat Department of Information Technology, 2008) 
 
Since 2006 and based on the experience gained, it has been realised that the EAC structure 
needs further refinement to propel higher organisational effectiveness. For example, the 
position of Deputy Secretary General (Projects and Programmes) is too broad in 
responsibilities which cut across several competencies. The position’s span of control is also 
too wide. This position covers the following responsibilities: (i) Productive and Social 
Sectors  which encompasses agriculture, livestock and food security, environment and 
climate change issues, tourism, health - HIV/AIDS, education, culture and sports, 
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immigration, labour and employment, industrial development, gender and community 
development among others; and (ii) Planning and Infrastructure which encompasses transport 
and works, metrology, civil aviation, ports and harbours and maritime transport, 
communications, planning and research, monitoring and evaluation, statistics, fiscal and 
monetary affairs, capital markets development, and investment promotion among others. 
 
Similarly, the responsibilities of the two Director positions under this Deputy Secretary 
General, that is, Director of Productive and Social Sectors and Director of Planning and 
Infrastructure are also too broad and embracing several competencies.  It is almost impossible 
to have a Director who can control such an unwieldy portfolio as Productive and Social 
Sectors.  Equally, the planning function has no direct relationship with infrastructure. To 
place these distinct functions under one Director inevitably leads to one function being given 
lesser attention based on the skills and competencies of the Director in charge.  The present 
organisation structure also depicts the location of staff functions that are by nature supporting 
or advisory, for example, audit, legal, research, planning, procurement and monitoring and 
evaluation, under directorates that are responsible for line or executing functions. These 
should ideally report to somebody who is not in a line function. In sum, the EAC is 
characterised by some Directorates supervising departments which are not homogeneous in 
terms of functions and competencies.  Not surprisingly, 80% of the respondents were of the 
view that the new EAC structure has not enabled the EAC to become more effective. Their 
views were in tandem with my findings based on literature review.  
 
5.2.4 Organisation processes  
 
The EAC’s organisational effectiveness can also be gauged on the basis of how effective its 
internal management systems are.  As an intergovernmental institution whose activities entail 
cooperation between sovereign states, the internal management processes most critical to the 
success of the EAC are its decision making processes, the manner in which it communicates 
and how it monitors and evaluates its performance.   
 
Decision making process:  Decision making systems, procedures and processes have an 
important part to play in assuring organisational effectiveness.  It is not simply adequate to 
have a beautiful organisation structure that delineates functions and responsibilities.  The 
ability of such structure to work hinges on the effectiveness of support systems, procedures 
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and processes in place.  In the section above where I addressed issues relating to organisation 
structure, reference was made to some of the challenges relating to decision making 
processes.  As noted, the structure in place at the EAC is amorphous and unwieldy.  It flows 
from Articles 11, 14, 18 and 21 of Treaty which stipulates that issues requiring final 
executive decision must first be considered by Sectoral Committees, then the Coordination 
Committee who then make recommendations to the Council of Ministers for final decision 
making (EAC Secretariat, 2002: 19-22, 24, 26).  Apart from its ineffectiveness in getting the 
EAC to become an effective deliverer of the mandate set for it, the process is too lengthy, 
bureaucratic and cumbersome.   
 
Moreover, and to make the decision making process even worse,  Article 12 (3) and 15(4) of 
the Treaty which stipulate that decision making will be by consensus (EAC Secretariat, 2002: 
12, 23) complicates matters even further.  Consensus requires that all Partner States must be 
in agreement before a decision is made.  While consensus decision making has the advantage 
of ensuring Partner States’ commitment to implementing regional decisions, it becomes 
impractical where many countries are involved in the integration process.  This is because it 
is not easy to reconcile a broader diversity of national interests in decision making.  
Consensus can also result in one state holding back other states often out of national interests 
that are not integrationist. For example, the idea of fast tracking East African Political 
Federation, was accepted by Kenya and Uganda but rejected by Tanzania. As a result, the 
whole idea was abandoned.  The consensus requirement has therefore been a major drawback 
to the EAC’s ability to effectively achieve its goals.   
 
Decision making in the EAC is further made ineffective by Rule 11 of the EAC Rules of 
Procedure which stipulate that there has to be quorum before meetings of the organs can be 
effective (EAC Secretariat, 2001:4). Quorum means that all EAC Partner States must be 
present at meetings for decisions to be operative.  This requirement has proved to be a 
nightmare and a major impediment to EAC’s ability to undertake its mandate on a timely 
basis.  Given the numerous meetings the EAC has at ministerial level and following the 
EAC’s enlargement with the accession of Rwanda and Burundi into the EAC in July 2007, 
the quorum requirement for meetings to take place and for enabling decisions to be reached, 
based on consensus, is becoming ever more difficult to realise.   
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For example, in Financial Year 2007/2008 alone, the following important EAC meetings 
have been postponed due to lack of quorum: Sectoral Council on Agriculture and Food 
Security postponed because Burundi could not attend due to financial difficulty, High Level 
Task Force on Negotiations on the Common Market postponed because Tanzania failed to 
give adequate notice of her inability to attend, Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs, 
postponed twice, first because Rwanda was not able to attend due to internal circumstances 
and secondly at the request of Kenya because the Attorney General was away in Europe, 
Sectoral Council on Transport, Communications and Meteorology postponed at the request of 
Tanzania and Sectoral Council on Tourism which has not been able to meet for more than a 
year because the responsible Ministers from the Partner States for one reason or another 
could not attend and thus quorum was not realisable.  As a result of these postponements the 
EAC has been unable to make progress in important areas of its objectives. It was therefore 
not surprising that in the area of decision making, 75% of the respondents believed that the 
EAC’s decision making process was not rational for effective achievement of EAC goals. 
 
Communication process:  Communication processes at the EAC take place at two levels: 
external and internal.  At the external front, communication revolves around reaching out to 
external stakeholders of the EAC on a range of issues whose overarching purpose is to 
promote a shared ownership of the integration agenda and of the measures being taken to 
realise deeper integration.  It is considered important that the citizens of East Africa as well 
as the political leadership, bureaucrats, members of academia, business players and civil 
society generally should at all times be informed about the achievements  EAC is making and 
the challenges it is facing in getting the integration process moving.  However, this challenge 
of getting a whole multi-stakeholder community engaged as to be aligned to the EAC’s 
objectives is very daunting and has constituted one of EAC’s visible failings.  The reports on 
national consultations on fast tracking political federation, to the extent that they reflected 
simple questions such as what tangible benefits are there from the economic aspect of 
integration as to demand a higher form of integration, namely political, clearly point to a 
serious disconnect between the EAC and the citizens of East Africa.  
 
A quick examination of the EAC website (www.eac.int) would reinforce this disconnect 
because it lacks the depth in information that can foster effective communication.  In some 
respects, this weakness over the external communication dimension centres on poorly 
organised and thinly staffed EAC Department of Public Affairs and Corporate 
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Communications.  For several years, this department has had only two officers and has lacked 
supportive infrastructure such as information technology, cameras and video equipment to 
enable it fulfil what is an onerous responsibility.  No doubt, the EAC has tried to bridge its 
low capacity by organising annual East African Media Summits, two so far, one in 2007 and 
another in 2008 as well as few sensitization workshops for various stakeholders in the EAC 
Partner States. Recently, a fortnightly e-Newsletter has been introduced but it is yet to mature 
in content and access to a wide audience as to have serious impact.  The situation thus 
remains unsatisfactory.  Little wonder that over 75% of respondents felt that part of the 
reason why EAC is perceived as ineffective is because of this serious paucity of information 
to external stakeholders.  
 
With regard to internal communication, there is a huge lacuna.  Communications have 
become too structured in the form of formal meetings of staff which are also few and far 
between. It is a fact that most communications are through memos and internet 
communications which are mostly of official nature and thus lacking in human socialisation. 
It can be summed up that the EAC leadership has failed to relate to the broad staff spectrum 
in a compelling way and as a result the culture of team work and shared mission lacks.  
Indeed, 75% of respondents viewed the internal communication channels at the EAC as 
ineffective both at inter-organ and intra-organ levels.  It was observed that although there 
were so many important meetings and events taking place at the EAC, the system of 
information flow between the organs of the EAC was poor.  As a result, many members of 
these organs are left without information on important issues taking place at the EAC.  Most 
EAC staff and members of its core organs could not, for instance, talk authoritatively about 
the EAC, its key achievements and its challenges or activities taking place in other organs 
because they have no reliable facts.  It was also observed that the links between the EAC and 
the Partner States were inadequate.  The EAC relies on telecommunication (fax and 
telephone) as well as postal services to communicate with the Partner States.  These have 
often proved challenging due to poorly developed telecommunication and postal services in 
East Africa.   
 
In the area of intra-organ communication, it was observed that information sharing within the 
EAC Secretariat was inadequate and uncoordinated.  The overarching view was that staff 
meetings were too infrequent and far-in between.  For example since the beginning of 2008 
only two Staff meetings had been held.  As a result of this, members of staff are not able to 
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fully follow what was happening in the organisation.  It was also noted that sometimes 
decisions are made without prior consultation and consequently communication of the same 
leads to misinterpretation and failure of implementation.  The example was given of officers 
who, without seeking the views of all or key staff, draft memos touching on operational 
procedures affecting other staff then walk into an Executive’s office and convince them to 
sign the memo which they then despatch to all employees as the new way of doing things. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation process: The EAC Secretariat is mandated to monitor and 
evaluate implementation of decisions made by the Summit of Heads of State and by the 
Council of Ministers (EAC Secretariat, 2002:52).  However, the Secretariat over the years has 
been weak in fulfilling this task.  There are two main reasons why the Secretariat has failed to 
live up to this challenge.  First, and as noted on the section above dealing with decision 
making process, the Secretariat lacks legal executive authority on implementation and 
enforcement of decisions made by EAC’s top executive organs, namely the Summit and the 
Council.  Secondly, for the past eight years of its existence the Secretariat has lacked the 
institutional capacity for monitoring and evaluation.  Indeed, it is only in April, 2007 that a 
department responsible for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was established in the EAC 
structure.  In fact, this department was established at the behest of EAC’s development 
partners who increasingly became concerned about poor or untimely reporting of utilisation 
of donor project funds reflecting a weak monitoring and evaluation function.  The position 
itself is funded by donors, not through the EAC mainstream budget contributed by the Partner 
States.   
 
As a result of weak M&E function in the EAC, the 3rd EAC Development Strategy (2006-
2010) observes that the implementation of the 2nd Development Strategy (2001-2005) partly 
suffered.  The responses to the questionnaire on the EAC position with respect to M&E 
reflects an 85% dissatisfaction about the M&E function, even after its incorporation in the 
EAC structure.  Reasons given range from the function being grossly understaffed (it only 
has one Professional Officer) to being ineffectual because it is misallocated in the overall 
structure, reporting to the Principal Officer responsible for Research and Planning instead of 
to the Deputy Secretary General responsible for Finance and Administration.  The position 
itself is graded low (at P2 salary scale in a salary scale ranging from P1 – P5 and D1 – D2 for 
Executives). 
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5.2.5 Ability to acquire resources 
 
Availability of adequate resources, financial, human and administrative (including 
technological in the form ICTs) constitutes an important driver of organisational 
effectiveness.  In turn, how an organisation is better able to mobilise and acquire such variety 
of resources crucially defines organisational effectiveness.  The research findings in as far as 
EAC’s ability to acquire resources yielded the following: 
 
Ability to acquire financial resources:  The EAC’s financial resources emanate from the 
Treaty provisions.  Article 132(4) stipulates three sources for such funds:  equal contributions 
by the Partner States, funds from development partners and any other sources as may be 
approved by the Council (EAC Secretariat, 2002:110).  In the area of financial resources, the 
EAC has had a chequered experience with ups and downs.  Generally speaking, however, 
unlike in many other African RIIs, the EAC has been blessed with Partner States that fully 
pay up their statutory contributions.  Often there are delays in remittances being made which, 
of course, slow down implementation of projects and programmes.   
 
Lately, with the accession of Rwanda and Burundi, a problem has emerged with respect to 
the formula of equal contribution to the EAC budget even when the two new members had 
agreed to abide to such requirement when negotiating accession.  The result is that the EAC 
saw a budget deficit of over US$7.5 million, about 35% in the fiscal year July 2007 to June 
2008 Budget because Rwanda and Burundi failed to meet their total obligations.  Burundi is 
in fact proving to be a basket case.  At an EAC Summit of Heads of State held in June 2008, 
Burundi requested to pay only US$ 1.7 million as budget contribution for Financial Years 
2007/08 and 2008/09 due to unfavourable economic conditions.  The Summit accepted this 
request and decided that the shortfall in the contribution arising from Burundi’s request shall 
be shared equally by the other four Partner States (EAC Summit of Heads of State, 2008:3).    
 
However, Members of Parliament of Uganda did not take the matter of bailing out Burundi 
lightly when it was brought before them for debate and approval in August 2008.  Although 
they eventually approved the issue, the debate was characterised by such comments: “What 
will the Government benefit from paying sh3.6billion for Burundi yet our resource envelope 
is not enough for the ministries?  Why do we bring in Burundi’s problems?” (Hon. Peter 
Mutuluuza) and “Uganda has to pay subscription fees this financial year.  Where will the 
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Government get extra money to pay for Burundi?” (Hon. Reagan Okumu) (The New Vision, 
2008:1).  It is yet to be seen how the Members of the National Assemblies of the other three 
EAC Partner States will react when this issue is brought before them for debate and approval.  
Not surprisingly over 90% of the respondents were of the view that the EAC was not capable 
of securing adequate funding requisite to the projects and programmes it is required to 
implement. 
 
In my view, taxpayers in one country cannot and should not be expected to shoulder the 
burden meant for taxpayers of another country.  The decision that the other Partner States 
equally apportion amongst themselves Burundi’s contribution to the EAC is preposterous, ill 
advised, unsustainable and fails to recognise Burundi’s sovereignty.  Partner States’ 
contributions to the EAC are appropriated from public taxes.  Taxes and other compulsory 
contributions are supposed to be allocated on expenditures that benefit respective Partner 
States’ internal needs.  In this regard, taxpayers in the other four Partner States are being 
requested to subsidise and pay taxes that would ordinarily be paid by Burundians. 
 
Table 3: Status of EAC Partner States Contributions to EAC Budget as at 30th April 2008 
 
COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION
DUE 2007/08 
CONTRIBUTION 
PAID FOR 
2007/08 
TOTAL 
OUTSTANDING 
% AGE 
PAID 
Kenya  4,296,532 4,164,328 132,204 96.92
Tanzania 4,296,532 4,296,843 (311) 100.01
Uganda 4,296,532 4,301,520 (4,988) 100.12
Rwanda 4,296,532 1,074,032 3,222,500 25.00
Burundi 4,296,532 84,455 4,212,077 1.97
Total 21,482,660 13,921,178 7,561,482 64.80
(Source: EAC Secretariat Directorate of Finance, 2008) 
 
At the level of cooperation with development partners, the EAC has succeeded to win the 
hearts and minds of donors and benefited from significant budget support.  For fiscal year 
2008/09, the budget support has risen by 100% from US$ 7 million in fiscal year 2007/08 to 
US$ 16 million in a total EAC budget of US$ 40 million.  Part of the reason for this huge 
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financial leverage is EAC’s development of a Partnership Fund which falls in line with the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness14.  The EAC is the only RII in Africa to develop 
such a fund that is informed by ownership of projects and programmes needing funding of 
donors.  The EAC is also now in the process of establishing a Development Fund which will 
help to address shortfalls in funding from Partner States for implementing development 
projects such as regional infrastructure.  This Fund will seek support from both the Partner 
States as well as from international financial institutions and international development 
partners such as the European Union and EU Member States.   
 
Needless to underscore, there is concern about EAC’s growing dependency on donor funding.  
51% of the respondents note that donor dependency frustrates EAC’s capacity for self 
reliance.  However, 49% felt that as with the Partner States themselves, EAC needs external 
support to lay the foundations for eventual self reliance.  A significant number of respondents 
(68%) raised concerns relating to EAC’s present capacity to utilise donor funds which they 
described as unsatisfactory.  A review of the EAC’s financial records during the budget years 
2006/07 and 2007/08 confirm this.  These reports paint a rather unsatisfactory picture about 
the effective application of donor funds to planned programmes and projects.  Indeed, some 
development partners have been wary giving additional funding because what had previously 
been allocated had not been fully spent.   The key reason cited for failure to effectively utilize 
donor funds was poor public financial management at the EAC.  This is one area where an 
EU diagnostic study of the EAC undertaken in 2006 clearly established.  More recently in 
August 2008, DFID recruited a consultant to determine EAC’s capacity to absorb funding 
support from the UK government.  The report of the consultant reinforces the results of the 
EU diagnostic study namely that the EAC has weak financial management and control 
systems (EAC Secretariat, 2008b:8). This is a worrying sign for a development partner who 
wants to allocate a sizeable financial support to the EAC.   
 
Ability to acquire human resources:  On the human resource front, the EAC faces daunting 
challenges in obtaining approvals of the Partner States to create new staff positions deemed 
necessary for effective performance.   This is linked to the EAC’s decision making process 
which requires that even mundane administrative matters such as creating new staff positions 
                                                 
14 The Paris Declaration of 2005 on aid effectiveness is an international agreement to which over one hundred 
Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials adhered and committed their countries and 
organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonization, alignment and managing aid for results with a set 
of monitorable actions and indicators.   
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have to go through, and be approved by the Sectoral Committee, the Coordination Committee 
and finally the Council of Ministers.  This greatly interferes with the EAC’s ability to acquire 
human resources.  It has for example, been a hard struggle to secure approval to revamp the 
EAC’s manning levels, with relevant skills and competences to respond to the institution’s 
expanding mandate and the emergence of more complex task on areas such as gender, 
environment, agriculture, metrology, labour, statistics, tourism, negotiation with the EU and 
negotiations with the Partner States on the establishment of a Common Market and the 
Monetary Union.  Despite these areas forming key parts of the EAC’s goals and objectives as 
laid down in the Treaty, officers were only recruited to man them in January 2007, almost six 
years after the establishment of the EAC.   
 
It has also been a herculean task for the EAC to introduce new terms and conditions of 
service that are motivational.   Between 2001 – 2006, several studies were carried out on how 
to improve the terms and conditions of service of staff of the EAC (Nyamunga Report, 
Eminent Persons Report, Pricewaterhouse Coopers).  However, none of these reports were 
adopted owing to failure by the Sectoral Committees to approve them.  It is only in 2006, 
following the recruitment of a new Secretary General, that the terms and conditions of service 
were improved; and this was only after the Secretary General personally visited the Heads of 
State in their respective capitals to explain to them the grim picture at the EAC with regards 
to staff motivation.  This led to salary levels and benefits of staff of the EAC being 
significantly increased.  These measures have been positively received by 52% of the 
respondents who indicated that the success in introducing a new organisation structure, 
additional manning levels and higher salaries and benefits in April 2007 has given birth to 
enhanced morale and motivation in the EAC. This in turn has increased the EAC’s ability to 
attract and retain competent staff.   
 
It is however important to note that a significant number of respondents (48%) were of the 
view that despite the improved manning levels and the improved terms and conditions of 
service, the EAC lacked the ability to attract and retain competent staff.  There was general 
criticism against Regulation 22 of the new EAC staff rules and regulations which introduced 
five year contracts (renewable once) for Professional Staff (EAC Secretariat, 2006:15).  
Previously the Professional Staff enjoyed five-year contracts which could be renewed 
indefinitely until the staff reached the retirement age of 60 years.  Respondents were of the 
view that the ‘ten-year maximum’ contract may undermine EAC’s capacity to attract the best 
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of the best in the labour market as potential employees may be unwilling to leave their secure 
permanent jobs to come and experiment with a five to ten year stint at the EAC.  It was 
further felt that this rule will prevent the EAC from building, over time, a strong and reliable 
workforce.  Also noted was that the increased manning levels had not entirely helped the 
EAC effectively achieve its objectives as many of the key sectoral units for example 
agriculture, gender, meteorology, livestock, statistics, energy, labour, aviation, tourism, 
education and health just to mention but a few, were still one-man departments.  As such the 
EAC is still grossly understaffed which impacts heavily on its ability to effectively undertake 
its mandate.  
 
It is important to point out that the EAC now faces the challenge of how best to integrate 
Rwanda and Burundi in its management structure.  Several professional positions have been 
reserved for these two new Partner States.  This affirmative action is aimed at actualising 
what the EAC regards as equitable sharing of posts among the Partner States as stipulated in 
Regulation 20(8) of the EAC Staff Rules and Regulations (EAC Secretariat, 2006:13).  This 
regulation has its drawbacks and short experience already indicates this concern.  Rwanda 
and Burundi have a different educational system – the French system vis-a-vis the English 
system of the original three Partner States – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.  Moreover, most 
of Rwanda and Burundi’s highly qualified people speak more French than English, not to 
speak of different legal system from the common law that rules in the original member 
countries.  Thus recruiting the right people for the EAC from these countries has been a 
daunting exercise.   
 
The research findings in as far as EAC’s ability to recruit staff on merit were in tandem with 
my findings.  Over 75% of the respondents were of the view that the quota system of 
employment has resulted in sub-standard officers being recruited into the EAC.  Concern was 
raised with the situation where when a new country joins the EAC it immediately must 
demand positions for its nationals.  This has resulted in the EAC creating sinecure positions.  
It further means that staff are recruited as much due to their nationality as to their 
competence.  Furthermore, it was noted that in recruitment of officers for top leadership of 
the EAC Secretariat, that is, the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretaries General, as 
well as recruitment into key EAC organs such as Members of the East African Legislative 
Assembly and Judges of the East African Court of Justice, personnel are often proposed for 
political reasons rather than for ability.  Okungu (2008) gives a harsh observation by noting 
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that the composition of the East African Legislative Assembly has been abused by local 
political interests in the Partner States.  As a result, he states, “Partner States have failed to 
send the best brains and the best visionaries to the EALA to champion the regional cause”.  
Some respondents also noted that appointment of Judges to the East African Court of Justice 
needed redefining.  Presently, the Judges are appointed by the Summit of Heads of State from 
among persons recommended by the Partner States.  This compromises the independence and 
effectiveness of the Judiciary. 
 
Administrative resources:  As stated earlier, administrative support systems are crucial in 
enabling tasks to be performed effectively.  Such support that ranges from good office space, 
computers and accessories, communication systems, library, records systems and accounting 
software is essential in creating good working conditions for achievement of results.  The 
EAC is making remarkable efforts to provide administrative resources to complement staff 
performance.  For example, thanks to a 14 million Euro grant from the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the EAC is now in the process of putting up its own 
Headquarters building.  There have also been efforts to introduce modern technological 
facilities that enable more effective work performance.  For example the Microsoft outlook 
internet facility is available to all staff.  In an effort to improve record management and 
timely response to correspondence, an electronic record management programme (TRIM) has 
been introduced.  Similarly, the Sun accounting software package has been introduced to 
improve accounting systems.   
 
The views of the respondents in this area however, contradicted my findings.  60% were of 
the opinion that administrative resources were not adequately provided by the EAC.  It was 
pointed out that there was a shortage of office space and many officers are currently 
compelled to share small offices.  Some officers do not even have telephone extensions in 
their offices.  Further, the entire organization only has two fax machines which are 
inadequate bearing in mind the heavy load of urgent incoming and outgoing documents that 
the EAC receives and despatches on a daily basis.  The requirement whereby all official 
telephone calls have to be routed through the Telephone Operator, was introduced in good 
faith as a cost cutting measure, but was cited by majority of respondents as negatively 
impacting on their ability to effectively perform their duties.   
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It was also noted that the EAC does not have a power back-up system and often suffers major 
power outages which compel staff to close for the day.  Important technological resources 
such as video conferencing, e-library, e-records are still nascent and rudimentary thus 
proliferating an already notorious paper culture in the EAC.   
 
5.2.6 Internal harmony   
 
The EAC is comparable to a system in the sense that it is made up of several interrelated parts 
which work together to achieve the objectives of the institution.  These parts, on a wider 
scale, comprise of the organs and institutions of the EAC as outlined in Article 9 of the EAC 
Treaty.  On a narrower scale, the parts comprise the functional departmental units of the EAC 
as set out in the EAC’s organisation structure as well as the various job groups that support 
these units.  Each part of the EAC system has been assigned a specific role through which it 
is expected to contribute to realisation of EAC’s objectives.  Being part of a system, these 
parts have to work closely, concertedly and in unison if they are to realise the EAC’s 
objectives.  Indeed, organisational effectiveness theories observe that organisations that have 
internal harmony, characterised by an absence of internal conflict, are more likely to be 
effective in achieving their goals and objectives.  The research findings, based on the views 
of over 70% of the respondents, however, reveal that the EAC does not have internal 
harmony in its inter-organ, inter-departmental and inter-staff job group relations. This 
situation if allowed to continue will become a cog in the wheel in building an organisation 
that operates on the basis of the principles of respect, trust and collective pursuit of shared 
objectives which are clearly spelt out in the Treaty.   
 
Inter-organ harmony:  The effectiveness of the EAC as an organisation is tampered by an 
atmosphere of mistrust among the key organs notably the Secretariat, the EALA and the 
EACJ.  The problem arises from some of the stipulations in the Treaty which have resulted in 
poorly structured relations between the Secretariat and the other two key organs namely the 
Assembly and the Court.  The biggest problem is found in Article 71(1)(o) of the Treaty 
which stipulates that the EAC Secretariat shall be responsible for the establishment of 
practical working relations with the Court and the Assembly. One cannot help but wonder 
why the Treaty vests such power on one of the organs of the EAC.  In itself, is evokes 
mistrust between the EAC organs as it appears as if one organ is being given greater 
importance than the others.   
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Article 66(1) of the Treaty further provides that the Secretariat shall be the executive organ of 
the Community; the Community being defined under the interpretation clause to mean the 
EAC.  But the EAC comprises other organs like the EALA and the EACJ.  The inference 
therefore, is that the Secretariat has executive authority over the EALA and the Court.  The 
same cloudy picture features under Article 67(3) where the Secretary General is described as 
the Principal Executive Officer of the Community.  It is not exactly clear what this means in 
terms of the Secretary General’s responsibilities vis-à-vis the different organs established 
under Article 9 where it is stated that there is hereby established as organs of the Community 
the Summit of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the Coordination Committee, the 
Sectoral Committee, the EALA, the EACJ and the Secretariat.  This clause seems to infer that 
the Secretary General is the Principal Executive Officer of all organs of the EAC including 
the Summit and the Council of Ministers, which is ludicrous.   
 
The above Treaty clauses have led to a lot of strain especially between the Secretariat and the 
EALA as well as between the Secretariat and the Court.  Majority of the respondents from 
these organs felt that the Treaty gives the EAC Secretary General a dual role as shown in 
Figure 5 below.  He is the Principal Executive Officer of the entire Community and yet he is 
also the Head of one of the EAC organs, the Secretariat.  This puts his impartiality into doubt 
when the Secretariat is seen as exercising more authority or benefiting from higher salaries 
and benefits.   
 
Figure 5:  The dual role of the EAC Secretary General 
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(Source:  Researcher’s presentation as cited in the text) 
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Ideally, the Treaty should clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the organs on the 
basis of the principle of separation of powers.  This is not the case. Evidently, this crucial 
aspect of organisational effectiveness, namely internal harmony has not been given due 
attention to the point that there is no internal harmony in the EAC in so far as the inter organ 
relations are concerned.  Often one has seen inter organ conflicts, especially between the 
Secretariat and the EALA, on issues ranging from EALA members not being accorded proper 
protocol at Summit meetings, to not giving adequate attention to the terms and conditions of 
service of the EALA Members as well as Judges of the EACJ, to perceived inequitable 
allocation of budgetary resources.  There is even a perceived notion of the Secretary General 
elevating the status of his position above that of the Speaker of the Assembly and the Judge 
President of the Court.  All these negative perceptions undermine internal harmony within the 
EAC and frustrate the collective pursuit of organisational objectives.  In the end, they 
undermine the effectiveness of the EAC as an institution.   
 
A significant number of respondents (65%) were concerned about lack of harmony between 
the EAC Secretariat and organs that represent Partner States’ interests; in particular, the 
Sectoral Committees which are made up of Senior officials from the EAC Partner States.  It 
was felt that these officials have the tendency of opposing everything that the EAC 
Secretariat proposes often without valid reasons.  The Sectoral Committees are an important 
organ in the EAC’s decision making process as they are the ones who make 
recommendations to the Coordination Committee who then make recommendations to the 
Council of Ministers for final decision making.  Lack of harmony between the Secretariat and 
this organ has a negative bearing on realisation of EAC’s objectives. 
 
Inter-departmental harmony: The EAC Secretariat has five main functional units: the Office 
of the Secretary General, the Office of the Deputy Secretary General in charge of Projects 
and Programmes, the Office of the Deputy Secretary General in charge of Finance and 
Administration, the Office of the Deputy Secretary General in charge of Political Federation, 
and the Directorate of Customs and Trade.  However, it was observed by 60% of the 
respondents, that whereas there are generally good working relationships between the heads 
of functional units as well as officers in the respective departments, inter-departmental 
coordination was very poor.  Respondents pointed out that often officers do not know what is 
happening in other departments even when those activities have a bearing on their work.   
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There is also a tendency for some officers to prepare programmes that commit officers from 
other departments without informing them or only informing them at the last minute when 
they have already committed themselves elsewhere or, if not committed, giving them 
inadequate time to effectively prepare.  It was also observed that some functions overlap 
among departments.  For example, the EAC is currently negotiating a Common Market 
Protocol.  The key competencies for this function fall under two departments: the Office of 
the Deputy Secretary General in charge of Projects and Programmes and the Directorate of 
Customs and Trade.  The question has thus arisen as to who is really in charge.   The lack of 
harmony among the EAC’s functional units no doubt undermines the ability of the institution 
to effectively achieve its objectives. 
 
Inter-staff harmony:  The EAC has three job groups, Executive Staff, Professional Staff and 
Support Staff.  Each of these job groups has an important role to play in enabling the EAC 
achieve its objectives.  Generally, relations among the job groups are harmonious as observed 
by 45% of the respondents.  However, it was also evident that one job group, that is, the 
Support Staff were disgruntled.  Of the 55% who believed there was no inter staff harmony, 
the majority were from the Support Staff job group.  The overarching opinion among these 
respondents was that Support Staff were alienated from the institution by the other more 
senior job groups.  Cases cited include that they were rarely involved in staff meetings; not 
consulted when decisions that affect their lives are made; and denied some basic allowances 
which other staff groups enjoy simply because of their job group. Indeed, in 2005, members 
of the Support Staff intended to lodge a case with the EACJ against the EAC Secretary 
General over what they perceived to be refusal to pay them a settlement allowance. The move 
was abandoned following tactful intervention by the Secretary General. However, negative 
sentiments about perceived discrimination still run deep among the Support Staff.   
 
A review of EAC records indicate that out of the 182 employees of the EAC, 70 are in the 
Support Staff category, this is slightly under half of the total EAC staff population.  Support 
Staff provide crucial services necessary to make the EAC an effective institution, for example 
secretarial, accounting, library, record keeping and registry services.  To have such a large 
number of staff disgruntled over what they perceive to be discrimination by the senior job 
groups, is an issue that is likely to undermine EAC’s ability to achieve its objectives in an 
effective manner.   
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5.2.7 Satisfaction of strategic constituencies 
 
Organisational effectiveness theories posit that one of the factors that underpin effective 
achievement of organisational goals is the satisfaction of an institution’s strategic 
constituencies. The EAC’s effectiveness can thus be deemed to hinge on how it relates with 
its strategic constituencies, both internal and external.  In this study, the staff of the EAC 
constitute the institution’s core internal strategic constituencies while the business community 
and the civil society constitute the key external strategic constituencies.   Presently, the EAC 
has taken several measures to ensure that its key strategic constituencies are at least 
minimally satisfied.   
 
Satisfaction of staff of the EAC:  In the area of staff satisfaction, the EAC, in 2007, 
improved the terms and conditions of service of its staff.  This led to improved salaries and 
benefits all of which are believed to have enhanced the satisfaction of staff employed in the 
EAC.  The EAC also offers opportunities for robust short training programmes for its staff to 
enable them improve or acquire new skills.  Although these opportunities are subject to 
availability of budget sources, many employees have benefited from training programmes 
sponsored by the EAC.  The research findings, based on stakeholder perceptions, however 
indicate that the EAC has failed to satisfy its key strategic constituency, its staff.  It was 
observed that 75% of the respondents, majority being staff of the EAC, did not believe the 
EAC staff were satisfied with their terms and conditions of service.   
 
The main source of dissatisfaction was that the terms and conditions of the EAC do not 
provide employees with the possibility for career advancement nor salary increment. 
Currently, the EAC has a system of locked-in 5 year contracts which lack adjustment factors.  
If for example, one joins the EAC at Officer level, there is no possibility that after several 
years he/she can move to Senior Officer level, then Principal level as is common in most 
RIIs.  Instead one remains stuck in that job grade for the duration of his contract.  If one 
wants to occupy a higher job grade, one must apply and compete with outsiders for the 
position and that is, only if a vacancy exists.  Similarly, salary scales are fixed meaning 
however long an officer works at the EAC his/her salary will never increase.  These terms 
and conditions of service were considered to be highly demoralising for the staff. As a result, 
many Officers consider the EAC to be a transit point to greener opportunities elsewhere and 
are averse to making long term career plans within the EAC.   
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A second source of dissatisfaction cited, especially among the Professional Staff, were the 
changes made to their contracts from five-year contracts which were perpetually renewable 
until one reached the retirement age of 60 years to five-year fixed contracts renewable once.  
The fixed contracts have created an element of job insecurity, instability and restlessness 
among the EAC’s Professional Staff, especially those in the 30-49 age groups, who are 
confronted with the prospects of risking unemployment prior to attaining the official EAC 
retirement age of 60 years.  The staff were of the opinion that the ten-year maximum contract 
is likely to create a situation in which the Professional Staff work diligently for the first five 
years of their contract and then on beginning their second and final five years, spend more 
time seeking job opportunities elsewhere thus adversely affecting their work performance at 
the EAC.  It was noted that job insecurity is stressful and demoralizing; it affects the 
employees’ ability to make plans for themselves and their families and may eventually lead to 
high staff turnover, a new phenomenon which the EAC is now beginning to experience15.  
 
A third source of dissatisfaction was the feeling of being under-utilised especially among the 
Professional Staff who felt that although they were employed as experts in their fields, the 
system of work in the EAC does not empower them enough to share their expertise and skills.  
The bone of contention was seen as limitations in the EAC Treaty which do not allow the 
Secretariat to be proactive. Instead, in many cases the EAC operates as an extension of the 
offices of the Partner States’ governments and therefore all key decisions and directions are 
left to the so called experts from the Partner States.  These Partner States’ experts were 
observed to have an attitude that the EAC Secretariat is there only to implement their 
decisions and not contribute to making decisions.  As such most Professional Staff end up 
feeling under-utilised and frustrated.   
 
A final source of dissatisfaction among staff was seen in the fact that the EAC does not have 
a system that rewards outstanding performance and in the same breath, sanctions 
incompetence.  Respondents lamented that however diligently one works at the EAC there is 
no room for internal position announcements aimed at promotion. Readings on EAC 
documents confirmed this.  Regulation 20(2) of the EAC Staff Rules and Regulations 
stipulates that no recruitment shall be undertaken unless an approved vacancy exists and for 
                                                 
15 In Financial Year 2007/2008 alone, the EAC lost three employees to greener pastures – Deputy Executive Secretary of 
the Lake Victoria Basin Commission, the Principal Engineer Planner and a Project Accountant.  
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which financial provision has been made (EAC Secretariat, 2006:13).  Earlier, under section 
5.2.5, we noted how difficult it is for new staff positions to be created at the EAC.  
Regulation 20(3) further stipulates that all vacancies shall be advertised.  This means that 
there is no room for automatic internal promotions in the EAC; all vacancies must be 
advertised and competed for.  Respondents further observed that the EAC does not have a 
system of performance enhancing motivations such as certificate of recognition or bonuses 
for staff who perform well.  It was also noted that disciplinary measures are hardly ever taken 
against members of staff who are incorrigibly incompetent.  Instead it is not uncommon to 
see the contracts of such staff being renewed despite management being aware of complaints 
against their performance.  All these factors were observed as negatively impacting the 
satisfaction of EAC staff. 
 
Satisfaction of the business community:  Article 7(a) of the EAC Treaty establishes, as one 
of the fundamental principles of the EAC, market-driven cooperation (EAC Secretariat, 
2002:15).  Presently, the EAC has taken important steps to achieve this treaty provision. In 
the area of market-driven cooperation, the EABC has been given observer status in the EAC 
and there are moves to make it an organ of the EAC.  Through close collaboration with the 
EABC, the EAC has been able to respond to the realization of the core EAC objective of 
market driven cooperation.  The EAC, in conjunction with the EABC, organised the 1st EA 
Investment Conference in June 2008.  The EABC is also invited to attend EAC policy organs 
meeting.  For example, during the last Summit of Heads of State held in Kigali in June, 2008 
the EABC was given audience with the Summit where they presented their views on how the 
EAC region can be enabled to become more competitive through addressing the factors that 
presently increase the costs of doing business. There is now a planned EAC-EABC Energy 
Conference to take place in Zanzibar in December 2008 to address energy issues in East 
Africa both in terms of promoting new investments in renewable energy but also to find 
solutions to high energy costs which reduce the competitiveness of the region.   
 
It is through this kind of partnership that the EAC hopes to be able to assure that the private 
sector plays a critical role in the integration agenda.  This partnership has a policy 
underpinning within the EAC in the form of a Private Sector Development Strategy which 
clearly outlines areas in which the EAC expects the private sector to focus upon in terms of 
trade investments promotion.  It also addresses issues related to the legal and regulatory 
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framework in the various Partner States with a view to making them more responsive to the 
needs of a more conducive environment that bolsters economic growth.   
 
The views of the respondents, in as far as how EAC has satisfied the business community, 
were a marked contrast to my findings. Over 70% of the respondents were of the view that 
the EAC has failed to effectively implemented the principle of mainstreaming the private 
sector led development and growth and the “market-driven” approach in the realization of its 
objectives.  The main source of dissatisfaction, especially among the private sector, was the 
feeling that they are not actively consulted in policy formulation relating to EAC’s 
integration process.  Although many acknowledged that they have sometimes been consulted, 
it was felt that the private sector had not been adequately brought into the EAC’s decision 
making process and had no formal forum for engagement with the policy making process. 
The EABC observer status is, in fact, viewed as marginalisation.  
 
A second source of dissatisfaction was cited as the non-adherence by the EAC Partner States 
to regionally agreed decisions impacting on the private sector.  An example is the manner in 
which the Agreement on the Common External Tariff which is part of the EAC Customs 
Management Act 2004 is implemented.    The Customs Management Act provides that a 
Common External Tariff (CET) of 25% in import duty be charged on all fabrics imported 
into the Community. Yet, Tanzania went against this joint decision by unilaterally allowing a 
local textile mill – Nida Textile Mills, a tax waiver to import fabrics thereby exempting it 
from the East African CET.  Soon thereafter, Kenya allowed Pakistani rice imports at duty 
rates out of line with the CET, ostensibly, as a trade off for exports of Kenyan tea to Pakistan.  
Uganda also demanded to expand a list of sensitive imports which she wanted protected from 
competition due to its low level of industrialization, landlocked status and infancy of its 
domestic industries.  In light of this, the three Partner States agreed to do some horse trading 
involving blatant breaches of the CET.  These decisions elicited widespread condemnation 
from the business community in East Africa who view such decisions as flagrant violation of 
the East African Community Customs Management Act. 
 
Non-adherence to regional decisions is further seen in the fact that non-tariff barriers still 
hamper business between the EAC Partner States despite the Customs Union protocol 
providing for their immediate elimination.  The EABC is on record as stating that non-tariff-
barriers are the greatest impediments to the free flow of goods in the region.  It cites the 
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serious delays that are recorded at road blocks and border points that have resulted in rent 
seeking opportunities in the form of corruption on the side of concerned officials  (The East 
African, 2007a:6).   
 
Other examples cited include the decision by the EAC Partner States to market East Africa as 
a single tourist destination.  Recently, it has emerged that Authorities in Tanzania are 
planning to introduce legislation that will bar foreigners from engaging in tourism-related 
business.  The legislation, which was expected to take effect as early as 2008, signals a 
growing resentment by the Tanzanian government of domination of the sector by foreigners.  
The proposed law sought to restrict the participation of foreign investors in the travel agency 
business, mountain climbing, trekking and from owning and operating travel agency 
businesses in the country (The East African, 2007b:1).  The business community felt that the 
move was likely to deal a severe blow to efforts to enhance cross-border trade within the 
EAC.  It also makes the joint decision to market East Africa as a single tourist destination 
hard to realize. It would be interesting to see how Tanzania navigates its position on this 
matter given that the Partner States are negotiating liberalisation of services both under the 
Common Market and the EPA negotiations.  Tanzania has not tabled the law in Parliament as 
yet. 
 
Satisfaction of the civil society: A major criticism slated against the EAC which points 
towards organizational ineffectiveness is the lack of adequate information in the public 
domain about what the EAC is all about and what it is doing and the benefits that are 
accruable to the citizens of East Africa.  The EAC is trying to respond to this criticism and 
shortcoming through creating effective ownership of the EAC integration project.  In this 
regard, the EAC has established close working relationships with key civil society groups in 
the areas of farmers, law, local government and human rights.  There is now an East African 
Local Government Association, East African Law Society (EALS), East African Farmers 
Federation and Kituo cha Katiba.  The EAC is involving the EALS in making proposals for 
the extended jurisdiction of the EACJ as well as in the amendments of the Treaty.  The EAC 
is also working with Kituo cha Katiba, a civil society that is engaged in improving the 
environment for human rights and the rule of law in East Africa.  Kituo cha Katiba has 
submitted proposals to the EAC for the introduction of a Bill of Rights for the EAC.  Effort is 
also being taken to help the youth of East Africa to constitute an East African-wide youth 
association as well as an East African wide student forum.   
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Despite the efforts made by the EAC, 75% of the respondents expressed their dissatisfaction 
with how the EAC had implemented the principle of ‘people-centred’ approach.  The main 
source of dissatisfaction, especially among respondents from the civil society, was the view 
that the civil society in particular and the public in general were not adequately sensitized on 
the EAC’s integration process.  An example was given of the abandonment of the project on 
fast tracking East African Federation which, the civil society blames entirely on poor 
sensitization.  Literature review supports the views of the respondents.  
 
For example, when the National Consultative Committee that collected views of Tanzanians 
on the proposed East African Federation presented its report indicating that majority of 
Tanzanians were against fast tracking Political Federation, the National Chairman of the 
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), Mr. Augustine Mrema stated that “No one can dispute the fact 
that whenever two or more countries unite to form a larger political unity there are gains to 
people of the respective countries, but in our case our leaders did not have proper plans on 
how the decision would be implemented.  For instance, until now we do not know which 
structure of federation our leaders are dreaming about” (The Citizen, 2007:14).  Dr. 
Wilbraod Slaa, another prominent political figure in Tanzania also remarked that “The 
problem with the idea is that there were no proper preparations. ….You cannot blame the 
public for the negative stand they have made….The government has not told the public how 
benefits from the federation would trickle down to the ordinary person” (The Citizen, 2007: 
14-15).  Evidently, inadequate sensitization of the East African public about the EAC remains 
a challenge for the EAC.     
 
5.2.8 Ability to adapt to change 
 
In July 2007, the EAC underwent a major change following the accession of Rwanda and 
Burundi into the EAC.  This increased the EAC membership from three Partner States to five.  
The entry of Rwanda and Burundi has brought in new challenges as far as the organisational 
effectiveness of the EAC is concerned.  Article 137(1) of the EAC Treaty stipulates that 
English is the official language of the EAC.  Hitherto with the founding English speaking 
Partner States of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, there was no difficulty in using English in the 
EAC’s management process.  However, with the entry of French speaking Rwanda and 
Burundi and the recruitment of Professional Staff from those two new Partner States, there is 
a culture shock that has emerged in the EAC’s management process.  Many of these 
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Professional Staff that have been recruited, whilst they possess requisite skills and 
competences, find themselves in a new organisational culture and environment where, given 
their French speaking backgrounds, they find it difficult to quickly adapt and prove their 
worth.  In light of this change, the question is posed, is it really rational for the EAC to 
continue to insist on English being its official language?  This is an issue that has got to be 
quickly addressed because it may constitute a factor in reducing the effectiveness of the EAC 
in delivering its mandate.   
 
Despite increased membership, the EAC rules of procedure for meetings still require quorum 
for meetings, that is, all Partner States must be present for a decision to be made operative.  
Whereas it was easy to achieve quorum when the EAC had three Partner States, with 
membership increasing to five Partner States achieving quorum is increasingly becoming 
elusive.  This has resulted in a number of important EAC meetings being postponed leading 
to EAC failing to undertake its mandate.  The enlargement of the EAC has also catapulted a 
broader diversity of national views and interests which makes consensus/unanimity of 
decisions not easily achievable.  The EAC Treaty however, still stipulates that decision 
making will be by consensus/unanimity.  This situation if left unchecked, may lead to 
gridlock in EAC’s decision making system.   
 
The two new Partner States of Burundi and Rwanda have also failed to effectively meet their 
financial obligations to the EAC.  Given that Article 132(4) of the EAC Treaty stipulates that 
the EAC shall be financed by equal contributions of its Partner States, the inability of the two 
Partner States to effectively meet their financial obligations has resulted in the EAC facing 
serious financial difficulties.  This can be attributed to failure of the EAC to foresee and adapt 
to change brought by admitting Rwanda and Burundi.  Ideally, before admitting Rwanda and 
Burundi, the EAC should have taken into account the economic weaknesses of the two states 
vis-à-vis those of the founding Partner States and come up with alternative financing 
arrangements for them. In this regard, the directive by the 9th Ordinary Summit of Heads of 
State that the Secretariat should undertake a Study on other budget funding modalities which 
the Summit can examine and pronounce itself on was welcomed by respondents as a 
recognition, at the highest level of the EAC, that the EAC needs to adapt to challenges 
brought by enlargement (EAC Summit of Heads of State, 2008:3). 
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Over the past few years the mandate of the EAC has increased tremendously, for example, on 
top of implementing the Customs Union, plans are underway to establish a Common Market 
and Monetary Union by 2012, the EAC has also signed an Economic Partnership Agreement 
with the European Union as well as a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the 
United States which it has to concretize.  The EAC has also committed to market the EAC 
region as a single tourist destination, been directed by the Summit to embark on a number of 
studies aimed at deepening integration and has to implement an ambitious 3rd EAC 
Development Strategy (2006-2010) among other activities.  In other words the EAC is 
pursuing a very ambitious integration agenda.  Yet, the increased mandate has not been 
matched with requisite manning levels and financial resources.  This has resulted in EAC’s 
inability to effectively achieve its increased mandate. 
 
One of the central challenges the EAC faces in adapting to change is how to overcome the 
zero-sum game mindset in some Partner States, notably Tanzania, with respect to deeper 
integration.  For example, whereas the EAC Partner States enthusiastically embraced the 
EAC Customs Union, Tanzania is increasingly developing ‘cold feet’ about the next stage of 
integration; namely the Common Market. It should not be forgotten that among the reasons 
which compel states to join or establish RIIs is the belief that the individual state will benefit 
from collective efforts.  National interests are supposed to be relegated in the interest of the 
bigger picture.  Where one state feels injured through deeper integration, Article 78 of the 
Treaty provides for safeguard measures (EAC Secretariat, 2002:57).  However this recourse 
is not exploited because the propensity to accept change is non-existent from the start.  It is 
for this reason that some Partner States are beginning to think about invoking Article 9(e) of 
the Treaty which allows variable geometry to step in where there is a strong view that some 
Partner States are undermining faster integration.  This principle allows for progression in co-
operation among groups within the Community for wider integration schemes in various 
fields and at different speeds (EAC Secretariat, 2002:15).   
 
Variable geometry would allow for those EAC Partner States that wish to proceed with a 
faster pace of integration to do so, while those that wish to go slower could do so yet still 
remain members of the institution.  But it is a highly sensitive model of integration.  In the 
EU, it has worked well in so far as the euro is concerned.  However, it has been disputed if its 
application were to extend to political integration as had been envisaged under the 
Constitutional Treaty which was rejected in 2005 as well as in 2008.  It is thus debatable 
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whether, for instance, the fast tracking of EAC’s Political Federation, can be proceeded with 
based on variable geometry.  What would result to those who remain outside the federation?  
Having noted such difficulties, 75% of the respondents still felt that many EAC programmes 
that were within the Treaty objectives are hampered by a low response to change. 
 
5.2.9 Transformational leadership 
 
The ability of an organisation’s top leadership to influence values, ethics and attitudes of 
organisational members and build commitment for the achievement of the organisation’s 
mission, objectives and strategies, better known as transformational leadership has been 
identified by theories of organisational effectiveness as critical to effective achievement of 
organisational goals.  The importance of transformational leadership emerges when a new top 
leader comes into an institution and is able to move the institution from the state he or she 
finds it to a level where the institution begins to realize greater effectiveness in the 
achievements of its objectives.  But this is not an episodic intervention.  Transformational 
leadership requires constant adaptation to change and effecting policies and directions that 
bring about positive change in structures, systems, processes as well as internal and external 
relationships on an on-going basis.  Transformational leadership is what imbibes and ingrains 
a new hope in an organisation.  It creates an environment that is supportive of team work, 
trust and a collective pursuit of shared goals.   
 
The current Secretary General of the EAC, when he came into the EAC at the beginning of 
May 2006, found the institution not only very thin on the ground in terms of staffing but also 
with a structure that was not adequately responsive to the demands that were imposed on the 
executive organ of the EAC.  Above all, he found a highly de-motivated staff; lowly paid, 
lowly incentivised and who had developed a culture of travelling out of station in order to 
obtain per diems to support their low remunerations.  Put differently, he found an EAC that 
had lost commitment and a clear direction in terms of the effective achievement of EAC’s 
goals.  His immediate focus as new Secretary General was thus to transform the EAC into an 
institution that was based on hope, commitment and job satisfaction.  This he was able to 
achieve by immediately recommending a new organisation structure and new grades and 
salaries as well as incentives for all the EAC staff.  In my view this is what transformational 
leadership is all about. However, as mentioned earlier, transformational leadership has to go 
beyond being an episodic leadership style.   In this regard, the research findings were a 
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marked departure from my own findings. Over 80% of the respondents interviewed believed 
that the EAC did not have a transformational leadership and that this is the fundamental 
reason why the EAC continues to face a number of challenges of a structural or systemic 
character. 
 
The reasons cited for EAC’s lack of transformational leadership had more to do with the 
structure of the Office of the Secretary General rather than the bearer of the office.  This 
structure was seen to act as a constraint on the ability of the Secretary General to effectively 
execute transformational leadership. Lack of executive authority by the Secretary General 
was seen as the main bottleneck.  Whereas the Treaty on paper gives the Secretary General 
power to run the EAC by designating him as the Chief Executive Officer of the EAC, 
respondents observed, however, that the Secretary General’s lacks the autonomy to lead the 
institution which is a fundamental characteristic of a transformational leader.  It was observed 
that the EAC Treaty does not give the Secretary General teeth to effect interventions in the 
achievement of the EAC’s objectives.  In terms of day-to-day management of the EAC, he 
has to revert to the policy organs, notably the Council of Ministers, for decisions that he 
would ordinarily be expected to make as a Chief Executive Officer.  Moreover, the Secretary 
General cannot restructure the organisation in the manner he deems fit and take responsibility 
for it.  Instead, he can only make proposals to the Council for decision.  Consequently, the 
key role of the Secretary General is subordinated to implementation of the Partner States’ 
decisions, the opposite of what a transformational leader is supposed to do. 
 
A significant number of respondents (70%) expressed reservations about the five-year fixed 
contract for the EAC Secretary General.  Five years were deemed to be too short for the 
Secretary General to make an impact and leave a legacy.  In such a short time the Secretary 
General cannot formulate long term plans for the institution.  Respondents further observed 
that there was a tendency at the beginning of their contracts, for the Secretaries General to 
have a focused vision for the institution; but towards the end of their contracts, they 
concentrate more on travelling and are also preoccupied with their post EAC prospects, often 
to the detriment of the institution. There was consensus that if the Secretary General’s 
contract was renewable then it would be possible for the EAC to have transformational 
leadership as the Secretary General would strive to effectively achieve the goals of the 
organisation in an effort to have his contract renewed.  However, this view flies in the face of 
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the core obstacle that faces the Secretary General in becoming transformation, that is, the lack 
of decision making authority. 
 
Also noted was the fact that the Office of the Secretary General was grossly understaffed.  
Other than staff who functionally report to the Secretary General (Legal, Internal Audit, 
Publicity, Defence and Resource Mobilization) his core officers comprise of only two 
officers: the Chef de Cabinet and the Senior Personal Secretary.  Respondents were of the 
view that for an office that oversees the operations of the entire EAC organs and institutions, 
such staffing level undermined the capacity of the Secretary General to undertake policy 
oriented activities that could make the position transformational for the EAC. 
 
A reasonable number of respondents (65%) further felt that the Chef de Cabinet assigned to 
the Secretary General had failed to define the functions of his office.  This has led to two 
negative consequences.  First, the Office of Chef de Cabinet at the EAC lacks the aura, allure, 
authority and decorum that ordinarily characterises the symbolism of the incumbent’s exalted 
status.  This in turn, has led to the Office of the Secretary General being poorly organised.  
The Chef de Cabinet is ideally supposed to provide an effective communication and 
coordination link between the Secretary General and the rest of the organisation as well as 
external stakeholders. Further, this office is supposed to receive and routinely re-assign for 
necessary action correspondence as well as advise the Secretary General on issues that affect 
the organisation including the initiatives that the Secretary General needs to undertake to 
improve organisational performance. Instead, the Chef de Cabinet’s office has been 
subordinated to Personal Assistant Role which leaves the incumbent with little time to 
concentrate on his core role.  Consequently, the entire organisation has been denied clear 
linkages with the Secretary General’s office.  It was observed, for example, that the Secretary 
General spends a considerable amount of his executive time doing technical work that should 
have been forwarded to Professional Staff for attention by the Chef de Cabinet.   
 
Respondents were also of the view that on account of his experience and day to day official 
interaction with the Secretary General, the Chef de Cabinet is nominally ‘the Secretary 
General’ whenever the incumbent is out of office or unavailable to attend to an event within 
or outside the organisation.  Yet in the EAC the Chef de Cabinet seems to lack initiative to 
perform some of the Secretary General’s duties in his absence, such as meeting high profile 
guests and/or representing the Secretary General in meetings.  This was attributed to two 
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factors.  First, the office is nascent with no structured job description.  Secondly, the job has 
been graded at Principal Officer level and thus does not rank high enough to command clout 
and symbolise authority.  This makes it difficult for the Chef de Cabinet to assign work to 
officers or to represent the Secretary General at high profile events.   
 
Despite the constraining circumstances under which the Secretary General of the EAC 
operates, over 80% of the respondents were of the view that the Office of the Secretary 
General has played an instrumental role in achieving the objectives of the EAC.  The former 
Secretary General, Mr. Nuwe Amanya Mushega (April 2001-April 2006) was credited for 
breaking the deadlock that characterised negotiations for the EAC Customs Union Protocol. 
This eventually led to the signing of the Customs Union Protocol and the establishment of the 
EAC Customs Union.  The current Secretary General, Amb. Juma Mwapachu is credited with 
improving the terms and conditions of service of EAC staff within his first year in office, 
something which had eluded the EAC for almost ten years despite many studies and 
recommendations being carried out. He is also credited with enhancing and strengthening the 
EAC’s partnership with the private sector as evidenced by the cordial and close working 
relationship that the EAC has developed with the East African Business Council since he 
took over office. Majority of the respondents believed that under his tenure the EAC would 
achieve its next stage of integration, that is, the Common Market. 
 
5.2.10 Political will 
 
A firm political commitment has been identified by theories of organisational effectiveness as 
critical for the effective achievement of goals especially for public sector organisations.  In 
the case of the EAC, a fair assessment reveals that there has been immense political will for 
the institution’s mandate.  For example, in 2005, the EAC Heads of State decided that each 
Partner State should establish a Ministry responsible for EAC Affairs. Since then, all the five 
Partner States have established ministries responsible for EAC Affairs in their respective 
capitals.  These ministries have contributed to better coordination between the EAC organs 
based in Arusha and the Partner States.  More importantly, these ministries are headed by 
Ministers who are sitting Cabinet Ministers as well as Members of National Assemblies in 
their respective state.  They have thus become key bridges between the national electorates 
and the EAC.  These Ministers, for example, present their budgets in their respective national 
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Parliaments and make statements on the state of the EAC including the benefits of EAC 
integration.   
 
The EAC Heads of State have also personally intervened in trying to sort out problems 
hindering integration. For example, in 2004, concerned that the EAC integration was moving 
at too slow a pace, the Heads of State   appointed a Committee on Fast Tracking East African 
Federation popularly known as the “Wako Committee” to look into the possibility of fast 
tracking the integration process so that the ultimate goal of a Political Federation could be 
achieved through a fast track mechanism.  Although the recommendations of this Committee 
were rejected by a section of the East African population, the establishment of the Wako 
Committee was, in itself, an enormous display of political will for integration on the part of 
the EAC Heads of State.  Tangibly, it was the intervention of the 2004 Summit meeting that 
fast tracked the conclusion of the EAC Customs Union Protocol which until then had been 
log jammed by national interests. 
 
The improved terms and conditions of service for EAC staff, which came into effect in 
January 2007 after almost ten years of a state of flux can be attributed to the political will of 
the EAC Heads of State.  This approval followed the Heads of State supporting proposals 
submitted to them by the EAC Secretary General who had personally called on each Head of 
State to explain the grim picture at the EAC with regard to low levels of staff motivation.   
 
Further, cognisant of the challenges imposed by multiple memberships of EAC Partner States 
to different RIIs, the EAC Heads of State in 2002 endorsed the idea of the EAC negotiating 
as a bloc.  That policy decision is what has enabled the EAC to negotiate the Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the EU. 
 
These research findings notwithstanding, however, over 70% of the respondents were of the 
view that there was inadequate political will necessary to assure effective achievement of 
goals by the EAC.  The overarching view was that the governments of EAC Partner States 
were in the habit of paying a lot of lip service about the need for regional integration which 
they rarely translated into action.  Areas of inadequate political will impacting negatively on 
the EAC’s ability to effectively achieve its objectives identified include: lack of sanctions 
against non-adherence to regional agreements, lack of decision making authority by RIIs, 
long delays in ratification of protocols, multiple membership in RIIs, weak ministries to 
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coordinate regional integration and failure to deal with negative social elements hindering 
integration.  The EAC Heads of State also seemed to acknowledge that there was inadequate 
political will.  For example in the Communiqué they signed after their 6th Extraordinary 
Summit held on 20th August 2007, they called upon the need to stimulate greater political will 
to promote deeper economic integration and to lock-in gains achieved from economic 
cooperation (EAC Summit of Heads of State, 2007:3). 
 
Lack of sanctions:  It was observed that the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC is lax 
on mechanisms for enforcements of collective decisions and imposition of sanctions for non-
adherence.  Article 143 of the Treaty stipulates that Partner States which default in meeting 
their obligations shall be subjected to such action as the Summit may, on the recommendation 
of the Council, determine (EAC Secretariat, 2002:116).  This article is vague and silent on 
specific sanctions.  As a result of this weakness, the EAC relies on the goodwill of Partner 
States to implement decisions by its various organs and institutions.  This makes non-
adherence to regionally agreed decisions easy for the Partner States as there is nothing to 
compel them to abide to decisions.  For example, respondents were of the view that lack of 
sanctions is responsible for the blatant breach of the provisions of the EAC Customs Union 
by the Partner States.  It was also attributed to the failure by Partner States to remit their 
financial contributions toward the EAC budget on time.   
  
Lack of decision making authority: The unwillingness of the governments of the EAC 
Partner States to cede executive authority to the EAC has resulted in a weak regional 
institution that is not able to effectively carry out its mandate.  For example, whilst the EAC 
Secretariat is the Executive organ of the EAC, it operates without the supranational authority 
needed to make and enforce decisions.  As earlier noted, this is largely due to Article 14 of 
the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC which vests all powers of decision-making on 
the EAC Council of Ministers and the Summit.  This decision making structure was seen by 
many respondents as a clear manifestation of reluctance by the EAC Partner States to cede 
national sovereignty to the EAC.   
 
In the case of the EALA, whilst it is the legislative organ of the EAC, its effectiveness, in as 
far as private members bills are concerned, is curtailed by Article 63 of the Treaty which 
allows any Head of State the right to refuse to assent a bill passed by EALA.   The use of 
protocols to run the EAC operations was also seen as reducing the powers of the regional 
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parliament.  Six articles of the EAC Treaty provide explicitly for protocols in running the 
operations of the EAC i.e. 15(4) and (5) - Protocol on Decision making, 75(1) – Protocol on 
Customs Union, 76 (1) and (4) – Protocol on Common Market, 81(4) - Protocol on 
Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing, 104(2) – Protocol on the Free 
Movement of Persons, Labour, Services and Right of Establishment and Residence and 
124(5)(e) – Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking (EAC Secretariat, 2002: 23, 55, 
56, 60, 82, 102). Concerns were raised over the suitability of protocols in accelerating the 
process of regional integration as opposed to laws passed by EALA.   
 
In the case of the EACJ, the recent decision by the EAC Summit of Heads of State to divide 
the Court into two divisions: a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division was 
perceived as an attempt by the governments of the EAC Partner States to ridicule the role of 
the EACJ in deciding contentious issues on the EAC Treaty.  It was noted that these changes 
were effected after the Republic of Kenya had a clash with the EACJ after the regional court 
rejected Kenya’s nominees to the EALA on the basis that their election was not undertaken 
within the requisite Article 50 of the EAC Treaty.  Following the ruling, the President of 
Kenya, Mwai Kibaki at a Summit of Heads of State held in November 2006 faulted the EACJ 
for their ruling and declared that “East African Partner States could not at this stage of 
integration cede their sovereignty to regional institutions”  (Saturday Nation, 2006:12).  
Also, whereas the decision of the EACJ on the interpretation and application of the EAC 
Treaty has precedence over decisions of national courts, the same does not by itself remove 
the possibility of there being conflicting decisions by the national courts on the same matter. 
 
Delays in ratifying protocols:  In the EAC protocols have to be ratified by the respective 
Partner States. This can be a lengthy process as in some Partner States this involves the 
protocols being debated in Parliament while in others cabinets have the authority to ratify 
them. Respondents observed that this is one area of major weakness in the EAC’s 
organisational system because where programmes and projects are governed by such 
protocols it means they cannot be implemented until such time as the protocols have been 
ratified.    
 
Multiple memberships: Currently, eastern and southern Africa has a multiplicity of RIIs with 
almost similar integration goals.  There have been criticisms levelled at this fragmentation.  
Prof. Richard Gibb (2006), in his Paper, Rationalisation or Redundancy? Making Eastern 
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and Southern Africa’s Regional Trade Units Relevant, has posited that “the institutional 
structure supporting regionalism is overcomplicated and incoherent.  Put bluntly, the present 
structure of overlapping memberships and shared integrative goals among the regional 
communities of eastern and southern Africa is unworkable.  It does not work now and it will 
not work in the future” (Gibb, 2006:2).  
 
In the case of the EAC and its Partner States, multiplicity of membership as shown under 
Table 4 below corresponds to Gibb’s sentiments.  Respondents observed that memberships to 
different regional groupings often put EAC Partner States in a position of competing against 
one another hence defeating the purpose of integration.  All the five EAC Partner States, on 
top of being members of the EAC, also belong to several other regional integration groupings 
that sometimes compete, conflict or overlap with the EAC’s integration agenda.  These 
regional groupings have remarkably similar integrative ambitions, for example COMESA 
and SADC have a shared desire to create, at the very minimum, a Customs Union.  The EAC 
already has a Customs Union.  However, according to World Trade Organisation rules it is 
not possible for a country to belong to more than one Customs Union and apply more than 
one Common External Tariff (CET) (Gibb, 2006:2).  Hence there has been a tendency for 
rivalry and tension between EAC, SADC and COMESA in their bid to retain or attract 
membership.   
 
Table 4:  EAC Partner States’ membership in selected regional institutions 
Partner 
State 
EAC COMESA SADC IGAD ECCAS CEN-
SAD 
Kenya + +  +  + 
Uganda + +  +   
Tanzania +  +    
Rwanda + +     
Burundi + +   +  
 
EAC: East African Community 
COMESA:  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
SADC:  Southern Africa Development Community 
IGAD:  Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
ECCAS:  Economic Community of Central African States 
CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(Source:  Researcher’s construction based on literature review) 
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Majority of the respondents felt that the membership by EAC Partner States to overlapping 
regional institutions often with different trade policy regimes has produced notable 
complexities and concerns for the EAC countries, their governments and private sector, who 
increasingly face confusing and conflicting situations as the respective integration agenda of 
the multiple institutions are deepening.  Such overlapping memberships lead to wasteful 
duplication of effort and counterproductive competition.  It also adds to the burdens of EAC 
Partner States as they are not only faced with multiple financial obligations but must also 
cope with different meetings, policy decisions, instruments, procedures and schedules.  
Customs officials and traders in the region also have to deal with different tariff reduction 
rates, rules of origin, trade documentation and statistical nomenclatures. All these are 
detrimental to deeper integration. The problem of multiple memberships is highlighted by 
Mshindi (2008:11), who observes that “Tanzania is suffering serious indecision over its 
status as a member of both the EAC and SADC.  It wants to enjoy the advantage of having 
feet in both camps for as long as possible before it finally opts for one – probably SADC, 
after wasting its neighbours’ valuable time”.   
 
Recent efforts, flowing from a 2005 starting point, by the Chief Executive Officers of SADC, 
COMESA and EAC to create a Tripartite Task Force that meets twice a year to coordinate 
and harmonise policies in trade, infrastructure and customs are proving useful in dampening 
the dysfunctions of overlapping membership.  Indeed, out of these efforts, a Tripartite 
Summit of Heads of State and Government of COMESA, EAC and SADC was held in 
Kampala on 22nd October 2008 during which the Heads of State of the three RIIs approved 
the expeditious establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) encompassing the member states 
of the 3 RIIs with the ultimate goal of establishing a single Customs Union (COMESA-EAC-
SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State, 2008:3). 
 
Weak coordinating ministries: The establishment of specialised ministries and Ministers 
responsible for EAC Affairs though hailed by majority of the respondents as an indication of 
political will, was deemed by a sizeable number of respondents (65%) as not contributing to 
the effective achievement of EAC objectives.  The reason cited was that rather than being the 
focal point for the implementation of the EAC’s regional integration objective at the national 
level, these ministries only coordinate meetings.  It was also observed that in some Partner 
States the ministries were grossly understaffed and lacked reliable communication 
technology.  They also lack identical vision, mission and core values as the EAC which 
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makes it difficult for them to work in harmony.  These ministries are in effect national 
ministries dealing with EAC Affairs.  Their values are predominantly national, not regional.   
 
Failure to deal with negative social elements of integration: It was also pointed out that the 
EAC governments have failed to deal with social stereotypes that are detrimental to 
integration.  For example, there have been xenophobic utterances made by politicians in 
Tanzania against the regional integration process.  It was noted that every time the issue of 
EAC integration came up in Tanzanian Parliament, debate follows a familiar pattern: Kenya’s 
level of industrial development is higher; it has better skilled labour that is more mobile; 
Kenyan business acumen is unrivalled, Kenyans are crime-inclined, among others.  Such 
sentiments are widely believed to have created anti-integration sentiments in Tanzania.  
Respondents wondered why the government of Tanzania was silent on these detrimental 
polemics when it could seize the opportunity to allay the fears of its citizens and encourage 
them to support the integration agenda.  The killing of Kenyan armed criminals in Tanzania 
in 2007 was also cited by respondents who wondered why the government of Kenya had not 
made any efforts to rein in on its citizens to stop exporting crime to the neighbouring country.  
Also, instead of Tanzania taking this as an issue of normal crime, the issue of the nationality 
of the criminals has been blown out of proportion which has led to the perception in Tanzania 
that Kenyans are crime-inclined.  Such social sentiments if left unchecked could deter support 
for the EAC’s integration process by sections of the populations in the region. 
 
 
(The Standard, 2007c:6) 
TZ: Tanzania, BUR: Burundi, KEN: Kenya 
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5.2.11 Overall view on EAC’s organisational effectiveness 
 
The last question in the research questionnaire sought the respondents’ view on whether they 
believed the EAC, as presently constituted, had the ability to effectively achieve its 
objectives.  Over 80% of the respondents answered ‘No’.  The main reasons cited for their 
views included the following: that the EAC lacks policy and operational autonomy which 
makes it difficult for the Secretariat, in particular, to organize its operations and make 
decisions in a rational manner for effective achievement of EAC goals and objectives; that 
there is mutual suspicion and mistrust between and among the key organs of the EAC which 
is detrimental to collective pursuit of objectives;  that key strategic constituencies of the 
EAC, especially the business community and civil society, have not been adequately involved 
in the EAC’ s integration process; that the institution lacks clarity of purpose as it is pursuing 
too many ambitious goals; that the institution lacks adequate human and financial resources 
to enable effective goal achievement; that there was inadequate political will manifested by 
the dominance by the EAC Partner States in the institution’s decision making process; that 
the terms and conditions of service of the EAC with locked-in contracts and fixed salaries 
were detrimental to staff motivation and commitment; that a negative organisational culture 
pervades the institution; and that the demarcation of roles among the key organs of the EAC, 
was not conducive to achievement of EAC’s objective as the most critical roles to effective 
integration have been assigned to organs made up of Partner States representatives. This has 
led to national rather than regional interests prevailing at the EAC. 
 
These findings seem to indicate that the EAC lacks the institutional underpinnings necessary 
to make it an effective institution.  This, together with the research findings in the preceding 
sections, seem to support the hypothesis that guided this study, that is, that RIIs are likely to 
be effective in achieving the objectives for which they were established if the basic 
fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are embedded in their institutional 
structures, systems and processes.  To the extent that the basic fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory are not embedded or are only weakly embedded in the institutional 
structures, systems and processes of a RII, it becomes difficult for the institution to 
effectively achieve its mandate. 
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5.3 ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Based on the research findings outlined in section 5.2 above, it is evident that the EAC as an 
institution faces a number of challenges which limit its effectiveness to realize the objectives 
that have been set for it.  In terms of how the EAC should address these shortcomings and 
improve its effectiveness, in this section, the study examines the EU experience to determine 
which best practices can be borrowed and applied in the EAC.  
 
The EU is considered to be the most successful RII in the world (Babarinde, 1996:11, Patten, 
2005:122-141).  Among its key achievements include a functioning Monetary Union in the 
form of the Euro, establishment of an Internal/Common Market characterized by free 
movement of people, goods, services and capital, a common commercial policy and a 
common agricultural policy (Europa Constitution, 2008:1-5).  In this context, the EU is 
examined from the perspective of the critical factors that underpin organisational 
effectiveness and in order to draw reference to them in determining lessons that the EAC can 
learn. 
 
5.3.1 Clarity of purpose 
 
A review of the European Union (EU) indicates that the fundamental objective which 
inspired the EU was the need to establish peace and security in Europe.  Once this objective 
was achieved, the institution focused its efforts on achievement of economic growth through 
creation of a Common Market, followed by a Monetary Union.  The institution has been able 
to successfully achieve these objectives (Kennes, 2008).  Unlike the EAC which is targeting 
too many ambitious goals at the same time, the EU experience seems to indicate that the 
institution meticulously identifies a few goals which it is then able to progressively focus 
attention on and implement.  It is not surprising therefore that the EU Single Market was 
achieved only in 1992, over three decades after the Treaty of Rome that gave birth to the 
European integration agenda.  The Monetary Union was also effected eight years later with 
the formal introduction of the Euro in January 2002. 
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5.3.2 Organisational culture  
 
In contrast to the EAC whose organisational culture was deemed to be dominated by negative 
values such as poor team work, indifference, laxity and nepotism, the EU’s organisational 
culture is dominated by three dominant values: efficiency, economy and effectiveness (EU-
CONSENT, 2006:9).  The EU’s positive organisational culture has been aided by the 
presence of a code of conduct that is binding on all Commission staff.  The code of conduct is 
anchored on efficiency, accountability, service and transparency (Kassim, 2004:47; Miller, 
1999:21).  As noted earlier, the EAC does not have a code of conduct for its staff. 
 
Literature review indicates that this rosy picture in the EU was not always the case.  There 
had been allegations that the EU organisational culture was characterized by fraud, 
mismanagement and nepotism.  This led to a Committee of Independent Experts (CIE) being 
appointed in January 1999 to look into ways of reforming the organisational culture of the 
institution. The Committee recommended four main reforms: efficient use of resources based 
on priority setting allocation; human resources management; audit, financial management and 
control and introduction of a culture based on service.  It can be argued that all of the 
significant measures have come to life in the EU.  In terms of priority setting, allocation and 
efficient use of resources, two essential policies were implemented: first, the Activity-Based 
Management (ABM) system which includes the Annual Policy Strategy (APS) a definition 
per Directorate of policy objectives and their related necessary resources and the Annual 
Activity Report (AAR), an assessment of the level of achievement of these objectives.   
 
On human resources issues, a European Personnel Selection Office was created; a new 
appraisal system - the Career Development Review was introduced; staff training was 
increased; Staff Regulations were amended to include a career structure revolving around two 
function groups – Administrators and Assistants; the Commission’s social policy, e.g. on 
parental leave, was updated; a new category of non-permanent staff, contract agents, was 
created; and a stricter disciplinary system was put in place.   
 
With regard to financial management, the financial control and auditing functions were 
separated. Also introduced were the description of the responsibilities given to authorizing 
officers and a mechanism of Activity Based Budgeting (ABB) with the distribution of 
spending by policy areas instead of the operational/administrative division. On internal 
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culture, European citizens and residents were given the right to access European documents, 
the Europa website was upgraded to become more user friendly and payments by the 
Commission to contractors was speeded up.   These reforms have instilled an organisational 
culture of efficiency, economy and effectiveness in EU’s operation (EU-CONSENT, 2006:7-
9).   
 
5.3.3 Organisation structure 
 
In contrast to the EAC whose key organs are divided between policy organs (The Summit 
and the Council of Ministers) and oversight as well as implementing institutions (the EAC 
Secretariat, the EALA, the EACJ), the key institutions of the EU can generally be divided 
into two groups: intergovernmental and supranational.  The European Council (equivalent to 
EAC Summit) and the Council of Ministers represent the intergovernmental institutions while 
the European Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice and European 
Court of Auditors represent the supranational institutions.  
 
The European Commission is the permanent executive body responsible for implementing 
the treaties.  It formulates policy and initiates legislation.  The Commission also has the 
authority to bring breaches of the treaties before the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  The 
Commission transmits proposals to the Council of the European Union.  The Commission is 
an independent body.  It does not represent the government or the state of the individual 
member states; rather, its function is supranational.  Its main objective is to work toward the 
common interests of the Community.  
 
On the other hand, the EU Council of Ministers is made up of Ministers from each member 
country and is the most powerful institution in the EU and the major decision making body.  
As such it decides on important Community policies and has the power to adopt rules.  The 
official acts of the Council include regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions.  The Council also coordinates economic policies of the Members States, and with 
the European Parliament plays a key role in adopting the EC budget (Duke University School 
of Law, 2005:2-3).   
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The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) supervises uniform interpretation 
and application of EU law (treaties and secondary legislation).  The Court adjudicates actions 
against Union institutions as well as issues advisory opinions interpreting the law of the EU 
to national courts.  Unlike the EACJ, the ECJ’s rulings are final and not subject to appeal.  
The Court of First Instance (CFI): was established by the Council in 1988 under the Single 
European Act to lessen the ECJ’s caseload by hearing certain types of cases (e.g. employment 
disputes).  Its decisions are appealable to the ECJ on points of law only (Duke University 
School of Law, 2005:3).   
 
The European Parliament is an elected body which originally had mostly advisory, rather 
than decision-making powers.  The Maastricht Treaty has increased the powers of the 
Parliament and enlarged its legislative role.  Members are directly elected every five years 
through general elections in every member state.  According to Seong-Chang (2004:91), the 
European Parliament is the first and only experiment in supranational democracy.  There is 
no other institution in the world like the European Parliament, in which members are elected 
by direct election in each nation, which transcends the interest of any particular member state 
and whose scope of authority and decision making power stands above those of the individual 
member states.  In summary, the EU has created stronger common institutions than other 
regions in the world.   
 
5.3.4 Organisation processes   
 
EU treaties provide for three basic ways in which the EU Council can take decisions: by 
unanimity, by qualified majority vote or by simple majority vote.  Unanimity used to be the 
normal requirement when a new policy was being initiated or an existing policy framework 
was being modified or further developed.  However, Treaty reforms have greatly reduced the 
circumstances in which a unanimity requirement applies and it is now largely confined to 
policy decisions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police and Judicial 
Cooperation pillars of the EU and to such sensitive and particularly important matters under 
the EC pillar as constitutional and financial issues. Unanimity is also required when the 
Council wishes to amend a Commission proposal against the Commission’s wishes.  Unlike 
in the EAC, in the EU abstentions do not constitute an impediment to the adoption of Council 
decisions that require unanimity.  Qualified Majority voting now applies to most decision 
under the EC pillar, to selected decisions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
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pillar and to a few types of decision under the Police and Judicial Cooperation pillar.  Simple 
majority voting in which all states have one vote each is used mainly for procedural matters 
(Nugent, 2003:168 -169). 
 
Laursen (2003:15-16), notes that the elements of an independent Commission and Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) add up to what could be called supranationality.  The European 
Commission is an independent European body; it is there to represent and further the 
European interest.  National interests are represented in the Council of Ministers, but to the 
extent that QMV is accepted in the Council, no single member can stop the adoption of 
measures they do not like.  She further notes that one of the problems of traditional 
intergovernmental cooperation, and the concomitant rule of unanimity, is that the slowest 
members will determine the speed of cooperation.  Under such form of cooperation one 
should expect decisions to be based on the lowest common denominator.  The EU on the 
other hand has created institutions that facilitate the “upgrading of the common interest.” 
 
The recent adoption of the EU Reform Treaty at Lisbon, though not yet ratified, offers bold 
recommendations on how to make the EU a more effective institution.  The main issue in the 
Treaty is the introduction of a double majority voting system which is expected to be phased-
in beginning 2014 and fully implemented three years later.  Under this system, a 55% 
majority of EU countries with at least 65% of the bloc’s population will be required to vote 
for a change to be approved.  Other issues include having a full-time President of the 
European Council, a new Foreign Affairs Chief, with the profile and the budget to give the 
EU more clout on the world stage, fewer national veto powers, more powers for the European 
Parliament and a slimmed down European Commission.  The EU Reform Treaty will need to 
be ratified by each of the EU’s member states, before entering into force in mid-2009 (BBC 
News, 2008:1-2).  Already, the Republic of Ireland has rejected the Treaty in a referendum in 
mid 2008. 
 
5.3.5 Ability to acquire resources   
 
The European Union’s policies, programmes and activities are all funded by a budget to 
which the 27 member states contribute annually.  Unlike the EAC whose Treaty provides for 
equal contribution to the EAC budget by the Partner States regardless of their economic 
differences, in the EU, the higher a country’s national wealth, the more money its 
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government contributes towards the EU’s running costs every year.  The financial resources 
of the EU come from three main sources: a share of each member state’s customs duties, a 
share of the harmonized value added tax (VAT) and a further contribution from the member 
states based on the size of their gross national income (GNI).  The limit on how much can be 
taken from national treasuries to run the EU is set by the member states themselves 
(European Union, 2008:1).   
 
The EU also has sound financial management policies embodied in one of its key organs, the 
Court of Auditors.  This organ examines and monitors revenue and expenditures of the EU 
institutions to make sure that both revenues received and spending are lawful and based on 
sound financial management (Duke University School of Law, 2005:4).  
 
With regard to acquiring human resources, the EU has in place a European Communities 
Personnel Selection Office which ensures that only well qualified and experienced personnel 
are recruited into the institution.  This has prevented nepotism and cronyism from prevailing 
in the recruitment process.  The institution also offers attractive terms and conditions of 
service with possibility of career advancement and salary increase which increases its ability 
to attract the best of the best from the EU labour market. 
 
5.3.6 Internal harmony 
 
Power in the EU is shared between four entirely independent and separate bodies: the 
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice.  Separation of powers ensures that nobody gets too much power 
which has led to a semblance of internal harmony amongst and between the organs and 
institutions of the EU.  For example, with regard to legislation, the European Commission (in 
contrast to the EAC where EALA can move private members Bills) is the only organ that can 
draft proposals for EU laws.  These proposals are then forwarded to the Council of the 
European Union which acts as one of the two chambers of the EU’s legislation branch, the 
other chamber being the European Parliament.  These two chambers go through proposed EU 
law and must agree on the final version of the law and negotiate if necessary. Once they agree 
the law is passed and it is the duty of the Commission to implement the law.  The European 
Court of Justice ensures that EU law in equally applied by the various EU member states 
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(The EU, 2008:1). Thus in the EU the powers and duties of the various organs and 
institutions are clearly spelt out, unlike in the EAC. 
 
It was observed that in the EAC the relations between the EAC Secretariat and the organs that 
represent Partner States’ interests especially the Sectoral Committees, were not harmonious. 
In contrast, in the EU, harmony has been established between the European Commission and 
the EU organs representing member states’ interests through the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) which consists of permanent national officials appointed by 
each member state to the EU Headquarters in Brussels.  COREPER is the administrative arm 
of the EU Council of Ministers. It occupies a pivotal position in the Community decision 
making system as it is a forum for dialogue among the Permanent Representatives and 
between them and their respective national capitals.  As often as possible, agreement on EU 
policies is reached at the level of COREPER as any agreement at their level would usually be 
formally ratified by the national Ministers (Roney & Budd, 1998:22).    Since COREPER is 
based in the EU Headquarters in Brussels, it is common and easy for the EC Commissioners 
to lobby and influence them to accept their proposals.  This has contributed to harmony in the 
EU’s decision making process as well as to improved relations between the European 
Commission and the Member States.  
 
5.3.7 Satisfaction of strategic constituencies   
 
With regard to satisfaction of staff, unlike in the EAC which has locked in contracts, career 
prospects in the EU institutions are good.  There are four job groups and each job group is 
further divided into several steps.  Staff become eligible for promotion on the basis of merit 
and seniority.  The most dynamic and motivated officials are thus assured of the possibility of 
reaching the highest levels.    Further, throughout the career structure, there are possibilities 
for self-improvement in terms of in-house courses to acquire new language, management and 
communication skills.  An important element in determining career advancement is the 
system of periodical evaluation, which is carried out for each member of EU staff.  
Recommendations for advancement are made on the basis of performance and seniority.  
Further, staff working for the institutions of the European Union enjoy an excellent standard 
of living with high basic salaries which are augmented by increments every two years on a 
scale which is reviewed annually.  These salaries are considerably enhanced by a package of 
allowances (expatriation, household, dependent child, education, relocation) depending on 
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personal circumstances.  Other benefits include a pension scheme, insurance, exemption from 
national tax (European Personnel Selection Office, 2008:1).   
 
As pertains to satisfaction of external constituencies such as the business community, civil 
society and the public at large, one of the organs of the EU is the Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) which is an advisory body with 222 members, selected from the private 
sector to represent industry, labour, consumers and the public at large to ensure that these 
groups are effectively represented in the institutional framework of the European Union 
(Duke University School of Law, 2005:3).  In this way the EU has been able to satisfy the 
needs of its external stakeholders.  
 
5.3.8 Adaptability to change 
 
One of the most significant changes the EU has undergone is enlargement through increased 
membership.  From an original membership of six states, there have been six successive 
enlargements, the largest occurring on 1st May 2004, when ten member states joined.  The EU 
is currently composed of twenty republics, six kingdoms and one grand duchy.  Following the 
addition of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the EU’s membership now stands at twenty-
seven. Negotiations are also under way with a number of other states (Wikipedia, 2008:1).   
 
Before enlargement, the impending change was met with a lot of fears.  For example, the fear 
that enlargement would make EU institutions dysfunctional; that it would lead to 
impossibility of reaching understanding and hence lack of unity within Europe; that there 
were too many substantial differences between new and old members in terms of democracy, 
culture and historical experiences to make enlargement viable; and that Europe would 
experience economic turbulences (Bianchi & Lasticova, 2008:5-8).  
 
Much as these fears were justified, they have so far not manifested themselves after 
enlargement.  Rather, the EU has been able to successfully overcome the fears by having in 
place an effective policy to deal with the anticipated change.  For example, in order to ensure 
progress in the negotiations leading to membership, the candidate countries must meet the 
requirements for membership, most importantly, the Copenhagen criteria which includes: the 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity 
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to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; and the ability to take on 
the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of palatial, economic and 
monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the acquis 
communautaire16 (European Commission, 2008: 1-2).  In all areas of the acquis, the 
candidate countries must bring their institutions, management capacity and administrative 
and judicial systems up to EU standards, both at national and regional level.  This will allow 
them to implement the acquis effectively upon accession and, where necessary, to be able to 
implement it effectively in good time before accession (European Commission, 2008: 2-3).  
In this way, the EU has been able to adapt to change brought about by enlargement.  The 
EAC has similar requisites for accession of new members into the EAC.  The different with 
the EU is that the EAC lacks strong preconditions. 
 
The EU’s adaptability to change is further enhanced by its flexibility. The EU has a number 
of areas of flexibility where its member-states are involved in a policy measure through 
variable geometry.  The most important one being participation in the single currency.  Other 
policies include borders and defence.  This is useful where members are unwilling or unable 
to participate fully.  Evidently, the EU has in place processes than can manage flexible 
coalitions successfully.  The key is to ensure that it maintains a consensus on the broad 
principles of European integration, even if its members’ involvement in individual policies 
varies.  For example the United Kingdom is still a member of the EU even though it is not 
part of the EU single currency.   
 
5.3.9 Transformational leadership 
 
Unlike the EAC where the top leadership is appointed by the Summit upon nomination by the 
relevant Head of State under the principle of geographical rotation, in the EU, the President 
of the Commission is appointed by qualified majority voting by the EU Council of Ministers 
subject to approval by the EU Parliament (Napel  &  Widgren, 2006: 2).  This has ensured 
that high calibre individuals capable of transformational leadership are appointed to head the 
EU.  The candidate selected by the Council has often been, but is not by definition, a leading 
national politician.  For example, Jacque Delors (1985-1994), who is regarded as the most 
                                                 
16 The term acquis communautaire or EU acquis, is used in European Union law to refer to the total body of EU 
law accumulated thus far.  (Wikipedia 2008:1).  Available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis_communautaire)  
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successful Commission President, being credited with giving the Community a sense of 
direction and dynamism, was a former French Finance Minister. During his term, he rallied 
Europe to the call of the single market and the goals of economic, monetary and political 
union (International Herald Tribune, 1992:1).  Another Commission President credited with 
successful administrative and institutional reforms that have enabled the EU to be effective in 
achieving its goals is Romano Prodi (1999-2004). According to Dimitrakopoulous (2004:4), 
Prodi, a former Italian Prime Minister and academic who had played an important role in 
Italy’s accession to the Euro-zone, seemed to combine two features of fundamental 
importance for any Commission President who aspires to make a significant contribution to 
the process of European Integration: he was both a political heavy weight and a man of 
inconsiderable intellect who commanded the respect of many European leaders.   
 
Transformational leadership has also been realised in the EU owing to the fact that the 
Commission President is given powers that can enable him or her to ensure effective 
achievement of the EU’s objectives.  On a wider scale, the EU Commission President takes 
part in decision making being the head of the only EU organ that is allowed to propose 
legislation. He can use vision to propose legislation that will enable the EU achieve its 
objectives.  On a narrower scale, the Commission President has the power to reshuffle 
portfolios and Commissioners, force the resignation of inefficient Commissioners as well as 
influence the appointment of key personnel among the Directorates-General.  In this way, the 
President of the Commission can shape his team.  The success of the Prodi Commission for 
example, is attributed to the fact that, unlike any previous Commissions, it took office with an 
explicit mandate from the Heads of State and Government to enact far reaching reforms 
(Kassim, 2004:40). 
 
Further, transformational leadership in the EU can be attributed to the fact that the contract of 
the Commission President can be renewed once.  This allows the incumbent Presidents to 
master the inside knowledge needed to turn the European Commission into the sort of 
efficient executive organisation that a united Europe will need.    The European Commissions 
led by Jacques Delors are regarded as the most successful in the European Union’s history, a 
gold standard by which future Commissions are judged (International Herald Tribune, 
1992:1).  It is notable that Delors’ Commission was the longest serving Commission.  It was 
composed of three separate Commissions: 1985-1988, 1989-1992 and 1992-1993 following a 
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decision by the EU Council to extend his period of office by two years.  It was the only 
Commission to serve three times and yet incidentally the one regarded as the most successful.   
 
5.3.10 Political will 
 
Unlike the EAC which has failed to create strong regional institutions, the governments of 
EU member states have demonstrated adequate political will by creating stronger regional 
institutions.  Important powers have been delegated to the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Commission is an independent European body: it is 
there to represent and further the European interest.  The ECJ makes binding decisions.  
Community law is different from traditional international law in that it has primacy if it 
conflicts with national law; and much EC legislation has direct effect on member states.   If 
we compare the EU with the EAC, some structural institutional differences become apparent.  
The EAC has not created independent supranational bodies like the EC Commission; the 
EAC Partner States have also not accepted anything resembling Community law even when 
the EALA passes legislation supposed to have force of law at national levels.  In the EC there 
has been a pooling and delegation of sovereignty.  This has been done to assure credible 
commitments (Laursen, 2003:15-16). The same has not featured at the EAC level.   
 
Adequate political will is also demonstrated in the EU through provision of explicit sanctions 
against non-compliance of EU laws and decisions.  Until the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the European Commission was not empowered to impose 
sanctions against member states who were in breach of their legal obligations.  Respect for 
Commission decisions was dependent on the goodwill and political judgment of the States 
themselves, backed up by the ability of the Commission to make a referral to the Court of 
Justice – though the Court too could not impose sanctions.  However, the Commission is now 
permitted, when a member state refuses to comply with a judgment of the Court, to bring the 
state back before the Court and in so doing to specify a financial penalty that should be 
imposed.  The size of the penalty must reflect the seriousness of the legal infringement, the 
duration of the infringement, and the state’s ability to pay (using GDP as an indicator).  The 
Court takes the final decision.   
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The first state to be fined by the Court was Greece, which in 2000, was held to have failed to 
fulfil its obligations on waste directives and was ordered to pay Euro20,000 per day until it 
complied with the Court’s judgment.  On a much bigger scale, in May 2002 the Commission 
asked the Court to fine France Euro242,650 per day for being in breach of EU insurance laws  
(Nugent, 2003:142).  The Commission has also exercised a great deal of authority in ensuring 
the EU Competition Law is strictly enforced.  Microsoft, for example, was fined US$1.4 
billion in February 2008 for defying sanctions imposed on her for anti-competitive behaviour 
after failing to comply with a 2004 ruling of the European Court of First Instance.  The EAC 
has a Competition Law in place but its enforcement remains fuzzy.   
 
Political will is further manifested in the EU having a development fund set aside specifically 
to provide compensatory support for revenue losing members, for supporting infrastructure 
development in lesser endowed economies and for enhancing social cohesion.  Such funds 
are important in dampening zero sum game attitudes because they create a hopeful win-win 
environment. 
 
 
5.4 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter sought to establish the reasons for the shortfalls by the EAC in effectively 
meeting its objectives.  The study was guided by the hypothesis that RIIs such as the EAC are 
likely to be effective in achieving the objectives for which they were established if the basic 
fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are embedded in their institutional 
structures, systems and processes. The fundamentals of organisational effectiveness identified 
were: clarity of purpose, facilitative organisational culture, rational organisation structure and 
processes, ability to acquire and manage resources, internal harmony, satisfaction of strategic 
constituencies, transformational leadership, ability to adapt to change and in the case of 
public sector organisations like RIIs, adequate political will. 
  
The study established that the basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are, 
in fact, only weakly embedded in the institutional structure, systems and processes of the 
EAC.  As a general conclusion, the following organisational weaknesses were established:  
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First, the EAC did not have clarity of purpose as it was pursuing too many objectives without 
requisite manning and financial resources.   
 
Second, the institution has a negative organisational culture characterised by laxity, 
individualism, unnecessary travel and poor time management which adversely affects its 
performance.   
 
Third, the organisation structure was found to be irrational as the demarcation of roles among 
the organs of the EAC has created a weak regional institution that does not have the power to 
steer itself to achieving its objectives.   
 
Fourth, the organisational processes, in particular decision making by consensus and the 
requirement of quorum, were found to be constraining the institution’s effectiveness.   
 
Fifth, it was also observed that the EAC did not have the ability to acquire adequate resources 
as it substantially depends on financial contributions from its Partner States which are often 
remitted late thereby leading to chronic financial shortages. Its dependence on donor funding 
is also viewed as unsustainable.  The institution’s ability to acquire staff was also seen to be 
wanting due to uncompetitive terms and conditions of service.  Management of resources 
both financial and human were seen to be wanting.   
 
Sixth, it was also observed that the institution did not have internal harmony as evidenced by 
strained relations between and among its key organs.  
 
Seventh, the strategic constituencies of the institution also registered their dissatisfaction with 
the institution.  The staff were unhappy about lack of career advancement, fixed contracts and 
fixed salaries.  The business community felt they were not adequately involved in the EAC’s 
decision making process and that EAC laws that affect their operations were often flaunted 
by the Partner States.  The Civil society felt that they were not adequately sensitized about 
the EAC’s programmes.   
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Eighth, the EAC was found to lack the ability to effectively adapt to change as seen in the 
grid lock in decision making and financial difficulties the institution is facing following its 
increased membership as well as its insistence in using English as its working language after 
admitting two French speaking countries.   
 
Ninth, transformational leadership was seen to be lacking mainly due to limited powers 
vested in the head of the institution.   
 
Finally, political will was also seen as inadequate as exemplified by the unwillingness of the 
Partner States to create strong regional institutions.   
 
The findings of the study can best be captured by the illustration below which depicts the 
Heads of State of the founder Partner States of the EAC, that is, President Kibaki of Kenya, 
President Kikwete of Tanzania and President Museveni of Uganda, on an East African 
Federation cart.  The illustration seems to indicate ‘right idea, wrong strategy’.   
 
 
(The East African, 2007c: 14) 
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The EAC was established to pursue noble objectives which if effectively achieved would lead 
to improved quality of lives for the people of East Africa.  However, the way in which the 
institution is structured leaves it as a lame duck, incapable of rising to the occasion in terms 
of fulfilling its mandate effectively.   
 
As a way to propose appropriate recommendations for improving EAC’s effectiveness, the 
study further sought to establish how the world’s most successful RII, that is, the European 
Union fairs with regards to the basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory.  It 
was found that, to a large extent, these fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory 
are well ingrained in the EU’s institutional structure, systems and processes.  The EU was 
seen to have clarity of purpose as it pursues a few goals which it concentrates its efforts on.  
The organisational culture of the EU was seen to be dominated by three values: efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness in EU’s operation.  The structure of the EU was found to be 
rational as the demarcation of responsibilities has created strong regional institutions with 
adequate powers to enable effective achievement of goals.   
 
As for organisational processes, unanimity/consensus in decision making is only used where 
sensitive political issues are concerned.  Otherwise, the most common mode of decision 
making is through qualified majority vote or simple majority vote. The institution was also 
found to be financially self reliant as it has a reliable and sustainable financing method.  The 
EU also has an effective financial management system embodied in one of its key organs, 
that is, the European Court of Auditors. The EU is also able to attract high calibre personnel 
as it offers attractive terms and conditions of service.  Internal harmony has been realised 
through sharing of powers between and amongst the key organs and institutions of the EU. 
Internal harmony and coordination is further enhanced by having member states’ 
representatives based at the EU Headquarters.   
 
As regards satisfaction of strategic constituencies, it was noted that the EU has good career 
prospects and annual salary increments which motivate staff.  Further, the business 
community, civil society and public at large are satisfied as their interests are represented in a 
key EU organ, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). The EU was seen to be an 
institution that effectively adapts to change as it has undergone six enlargements without any 
difficulty.  Its adaptability is further enhanced by its flexible approach whereby it allows 
member states to advance at different pace of integration yet still remain members of the EU. 
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Transformational leadership was seen to be present in the EU mainly as a result of the fact 
that the top leadership of the European Commission is appointed through a competitive 
process and has the power to initiate and implement change.   
 
It was also observed that there was enormous political will for the EU as the governments of 
the member states had ceded considerable sovereignty to the institution through creation of 
strong regional institutions like the European Commission, European Court of Justice and the 
European Parliament.  The EU also has stringent sanctions for member states that fail to 
abide to regional laws. 
 
Finally, it was observed that the fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theories are 
deeply embedded in the EU’s institutional structure, systems and processes.  It is therefore 
not surprising that the institution has achieved the deepest levels of integration as compared 
to other RIIs in the world.  It is for this reason that the EAC has much to learn from the EU’s 
institutional framework. 
 
In the next chapter, a summary of the study as well as the research findings is undertaken.  
Recommendations on what can be done to enhance the EAC’s ability to effectively achieve 
its objectives are proposed on the basis of the determinants of organisational effectiveness 
which formed the basis on which the EAC was analysed.  Recommendations also cover 
factors that underlie effectiveness of RIIs that are replicable from the EU.  Areas for further 
study are also suggested.   
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Chapter Six 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
 
This study sought to establish the critical underpinnings for organisational effectiveness of 
RIIs with specific reference to the EAC.  The interest arose out of a general observation of 
failure by RIIs in Africa to effectively achieve the objectives for which they were established.  
Informed by public administration theories of organizational effectiveness, the study 
hypothesised that RIIs are likely to be effective in achieving the objectives for which they 
were established if the basic fundamentals of organizational effectiveness theory are 
embedded in their institutional structures, systems and processes.  In turn, to the extent that 
such fundamentals of organizational effectiveness theory are not embedded or are only 
weakly embedded in the RII, the likelihood of such institutions failing to effectively achieve 
their mandates is evident.  In seeking to determine the validity of this hypothesis, the study 
was structured along five chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter one gave a general background on the establishment of RIIs as well as what 
constitutes the central problem necessitating the study.  The statement of the research 
problem was outlined as well as the empirical approach that informed the entire study. The 
key concepts underlying the study were outlined to clarify their meanings and application and 
to bring out the broad dimensions of the study.  
 
Chapter two outlined a broad review of literature on the rationale for establishing RIIs.  The 
main characteristics of RIIs as well as an overview of the performance of selected RIIs in 
Africa were highlighted.   
 
Chapter three focused on a broad literature review of the EAC.  The history of the EAC, its 
objectives, the fundamental and operational principles that govern its operations as well as 
the major organs through which it operates were outlined.  The successes and shortcomings 
of the EAC were further highlighted.  The chapter also included a broad literature review on 
possible causes of the EAC’s shortcomings.  Literature review on how institutional 
frameworks can explain the EAC’s shortcomings was also undertaken. 
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Chapter four, examined the concept of organisational effectiveness within the framework of 
organisational effectiveness theory and contextualized it within the area of study, that is, the 
organisational effectiveness of RIIs.  The main theoretical models of organisational 
effectiveness were highlighted.  Determinants of organisational effectiveness were identified 
and briefly described in terms of what the ideal situation should be.   
 
Chapter five documented the research findings.  Herein, the organisational effectiveness of 
the EAC was analysed vis-a-vis the determinants of organisational effectiveness identified in 
chapter four.  The aim was to establish the extent to which the basic fundamentals of 
organisational effectiveness theory are embodied in EAC’s organisational structures, 
processes and systems and how they impact the institution’s effectiveness.  A comparative 
analysis of the EU (regarded as the most advanced RII in the world) was also presented in 
this chapter.  The aim was to establish to what extent the basic fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory are embedded in the EU’s structures and processes and whether it 
accounted for its more successful regional integration process.   
 
The research findings, based on literature review of EAC policy documents, the researcher’s 
own critical observations, discussions held with key stakeholders and results from the 
questionnaire, supported the hypothesis that guided the study.  In this context, there was an 
overwhelming consensus on two issues:  
 
i) that the EAC had not effectively achieved the objectives for which it was established; 
and 
 
ii) that the key fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory such as: clarity of 
purpose, positive organisational culture, rational organisational structure and 
processes, ability to acquire resources, internal harmony, satisfaction of strategic 
constituencies, ability to adjust to change, transformational leadership and political 
will, were weakly embedded in the EAC’s institutional structures, processes and 
systems thereby contributing to a lacklustre performance.   
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Literature review on the EU also drew two conclusions: 
 
i) it is considered to be the world’s most advanced RII; and 
 
ii) the basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theories are deeply embedded 
in its institutional structures, processes and systems thereby making the institution 
better positioned to achieve its mandate.   
 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Whenever institutions are created many factors come into play, which determine how 
effective they will be in achieving the goals for which they were created.  Organisational 
studies attempt to understand and model these factors based on scientific analysis. These 
studies have produced theoretical models which predict and explain what institutions need to 
do in order to effectively achieve their objectives.  These theories are useful in controlling, 
predicting and explaining organisational behaviour.  However, theory can only go so far in 
making a priori prescriptions on the form specific institutions should take.  In reality, the 
‘one size fits all idea’ is inapplicable to organisation design and each institution must chart its 
own course.   
 
Indeed, the EU experience shows that the institutional arrangements that the EU adopted in 
its early development have been modified over time in response to emerging challenges and 
changing patterns of preference influenced by successive enlargements, transformational 
leaders and the internal dynamics of the institutional system itself. These institutional 
arrangements, while borrowing from prescriptions of organisational effectiveness theory, 
represent the EU’s own way of addressing its own challenges.  In the proceeding section, the 
study outlines recommendations on what measures should be put in place in order to enable 
the EAC effectively achieve its objectives and goals.  These recommendations are based on 
advice received from key stakeholders of the EAC as well as from my own critical analysis of 
the institutional framework of the EAC and the challenges it has faced, having been a 
member of staff of the EAC over the last seven years.   
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The recommendations take cognisance of the ten basic fundamentals of organisational 
effectiveness theory that underpinned the study’s analytical framework and on which basis 
the EAC was found to be underperforming.   
 
6.2.1 Clarity of purpose 
 
There is need to formulate a more succinct vision and mission of the EAC.  These should be 
short, simple, clear and exciting enough for EAC members of staff, members of the other 
EAC organs as well as key external stakeholders to internalise.  For example in the case of its 
vision, the caption could be: “A united and prosperous East African nation”.  This is short, 
clear and easy to remember.  Further, it invokes a feeling of one-ness and East African unity 
which is exciting. 
 
Good operational plans and indicators of goal achievement should be developed for each goal 
of the EAC.  This will enable implementers to know their exact roles and how to monitor and 
evaluate their goal achievement.  As was observed earlier, the 3rd EAC Development Strategy 
(2006-2010) has generally tried to develop operational plans and indicators of goal 
achievement for the priority goals identified for the period 2006-2010.  However, this should 
be extended to all goals of the EAC as well as to new goals that emerge. 
 
There is urgent need to beef up the EAC Secretariat with adequate human and financial 
resources to enable more effective achievement of the ambitious goals and objectives 
outlined in the EAC Treaty and the 3rd Development Strategy (2006-2010).  It is tactless for 
the EAC to expect to effectively achieve its objectives with one-man departments.  As earlier 
seen, key sectoral programmes such as agriculture, industry, environment, gender, labour, 
trade, education, international relations and political affairs, which feature prominently in the 
EAC Treaty, are each manned by only one officer. At the bare minimum, the EAC should 
strive to have at least three officers in each department; a Principal Officer, a Senior Officer 
and an Officer.  Until such a time that manning levels improve, the EAC should consider 
outsourcing some of its technical work to consultants and hired experts so that the few 
permanent staff focus more on implementation and evaluation of programmes.   
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The EAC should pursue a pace of integration that is realistic.  Such a pace should be 
minimalist and incremental in approach.  It should not make unrealistic demands on the 
institutional, technical and political capacities of the EAC Partner States.  It should seek to 
concentrate on a few carefully targeted and politically viable projects or schemes within 
clearly defined sectors.  In this regard, the EAC may wish to reconsider its decision to rush to 
implement the 2nd and 3rd stages of integration, that is, the Common Market and the Monetary 
Union, before completing implementation and assessment of the 1st stage of integration, the 
Customs Union. 
 
The EAC Treaty should lay down clear and realistic timeframes for the achievement of keys 
objectives of integration.  This would not only help the EAC have clear targets to work 
towards but would also prevent the EAC Heads of State from setting unrealistic timeframes 
for the achievement of EAC objectives. 
   
6.2.2 Organisational culture 
 
To improve the EAC’s organisational culture, a Staff Code of Conduct and Ethics should be 
written.  This Code of Conduct should benchmark the ideals and moral probity that should 
guide and characterise the behaviour of members of staff of the EAC as they execute their 
responsibilities.  The Code of Conduct is not intended to be a basis for disciplinary action 
against members of staff; rather, it is meant to encourage staff to pursue excellence as they 
exercise their responsibilities. 
 
To reduce the culture of unnecessary travel, there is need for the EAC to come up with staff 
rules on official travel.  It is irrational to have an institution where everyone travels and no 
one sits at their desks to plan and follow up. Every week the EAC receives hundreds of 
invitation letters to various workshops, seminars and meetings.  Such invitations should not 
be accepted indiscriminately; rather, there should be a set criteria for accepting and rejecting 
them.  One criterion would be to accept invitations that are clearly linked to EAC’s priority 
goals as identified in the Development Strategy. Deliberate efforts should also be taken to 
hold routine technical meetings involving Partner States at the EAC Headquarters in Arusha 
instead of the current practise where the venues of technical meetings keep moving from one 
Partner State to another. 
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To eliminate individualism and improve team work, there is need to introduce social 
activities like sports, regular cocktails, staff parties and team building exercises for members 
of staff of the EAC.  The EAC office environment is not the easiest to get to know people.  
Officers hardly have time to socialise during working hours due to pressure of work.  The 
EAC workplace is also often filled with stress and competition.  These are not the best 
conditions in which to facilitate team bonds.  But if members of staff are taken out and into a 
new environment, they are provided with an opportunity to see each other in a new light.  
They will have the chance to learn new things about each other, and in many instances new 
things that they have in common.   
 
Further, the competition that is associated with some social activities (football match, dancing 
competition) is really a healthy way to address the competition at the office.  Members of 
staff can get these feelings out during such social activities; so that everyone can join forces 
successfully back at the office.  Last but not least, social activities will give EAC members of 
staff the chance to build shared experiences and memories.  By participating together in 
various social activities, the members get to be informal, laugh, and have an awesome time 
with each other, something that they will all remember positively.  These feelings and 
experiences will follow them all back to the office where they will serve to create bonds 
among staff which supports increased productivity and office morale. 
 
To ensure an overall positive organisational culture it is important that the EAC’s top 
leadership leads by example.   Leadership and organizational culture are tightly intertwined.  
The top leadership of the EAC, in particular the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretaries 
General and the Director General, must role model desired mind-sets and behaviour.  In other 
words, they should be seen to”walk their talk” in order to gain the confidence of staff to 
change to a positive organisational culture.  As was observed in chapter four, whether leaders 
realize it or not, they seem to be in front of the cameras when they speak or act.  Every move 
they make, everything they say, is visible to all.  Therefore the best approach is to lead by 
example.  They should live up to Mahatma Gandhi’s famous edict, “For things to change, 
first I must change.”   
 
 
 
 
 181
6.2.3 Organisation structure 
 
The EAC’s organisation structure, at the level of structure based on organs, can be 
streamlined through rational assignment of powers and responsibilities to the organs.  This 
would require that the organ of the EAC representing the hierarchical level at which an issue 
can be most effectively tackled should be assigned the responsibility for that issue.  One way 
in which this could be operationalised would be by disbanding from the EAC structure two 
organs, that is, the Coordination Committee and the Sectoral Committee, and assigning their 
roles to the EAC Secretariat.  As seen in chapter five, these two organs are made up of 
Partner States representatives and hence ideally represent national interests.  However, they 
have been assigned roles that are crucial to effective integration, that is, the role of submitting 
reports and recommendations on the implementation of the EAC Treaty and the role of 
preparing implementation programmes and setting out of priorities for the EAC respectively.  
These are roles that can only be effectively carried out by an organ that represents regional 
interests such as the EAC Secretariat and not by organs that represent national interests. 
 
There is also need to devolve some decision making powers to the EAC Secretariat.  
Presently, there is a wide array of mundane issues and activities that could easily be handled 
by the Secretariat without harming the national interests of the Partner States.  Instead, we 
find both the Partner States and the EAC getting engaged in costly decision making processes 
that entail the presence of both parties, yet only one party, the EAC Secretariat could easily 
make the decision then report to the Partner States.  Going by the current structure which 
involves numerous meetings of Sectoral and Coordination Committees, and now involving 
five countries where even quorum becomes a precarious issue, the EAC may find it difficult 
to transact its business efficiently if some devolution of decision making powers to the 
Secretariat is not sanctioned. 
 
At the level of structure based on EAC’s functional units, it is recommended that the Office 
of the Deputy Secretary General in charge of Projects and Programmes, which currently has 
an extensive span of control, be split into two offices:  Office of the Deputy Secretary 
General in charge of Productive and Social Sectors and Office of the Deputy Secretary 
General in charge of Planning and Infrastructure.  The two Directorates under this Office, that 
is Directorate of Planning and Infrastructure and Directorate of Productive and Social 
Sectors, were also found to have an extensive span of control.  These Directorates should be 
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split into four to create Directorate of Planning, Directorate of Infrastructure, Directorate of 
Productive Sectors and Directorate of Social Sectors.  The recommended new structure for 
the Office of the Deputy Secretary General in charge of Projects and Programmes is 
illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6:  Proposed Restructuring of Current Office of Deputy Secretary General  
(Projects and Programmes) 
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6.2.4 Organisation processes 
 
There is need to improve the present system of decision making in the EAC, mindful of 
national sensitivities.  If we examine what takes place in the EU, we observe that the EU 
Member States do not have to make all decisions on the basis of consensus, even over some 
key policy matters.  To address the EAC’s decision making challenges, there is need to strike 
a delicate balance between matters that are of extreme political sensitivity as to demand 
consensus in decision-making (for example deciding on the Protocols for the Common 
Market and the Monetary Union) and those that are not politically sensitive and which a 
simple majority voting or qualified majority voting system could suffice. The EAC needs to 
recognise that decision making by unanimity/consensus is a recipe not only for 
procrastination and delay, but also for unsatisfactory, or even, no decision making.  The 
situation whereby consensus remains the rule even on issues where countries would not 
object too strongly to being voted down is unsatisfactory in the face of the manifest need for 
the EAC to become efficient and dynamic.  
 
To overcome the problem of quorum in decision making, the EAC should borrow a leaf from 
the EU where abstentions do not constitute an impediment to the adoption of Council 
decisions that require unanimity.  Such a clause, if introduced in the EAC’s decision making 
rules is likely to result in Partner States being committed to attend scheduled meetings instead 
of the current situation where scheduled meetings are often cancelled because one Partner 
State is unable to attend for one reason or another. 
 
To improve the EAC’s communication processes, at the level of external communication, 
there is urgent need to improve the manning levels of the EAC’s department of public affairs 
and corporate communications.  As was seen, this department has an onerous responsibility 
of getting a whole multi-stakeholder community engaged and aligned to the EAC’s objectives 
yet, it only has two officers.  For a start, it is recommended that each Partner State seconds a 
Communication Officer to the EAC to support the two heavily overworked officers manning 
the department.  There is also need to provide the department with supportive infrastructure 
such as information technology, cameras and video equipment to enable it effectively fulfil 
its duties.  Further, the current practice of holding sensitization workshops for various 
stakeholders in the EAC as well as the East African Media Summits should be encouraged 
and increased.   
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In the area of internal communication, there is need to improve information flow between the 
EAC Secretariat and the relevant Ministries in the Partner States.  The most effective method 
of improving information flow would be by introducing a cost-effective electronic 
information exchange system linking the EAC Secretariat and the Ministries responsible for 
EAC Affairs in the respective capitals.  This will speed up the sending and receiving of 
information and, hence, increase effectiveness in undertaking various EAC activities.   
 
To improve intra EAC Secretariat communication there should be institutionalised regular 
staff meetings and briefings, at least once every month, for Executive and Professional Staff 
and once every two months for all staff including Support Staff.   The various functional units 
should also be encouraged to hold regular weekly meetings.  In this way, all members of staff 
will be able to know what is going on in the institution. 
 
The EAC’s monitoring and evaluation process can be improved by giving the EAC 
Secretariat legal executive authority over implementation and enforcement of decisions made 
by EAC’s top executive organs, namely the Summit and the Council.  As most decisions 
require implementation at the Partner State level, this is the only way in which the EAC will 
be able to compel Partner States to play their part.  Secondly, there is urgent need to increase 
the EAC Secretariat’s institutional capacity for monitoring and evaluation.  More staff need 
to be recruited to assist the one officer currently manning the division.   
 
6.2.5 Ability to acquire resources 
 
In order to improve the EAC’s ability to acquire financial resources there is need to develop a 
more pro-active mechanism of financing the EAC as opposed to the current system of equal 
contributions by the Partner States.  It is unrealistic to expect that the EAC Partner States can 
pay for the EAC budget on an equal scale taking into account their different economic 
strengths.  The EU would not have advanced at its pace without innovative, adequate, and 
sustained financing through various mechanisms, including selective taxes.  For instance, the 
EU Partner States’ national legal frameworks were amended to provide for an automatic 
payment to the institution out of a specified revenue sources according to an agreed formula.  
EAC can borrow from this. A formula should therefore be devised to determine the share of 
each EAC Partner State’s contribution based on its revenue.  The system of financing must 
take into account a number of factors, for example the size of the population and of the 
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economy, individual benefits accruing to a country and national budgets.  This 
recommendation may, however, trigger demands for concessions by those Partner States that 
would be required to contribute bigger budgets.  How to handle such a possibility should be 
taken into account when developing the new financing mechanism.  
 
There must also be explicit mention of sanctions against countries that fail to remit their 
financial contributions.  These sanctions should be severe and prohibitive.  For example, a 
country that is in arrears for more than one year should not be entitled to receive any 
document for policy meetings and should also not be allowed to speak in any meeting except 
if they need a dispensation of the Chair to speak about their commitment to pay, not anything 
else. Recruitment of its nationals into the EAC should also be frozen. Such measures are 
likely to compel Partner States to pay their dues in time and hence overcome EAC’s financial 
difficulties. 
 
Whereas the EAC has an Audit Commission which audits the accounts of the Community, in 
order to ensure sound financial management policies, there is need to transform the Audit 
Commission into an organ of the EAC.  This would be in line with EU practice in which one 
of the key organs of the EU is the Court of Auditors.  By becoming an organ of the EU, the 
European Court of Auditors gained new powers, such as the ability to bring actions before the 
European Court of Justice as well as the right to be consulted before the adoption of any 
legislation with financial implications.  In this way the EU Court of Auditors has been able to 
ensure that both revenues received and spending are lawful and based on sound financial 
management. 
  
In the area of human resources, the EAC’s ability to acquire competent human resources can 
be improved by making its terms and conditions of service more attractive.  For a start, there 
is urgent need to do away with the present system of fixed salaries.  The EAC must surely be 
the only institution in the world where an employee can work for ten years without an 
increase in salary! Even in the EAC Partner States’ ministries who were the architects of the 
fixed salary rule, this situation does not prevail; so why have it in the EAC?  Secondly, there 
is need review the five-year contract renewable once for all Professional Staff.  Not all jobs in 
the Professional Staff category should be on fixed contract basis. The lower level 
Professional Staff categories (P1-P3) should be on a continuous five-year renewable contract 
until the retirement age of 60.  This is because these jobs are usually occupied by officers in 
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age group 30-50 who are in their most productive years.  The higher level P4 and P5 can have 
five-year contracts renewable once as officers in this job groups usually join the EAC in age 
group 50 and above. This will not only ensure the EAC’s ability to attract the best of the best 
from the EAC labour market but will also ensure continuity and curb the potential of 
institutional memory erosion.   
 
The stipulation in the EAC staff rules and regulations that all staff will be recruited on the 
basis of merit should be strictly adhered to in the EAC.  In particular, regional balancing 
should not be over emphasized at the expense of merit. 
 
There is also need to establish within the EAC a specialised Public Service, Judicial Service 
and Legislative Service Commissions to govern the terms and conditions of service of staff of 
these branches within the EAC.  This system would replicate what obtains at the national 
levels.  Having an EAC Public Service Commission would improve the EAC’s ability to 
acquire competent human resources in three ways:  it would prevent nepotism and cronyism 
from prevailing in the EAC’s recruitment process; it would ensure regional balancing of 
positions without compromising quality; and it would result in the terms and conditions of 
service of EAC staff being periodically reviewed and improved.  
 
6.2.6 Internal harmony 
 
To improve internal harmony in the EAC, in as far as inter organ conflict is concerned, there 
is need for the EAC Treaty to clearly separate powers between the key organs of the 
institution.  As seen in chapter five, the Treaty appears to give too much power to one organ, 
the EAC Secretariat, at the expense of the other organs especially the EACJ and the EALA. 
This has led to tension between these three organs.  Just like in the EU, there should be a 
clear separation of powers between the key organs of the EAC to ensure that nobody gets too 
much power.  For example, as the Principal Executive Officer of the Community with 
authority over all organs, the Secretary General should not also be the Head of the EAC 
Secretariat as this gives him a dual and biased role.  One of the Deputy Secretaries General 
should be assigned to head the EAC Secretariat so that the Secretary General plays an 
oversight neutral role over all the organs. 
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There is also need to enhance, at appropriate levels, regular exchange of information between 
the EAC Secretariat, EALA and EACJ regarding the implementation of the Treaty and the 
Development Strategy.  Lack of knowledge has often given rise to lack of cross appreciation 
and support among the three organs.  It also breeds unnecessary mutual suspicion.  The 
appropriate levels of information exchange would be regular consultative meetings of the 
Secretary General, the Speaker and the President of the Court; regular consultative meetings 
at Professional Staff levels of the three organs notably by the Counsel to the Community, the 
Clerk of the EALA and the Registrar of the EACJ; and regular inter staff level consultations 
on relevant day to day activities.  Having an annual retreat of these three organs would also 
help to reduce tensions and create inter-organ harmony.   
 
In order to improve relations between the EAC Secretariat and the organs that represent 
Partner States’ interests such as the Sectoral Committees, Coordination Committee and 
Council of Ministers, the EAC Partner States should have permanent national representatives 
based at the EAC Headquarters in Arusha as is the case with COREPER in the EU.  Such 
representatives should act as the administrative arm of the EAC Council of Ministers in the 
EAC Headquarters.  They should occupy a pivotal position in the EAC’s decision making 
system by constituting a forum for dialogue among themselves as Permanent Representatives 
and between them and their respective national capitals.  As often as possible, agreement on 
EAC policies should be reached at the level of these representatives.  Any agreement at their 
level should ideally be formally ratified by the national Ministers. Being based in Arusha, it 
would be easy for the EAC Secretariat to lobby and influence these representatives to accept 
their proposals.  This will contribute to harmony in the EAC’s decision making process as 
well as to improved relations between the EAC and the Partner States.  
 
Inter-departmental harmony can be improved by setting up a mechanism that encourages 
inter-departmental and inter-directorate communication so that all staff know what is 
happening in other departments or directorates.  This should be supported by regular briefings 
to the Executive Staff by the Directors in charge of respective Directorates.  The Directors 
would have in turn been briefed through regular briefing sessions by the respective officers 
falling under their Directorates. 
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Inter-staff group harmony can be improved by staff rules and regulations that value all staff 
of the EAC regardless of their job groups.  It was observed that a large percentage of the 
Support Staff are disgruntled at perceived alienation from the institution by the other more 
senior job groups.  Harmony can be improved by involving Support Staff in staff meetings, 
consulting them when decisions that affect their lives are being made and giving them some 
basic allowances which other staff groups enjoy, most importantly settlement allowance and 
home leave which seems to be their main bone of contention. 
 
6.2.7 Satisfaction of strategic constituencies 
 
In order to ensure that the internal strategic constituency of the EAC, that is its staff, are 
satisfied, two things are crucial.  First, the career prospects of staff must be improved.  Key 
among this would be to do away with the fixed job groups which lack factor adjustment 
presently in use at the EAC.   Each job group should instead be further divided into several 
steps so that staff can become eligible for promotion on the basis of merit and seniority.  This 
will ensure that the most dynamic and motivated officials are assured of the possibility of 
reaching the highest levels in the institution as is the case in the EU.   There should also be a 
scheme of service that addresses long term career plans for those who choose to remain in the 
institution so that over the years they can grow in the service of the EAC. 
 
Secondly, there is need to enable the extremely qualified personnel who are recruited into the 
EAC Secretariat to translate their qualifications and experienced into improved performance.  
As noted in chapter five, this is currently not possible because of Treaty provisions which 
state that the Secretariat’s role is coordination.  Such staff should be allowed to play a more 
proactive role in the integration process.  This will be possible if, as was suggested in section 
6.2.3, the Coordination Committee and the Sectoral Committees are disbanded and their roles 
given to the EAC Secretariat.  The roles given to these two organs of submitting reports and 
recommendations on the implementation of the EAC Treaty and preparing implementation 
programmes and setting out of priorities for the EAC respectively are roles that should ideally 
be performed by officers recruited into the EAC Secretariat not by Partner States’ officials.   
 
In the area of satisfaction of external strategic constituencies, the EAC should recognise that 
if integration does not reflect the aspirations of the private sector and civil society it has little 
chance of success.  Mechanisms should thus be developed to ensure the private sector and 
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civil society participate fully in the integration progress.  One such mechanism would be to 
borrow a leaf from the EU experience where an organ, the Economic and Social Committee; 
has been specifically established to ensure that the interests of the private sector (industry, 
labour, consumers) and the public at large, are represented in the institutional framework of 
the EU.  The EAC should establish a similar organ but with care not to subject it to budget 
accounts oversight by EALA and administrative control by the EAC Secretariat.   
 
6.2.8 Adaptability to change 
 
The bigger the number of Partner States a RII has, the more difficult one would expect the 
decision making process to be.  EU experience shows that each successive enlargement has 
changed the nature of the EU.  The EU adapted by changing its decision making procedures 
from consensus decision making to qualified and simple majority decision making in a 
number of politically soft issues.  The EAC should therefore realise that its enlargement from 
three to five Partner States should ideally go in parallel with steps to increase the decision-
making capacity of the institution otherwise the institution will never move.  Time is ripe for 
the EAC to adopt qualified majority and simple majority decision making procedures. 
 
The EAC also needs to have in place an effective change management policy to deal with 
anticipated change such as membership enlargement.  An important aspect that needs 
improvement is in the area of the preconditions for admitting new members into the EAC. 
These preconditions as set out in Article 3 of the EAC Treaty are very lax.  They are only 
limited to acceptance of the EAC as set out in the Treaty, adherence to universally accepted 
principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and social justice; 
potential contribution to strengthening of integration within the East African region; 
geographical proximity; establishment of a market driven economy; and social and economic 
policies that are competitively with those of the EAC.  The EU, on the other hand, has very 
stringent preconditions for admitting new members among them, the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of palatial, economic and 
monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the body 
of European law so far accumulated.  This is a precondition that the EAC may wish to adopt 
in order to ensure that future states that wish to join its membership will be able to meet the 
obligations of such membership.  
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In light of the fact that the EAC has admitted two French speaking countries, there is need to 
introduce French as one of the working languages of the EAC in order to enable effective 
participation in EAC’s regional integration process by nationals of Rwanda and Burundi. 
This will entail amending the EAC Treaty which currently recognises English and Kiswahili 
respectively as the official language and lingua franca of the EAC. 
 
In order to effectively adapt to change, the EAC’s framework for regional integration should 
allow enough flexibility to permit progress at different speeds.  If all the EAC Partner States 
must move at the same speed, progress will be determined by the speed of the slowest 
moving state.  In this regard, the EAC should operationalise the principle of variable 
geometry.  Although this principle is identified in the EAC Treaty as one of its core 
operational principles, it has never been put into practise.  Variable geometry implies that, 
within a grouping, some sub-groups of countries may move faster than others towards the 
integration objectives.  It is useful where some Partner States are unwilling or unable to 
participate fully in an aspect of integration.  It allows for such Partner States to continue 
being members of the institution without undermining those Partner states that wish to 
continue with deeper integration.   The EU has a number of areas of flexibility where its 
member-states are involved in a policy measure through variable geometry.  It is for this 
reason that the UK is not part of the Schengen Visa System.  Moreover, the UK and few other 
EU Member States are not members of the Euro.  The EAC could apply the principle of 
variable geometry in the area of the Common Market which Tanzania seems uncomfortable 
with. 
 
6.2.9 Transformational leadership  
 
Several measures need to be put in place in order to bring about transformational leadership 
at the EAC.  First, the position of Secretary General should be subjected to competitive 
recruitment process unlike the present situation where the bearer is appointed by the Summit 
upon nomination by the relevant Head of State under the principle of rotation.  This will 
ensure that only high calibre individuals with proven records of transformational leadership 
are appointed to head the EAC.   
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Secondly, the Secretary General should be given executive authority to enable him have teeth 
to effect interventions in the achievement of the EAC’s objectives.  For example, in terms of 
day-to-day management of the EAC, he should be given decision making powers over 
decisions that are ordinarily made by Chief Executive Officers without having to revert to the 
Council of Ministers.  He should also have the power to restructure the EAC institution in the 
manner he deems fit and take responsibility for it.  As is the case in the EU, he should have 
the power to reshuffle portfolios of the Deputy Secretaries General, cause the resignation of 
inefficient Deputy Secretaries General and other Executive Staff as well as influence the 
appointment of key personnel to head EAC institutions.  In this way, the Secretary General 
will be able shape a team that can assist him to be transformational. 
 
Third, there is need to review the contracts of the EAC Secretaries General from the current 
five-year fixed contract to a five-year contract renewable once.  The hope of contract renewal 
is likely to make the Secretary General strive to effectively achieve the EAC’s goals and 
objectives.  It will also give the Secretary General enough time to make an impact and leave a 
legacy as he will be able to formulate long term plans for the institution.  In this regard, the 
EAC Partner States should not be so obsessed with having one of their own as Secretary 
General in the shortest time possible even at the expense of the institution’s organisational 
effectiveness. They should take cue from the EU’s Delors’ Commission which was the 
longest serving Commission yet regarded as the most successful.  In other words, if a 
Secretary General proves himself as capable of transforming the EAC into an achieving 
institution, there is no need for him to leave office in five years just because another Partner 
State wants to have its turn at the helm of the EAC; rather, it should be possible to renew his 
contract so that the EAC can continue to benefit from his leadership. 
 
Fourth, there is need to improve the manning levels in the Office of the Secretary General.  
As earlier seen, the Secretary General has only two core officers in his office: the Chef de 
Cabinet and the Senior Personal Secretary.  In order to increase the capacity of the Secretary 
General to undertake policy oriented activities that could make the position transformational 
for the EAC, he needs to be equipped with two Senior Liaison Officers at P2 level, one in 
charge of Regional Integration whose role will be liaise with departments dealing with 
regional integration projects and programmes and bring important ongoing developments to 
the attention of the Secretary General.  The second Liaison Officer would be responsible for 
institutional development with a key role of acting as a link between the Secretary General 
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and departments dealing with institutional development and capacity building as well as 
inter-organ coordination.  A third position of Personal Assistant to the Secretary General 
should also be created at P1 level.  The Secretary General should have the discretion to 
choose his Personal Assistant and the latter’s contract should be tied to the Secretary 
General’s contract.  This is unlike the present situation where the Chef de Cabinet’s position 
is tied to the Secretary General. 
 
Fifth, there is need to define the job description of the Office of the Chef de Cabinet in order 
to give the office the aura, allure, authority and decorum that ordinarily characterises such 
office.  The EAC could try and see what transpires in this office in other intergovernmental 
institutions such as the EU, UN and ECOWAS all of which have the position of Chef de 
Cabinet.  The Chef de Cabinet should be recruited on competitive terms unlike the present 
situation where the Secretary General has the discretion to choose whoever he pleases to 
occupy the position.  This is what has tended to subordinate the position to that of Personal 
Assistant role which leaves the incumbent with little time to concentrate on his core role.  To 
ensure institutional memory in the Office of the Secretary General, the Chef de Cabinet’s 
position should not be tied to that of the Secretary General as is presently the case.  It is also 
necessary to grade the position of Chef de Cabinet at Director Level (P5) in order to make it 
command clout and symbolise authority.  In this way it will be easy for the Chef de Cabinet 
to assign work to officers or to represent the Secretary General at high profile events.   
 
6.2.10 Political will 
 
The EAC leaders must be prepared to commit a high level of what has been called by Julius 
Ihonvbere (1994:11), “sovereignty suicide”. They should be willing to transfer a certain 
degree of national sovereignty to regional organs such as the EAC Secretariat, the EALA and 
the EACJ.  As earlier pointed out, EAC Partner States have, at least in practise, hitherto 
retained total sovereign control of their territories and all aspects of decision making, and 
have demonstrated a remarkable unwillingness to cede any part of this authority for the 
common good of the region.  The transfer of some powers will not only provide regional 
organs with the necessary legitimacy but, most important, will vest in these institutions the 
necessary authority to make tough policy decisions and to enforce coordinated action on 
critical areas of national policy management.  These shifts in decision making do not 
necessarily imply erosion of existing state power and authority.  Rather, what will have 
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changed is the way in which states use their power and authority; decision making will be 
made in coordination with other Partner States.   
 
Moreover, the transfer of authority to supra-national bodies will enhance their ability to plan, 
strategize, coordinate, monitor and evaluate the implementation of collective projects and 
programmes.  In this context, sovereignty need no longer be thought of as a zero-sum game.  
Pooling it does not reduce sovereignty.  Rather the trade-offs of pooling sovereignty include 
security and stability, reduced anxiety and conflict, reduced military spending and enhanced 
economic, political, social and technological cooperation.   
 
One way in which sovereignty could be pooled is giving greater autonomy to the EAC to 
allow it function effectively. This could be done by transforming the EAC Secretariat into a 
Commission.  The Commission should be a supranational East African body; it should be 
there to represent and further the East African interest. The structure of the Commission may 
be based on relevant aspects of the European Commission model.  It may have five 
Commissioners each representing one of the five EAC Partner States.  Commissioners may 
be in charge of one of the following key sectoral areas: Finance and Administration; Planning 
and Infrastructure; Productive and Social Sectors; Political Affairs; and Customs and Trade.  
The Commission may be presided over by a President who may be appointed on a rotational 
basis from any of the Partner States for a five-year term, renewable once.  This means that at 
any one time, one Partner State will have two officers at the helm of the Community; the 
President of the Commission and one Commissioner.  This arrangement will eliminate the 
current Treaty provisions that compel the top leadership of the EAC to have a five-year fixed 
contract which seems to be driven by the desire by the Partner States to always see one of 
their own at the helm of the EAC. The Partner States should cede more powers to the 
Commission to make it more effective.  This should include assigning all the powers 
currently enjoyed by the Sectoral and the Coordination Committee to the Commission. The 
Partner States should also cede decision making powers to the Commission. 
 
When determining what decision making powers to cede to the Commission, the EAC 
Partner States could choose from the menu recommended by Best (2006:8-9).  The menu 
outlines, in a rough descending order of degrees of autonomous power, four methods in 
which decision making power could be ceded: 
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 the right of the Commission to adopt normative decisions, that is, general rules, 
directly on the basis of the Treaty and without the need for approval by the Partner 
States; 
 the need of the Commission to agree with the Partner States in adopting normative 
decisions; 
 the exclusive right of the Commission to initiate proposals for the adoption of 
normative decisions by the Partner States;  
 the autonomous right of the Commission to adopt binding implementing acts;  
 the exclusive right of the Commission to adopt binding implementing acts with the 
approval of the Partner States.   
 
The EALA should be strengthened through direct elections by the citizens of East Africa.  
Once this is done, the Council of Ministers should be answerable to the EALA with a 
reporting line to the Summit just like national Ministers are answerable to Parliament first 
then to the Head of State.  If EALA is strengthened through direct elections, it will possible 
for it to pass binding laws that will also help curb obstacles to integration. There is also need 
to review, especially with regards to private members Bill, Article 63 of the Treaty which 
allows any Head of State the right to refuse to assent a bill passed by EALA.   In order to 
increase the powers of the EALA, the use of protocols to run the EAC operations should be 
reconsidered.  Serious thought needs to be given over the suitability of protocols in 
accelerating the process of regional integration as opposed to laws passed by EALA.   
 
In as far as interpretation or application of the provisions of the EAC Treaty is concerned, the 
EACJ, and not national courts, should be the only court empowered to make binding 
decisions.  This would ensure that the EAC Treaty and other EAC laws are interpreted and 
applied uniformly throughout the EAC Partner States.  In the EU, Community law is different 
from traditional international law in that it has primacy if it conflicts with national law; and 
much EC legislation has direct effect on member states.   The EAC Partner States should 
similarly accept the supremacy of Community law and the sole jurisdiction of the EACJ 
where conflict arises.   
 
As one of the main objectives of the EAC is to promote balanced growth within the region, 
efforts should be made to ensure that this objective is promoted and sustained at all cost.  
Recognising the imbalances within society and taking corrective action strengthens political 
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will.  The EAC could borrow a leaf from the EU which has a development fund set aside 
specifically to provide compensatory support for revenue losing members, for supporting 
infrastructure development in lesser endowed economies and for enhancing social cohesions.  
Such funds are important in dampening zero sum attitudes because they create a hopeful win-
win environment.  The EAC thus needs to develop an equitable compensation scheme since 
some countries will benefit more than others, at least in the short term.  The short-term losers 
need to be assisted to counter the impact on their economies resulting from regional market 
integration.  This would include infrastructural development and other compensatory 
mechanisms.  The funds for this should come from the EAC’s own sources and not directly 
from other member states. In this regard every effort should be made to establish an EAC 
Development Fund.   
 
Adequate political will is demonstrated in the EU through provision for sanctions against 
non-compliance of EU laws and decisions.  The EAC, through Article 143 of its Treaty, also 
has provision for sanctions but they are weak being limited to such action as the Summit 
may, on the recommendation of the Council, determine.  In this regard it is necessary to 
establish an explicit regional surveillance system and mechanism for assessing and 
monitoring compliance to EAC laws and decisions by Partner States.  Strict and clearly laid 
down sanctions should be employed against those states which persist in non-implementation 
or non-compliance.   
 
One way in which political will for the EAC’s integration process can be greatly displayed 
would be in speeding up the process of ratifying EAC protocols.  As earlier seen, most of the 
EAC’s programmes and projects are governed by protocols.  As such they cannot be 
implemented until such time as the protocols have been ratified.   Protocols have to be 
ratified by the respective Partner States. This can be a lengthy process as in some Partner 
States this involves the protocols being debated in Parliament while in others cabinets have 
the authority to ratify them.  Deliberate efforts have to be taken to speed up the ratification of 
protocols. 
 
Adequate political will is needed to overcome the challenges emanating from multiple 
memberships of EAC Partner States to different RIIs.  As membership to a RII is often 
backed by economic, social, cultural and technological reasons, it is difficult, at this point, to 
demand that the EAC Partner States quit membership of other RIIs.  What can be done is to 
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find ways of harmonising the policies and programmes of these RIIs.  As seen earlier, recent 
efforts, flowing from the Chief Executive Officers of SADC, COMESA and EAC have 
created a Tripartite Task Force that meets twice a year to coordinate and harmonise policies 
in trade, infrastructure and customs.  This is proving useful in dampening the dysfunctions of 
overlapping membership.  Indeed, a Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government of 
COMESA, SADC and EAC was held in Kampala in October 2008.  This Summit endorsed 
the creation of a Free Trade Area across the three RIIs.  The Heads of State of the EAC and, 
by extension, the Heads of State of SADC and COMESA should maintain their support for 
the efforts being made by the Chief Executive Officers of these three institutions to 
harmonise their programmes and policies. 
 
There is urgent need to strengthen the capacity of the Ministries responsible for EAC Affairs 
in order to enable them play a more meaningful role in assisting the EAC effectively achieve 
its objectives. These ministries should ideally be the focal point for the implementation of the 
EAC’s regional integration objective at the national level, rather than the current situation 
where they only coordinate meetings.  It is also important to increase the manning levels of 
these ministries as most of them are grossly understaffed.  They should also be equipped with 
reliable communication technology.  It would also help if these ministries were to share the 
same vision, mission and core values as the EAC as this will enable them work in harmony 
with the regional institution.  Presently, they seem to be more of appendages of national 
interests and this creates a difficult working relationship between them and the EAC 
Secretariat.   
 
The governments of the EAC Partner States should quickly address social stereotypes that are 
detrimental to integration rather than turn a blind eye as is currently the case.  The Tanzanian 
government, in particular, should take firm action against politicians who make xenophobic 
utterances against the regional integration process.  It should at the same time take deliberate 
action to sensitise its citizens on the benefits of integration.  This will counter the anti-
integration sentiments deeply embedded amongst it populace thanks to the unchecked 
utterances of politicians. The Kenyan government on the other hand should rein in on its 
citizens to stop exporting crime to neighbouring countries.  When criminals from one EAC 
Partner State commit crime in another Partner State, rather than blowing out of proportion the 
nationality of the criminals, it would help to see the police forces of the states involved 
issuing a joint statement and working together to deter future crimes.   
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Finally the governments of the EAC Partner States should realize that regional integration 
comes with a cost, and not larger than the cost of surrendering some autonomy and opening 
up their doors to allow the infusion of resources and competitions from other Partner States.  
The potential benefits of regional integration have been fully demonstrated.  Thus, rather than 
delay integration through belated excuses such as that their economic and social structures 
cannot manage the demands of integration or the economies of other Partner States are 
stronger, each Partner State should devise a strategy that enables its industrialists to benefit 
from partnering with others who will set up shop in their territory.  Further, instead of 
lamenting about other Partner States having professionals that will have an unfair advantage 
over its own citizens, each Partner State should expose its professionals to skills and work 
attitudes that raise its citizens’ competitiveness. 
 
 
6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY  
 
The various public administration theoretical frameworks that were used in evaluating the 
organisational effectiveness of the EAC suggest diverse issues to explore in the course of 
evaluations.  Such issues require adequate time and resources for effective analysis.  Given 
that this study had to be completed within one year and the scarce financial limitations of the 
researcher, a detailed examination of the whole institution and of all the minute details under 
the criteria of organizational effectiveness identified was not feasible.  It is therefore likely 
that the study may not have been able to unearth all the factors that impinge on the EAC’s 
organisational effectiveness.  It is recommended that a similar study be undertaken by 
Consultants who will have the time and the resources to conduct a more detailed analysis of 
the organisational effectiveness of the EAC. 
 
Secondly, one of the issues observed from this study is that the EAC Partner States have a big 
role to play in determining the organisational effectiveness of the EAC.  This is because most 
of the goals and objectives of the EAC require implementation at the national level.  For 
example, the EAC may pride itself in having established a Customs Union but if the Partner 
States continue to flaunt the provisions of the Customs Union, as is presently the case, then 
the Customs Union becomes ineffective.  In other words, ineffectiveness on the part of the 
EAC Partner States often makes the EAC appear to be ineffective.  There is therefore need to 
study what is hindering the EAC Partner States from effectively implementing EAC policies, 
 198
programmes and projects at the national level and what measures can be put in place to 
strengthen the capacity of the Partner States to become more effective at implementing 
regional policies, programmes and projects. 
 
Finally, although this study was mainly concerned with the organisational effectiveness of the 
EAC, a brief review of the EU’s organisational effectiveness was also carried out in order to 
identify best practices that the EAC could borrow.  This review, brief as it was, nonetheless 
revealed that there are certain practices that intergovernmental institutions, such as the RIIs, 
need to have in place if they are to effectively achieve their mandate.  For example: flexible 
decision making, financing on the basis of the economic strength of respective Partner States 
and empowering the head of the executive organ of the RII just to mention but a few.  There 
is need to carry out a detailed study of the finer details of these practices, to determine their 
pros and cons and their suitability for RIIs in Africa.  In this regard, there is need to conduct 
an in-depth analysis of the EU’s institutional framework with a view to establishing what 
institutional aspects can be replicated in African RIIs such as the EAC. 
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Appendix A 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF  
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
 
Dear Respondent 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collate primary information towards a research dissertation on 
‘Organizational Effectiveness of Regional Integration Institutions:  A Case Study of the East 
African Community’.   The dissertation is being written by the Researcher in partial fulfilment of the 
award of Masters of Art Degree in Public Administration tenable at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA). 
 
On account of your deepened experience and demonstrable knowledge of the East African 
Community Affairs, you have deliberately been identified as a respondent in this investigative 
research.  The invaluable information you provide will strictly be treated with utmost confidence and 
used for academic purposes in the said study only.  Under the circumstances it is not obligatory that 
you provide your name if you do not wish to do so.    Please feel free to provide information in this 
questionnaire and revert to the researcher early.  Please provide your answers by writing on the 
available space (dotted) or by tickling/circling your answer where appropriate.  Where necessary you 
may use additional pieces of paper that you may then append to the questionnaire.   
 
 
 
A) INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The overarching objective of the EAC is to widen and deepen cooperation among the EAC 
Partner States in political, economic, socio-cultural, research and technology, defence, 
security, legal and judicial affairs in order to improve the quality of lives of the people of East 
Africa.  In your opinion has the EAC since 2000 effectively achieved the objectives mandated 
to it by the Treaty?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No   
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. If your answer is in the negative, explain why you think the EAC has failed to realise its 
objectives. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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B) CLARITY OF PURPOSE  
 
1. Clarity of purpose in an organization is mirrored in a clear organization vision and mission as 
well as well defined goals and objectives in terms of their clarity, prioritization and capacity 
for implementation.  In your opinion does the EAC have clarity of purpose? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No   
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. The vision of the EAC is to have a prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically 
united East Africa while the Mission of the EAC is to widen and deepen economic, political, 
social and cultural integration in order to improve the quality of life of the people of East 
Africa through increased competitiveness, value added production, trade and investment.  In 
your opinion, are the vision and the mission of the EAC capable of providing members of the 
organization with a sense of shared purpose and direction? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No   
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. In pursuit of its integration process, the EAC Partner States established a Customs Union and 
are currently negotiating a Common Market that will be succeeded by a Monetary Union and 
ultimately a Political Federation.  The realization of the full Customs Union will be attained 
in January 2010.  The Common Market and Monetary Union are expected to be in place by 
2012.  In your opinion is this integration roadmap realistic? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. In pursuit of its objectives, the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC identifies seven broad 
goals; these include:  attainment of sustainable growth and development of the Partner States 
by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of the region; strengthening and 
consolidation of co-operation in agreed fields that would lead to equitable economic 
development in the Partner States; promotion of sustainable utilisation of the Partner States’ 
natural resources; strengthening and consolidation of the long standing political, economic, 
social, cultural and traditional ties and associations between the peoples of the Partner States; 
 219
enhancing the role of women in development; promotion of peace, security and stability 
within, and good neighbourliness among, the Partner States; and enhancing and strengthening 
partnerships with the private sector and civil society.  In your opinion is the EAC currently 
well equipped to facilitate effective achievement of these goals? 
  
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
5. In your assessment, does the EAC have suitable plans and strategies for effective achievement 
of its goals and objectives? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
C) ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE  
 
 Organizational culture comprises the fundamental values, assumptions, beliefs and 
behavioural expectations held in common by members of an organization.  Employees impart 
the organizational culture to new members, and culture influences in large measure how 
employees relate to one another and their work environment.  In some institutions, the 
organizational culture results in a relatively high level of performance while in others it 
perpetuates poor performance. A facilitative organizational culture is for example evidenced 
in values and norms such as excellence, team work, efficiency and innovation.   
 
1. In your opinion is the organizational culture in the EAC conducive to effective attainment of 
its goals and objectives? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
 
Give reasons for your response.   
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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2. If your answer is in the negative, what measures would you recommend to improve the 
EAC’s organization culture? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. At a Staff Retreat held in Tanga in 2007, ‘accountability’, ‘teamwork’, ‘mutual respect’ and 
‘allegiance to the EAC’ were adopted as the core values of the EAC.  In your opinion are 
these values practiced in the EAC?  Give reasons for your answer. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. Are the four values adopted by the EAC, that is, ‘accountability’, ‘teamwork’, ‘mutual 
respect’ and ‘allegiance to the EAC’ sufficient to make the EAC an effective institution?  If 
your answer is in the negative, what other values are crucial to enable effective achievement 
of goals by the EAC? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
D) ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
 
1. The EAC operates through seven main organs each of which has been assigned specific roles: 
The Summit of Heads of State whose role is to give general direction to the development and 
achievement of the objectives of the EAC; the Council of Ministers which is the key decision 
making body of the EAC; the Co-ordination Committee which submits reports and 
recommendations on the implementation of the Treaty to the Council of Ministers; the 
Sectoral Committees which prepares comprehensive implementation programmes, with 
respect to the various EAC sectors as well as monitors their implementation; the East African 
Court of Justice which ensures the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaty establishing the EAC; the East African Legislative Assembly which debates and 
approves the budget of the EAC, enacts legislations, and plays an oversight role; the 
Secretariat whose key role is the administration of the implementation of the Treaty which 
includes implementation of programmes for the most appropriate, expeditious and efficient 
ways of achieving the objectives of the EAC as well as implementation of decisions of the 
Summit and the Council. In your opinion is this demarcation of roles conducive to effective 
achievement of EAC’s objectives? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
 
Give reasons for your response.   
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.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. The EAC has more than once undertaken a review of its structure.  Currently, the Secretariat 
is divided into five functional areas: the Office of the Secretary General, the Office of the 
Deputy Secretary General (Finance and Administration), the Office of the Deputy Secretary 
General (Projects and Programmes), the Office of the Deputy Secretary General (Political 
Federation) and the Directorate of Customs and Trade.  Bearing in mind the objectives of the 
EAC, is this organization structure conducive to effective achievement of goals by the EAC? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer.  If your answer is in the negative, what functional structure 
would you recommend for the EAC? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
E) ORGANIZATION PROCESSES  
 
1. The structure of decision making in the EAC is quite bureaucratic – issues requiring decisions 
are first considered by Sectoral Committees who make recommendations to the Coordination 
Committee who make recommendations to the Council of Ministers (including Sectoral 
Council of Ministers) for ultimate decision making.  Is this bureaucratic structure supportive 
of EAC’s ability to effectively achieve its goals?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your opinion.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. The EAC Treaty stipulates that decision making will be by consensus.  In your opinion is the 
requirement of consensus in EAC’s decision making helpful or is it a constraint to EAC’s 
ability to effectively achieve its objectives? 
 
a)  It is helpful  b) It is a constraint 
 
Give reasons for your answer.  If your answer is in the negative, can you cite any cases where 
the requirement of consensus in decision making has made the EAC dysfunctional? What 
recommendation would you make to overcome this situation? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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3. The rules of procedure of the EAC further stipulate that there must be quorum for meetings of 
EAC organs to take place; which in essence implies that all Partner States must be present.  Is 
the requirement of quorum for meetings of EAC organs an obstacle to effective achievement 
of EAC’s objectives? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No  
 
 
Give reasons for your answer and suggest an alternative procedure for meetings if your 
answer is in the negative. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. Communication can serve as the glue holding an organization together; alternatively, it can 
break it apart – for both information and misinformation constantly flow in organizations.  
Effective communication about ongoing activities is thus vital to keep employees and 
stakeholders informed as well as motivated.  In your opinion are there effective 
communication channels at the EAC?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
 
Give reasons for your answer.  If your answer is in the negative, what can be done to bring 
about effective communication at the EAC? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
5. Monitoring and evaluation establishes gaps between planning and implementation of 
operational objectives.  In your opinion is there an effective monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism in the EAC?    
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer.  If your answer is in the negative, what can be done to bring 
about an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism at the EAC? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
F) ACQUISITION OF RESOURCES 
 
 
1. In your opinion, does the EAC secure adequate funding requisite to the projects and 
programmes it is required to implement?   
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a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your opinion. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. The EAC programmes and projects have a huge donor funding.  Does this dependency assure 
the EAC the capacity to realise its objectives?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your opinion. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. What proposals would you put forward in getting the EAC to be financially sustaining and 
self-reliant?   
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. Recent records of EAC’s absorptive capacity of donor funds have fallen short of expectations.  
In your opinion what are the reasons for this shortcoming?   
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
5. An organization’s most important asset is its staff.  Given its current terms and conditions of 
service with locked in contracts, do you believe the EAC is capable of attracting the most 
qualified employees? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer.   
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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6. The EAC Secretariat was heavily restructured in 2006 leading to new recruitments of 
Professional Staff in March 2007.  In your opinion, has the restructuring and the improved 
manning levels improved EAC’s capacity to achieve its objectives?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
7. The EAC has a system of employment contracts for its Executives and Professional staff (5 
years fixed term for the Secretary General, 3 years renewable once for the Deputy Secretaries 
General and 5 years renewable once for Professional Staff).  In your opinion, is this an 
effective system for assuring development of experience necessary for making the EAC an 
effective organization?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer.  What alternative employment system would you propose if 
your answer is in the negative?   
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
8. The EAC Staff Rules and Regulations stipulate that all recruitment into the EAC will be 
based on merit.   In your opinion, is this Treaty provision adhered to in the recruitment 
process in the EAC?   
  
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
9. Organizations need basic administrative resources to enable work to transpire – for example, 
reasonable space in a building equipped with adequate lighting, clean water, a dependable 
supply of electricity, scanners, computers, photocopiers etc. In your opinion are there 
adequate administrative resources to facilitate effective work performance in the EAC? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
 
Give reasons for your answer. 
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.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
G) SATISFACTION OF STRATEGIC CONSTITUENCIES 
 
1. The success and effectiveness of an organization may be mirrored by the level of satisfaction 
and confidence its staff and external stakeholders such as the business community, civil 
society and the general public have in it.  What are your views regarding the effectiveness of 
the EAC in this regard? 
 
a)  Effective b) Not Effective 
 
 
Give reasons for your answer. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. In your opinion, do you think the EAC staff are satisfied with their terms and conditions of 
service? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
 
Give reasons for your answer.  Give recommendations on areas of improvement if your 
answer is on the negative. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. Do you think that the staff of the EAC are effectively deployed to ensure optimization of their 
skills and abilities? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer.  Give recommendations on areas of improvement if your 
answer is on the negative. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 226
3. The Treaty establishing the EAC provides that the EAC shall be people-centred.  Are you 
satisfied with how EAC has implemented this principal in the realization of its objectives? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer above. 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. The Treaty establishing the EAC further provides that the EAC shall be market-driven.  Are 
you satisfied with how EAC has implemented this principal in the realization of its 
objectives? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
 
Give reasons for your answer above 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
5. How can the EAC improve its people-centred and market-driven approach?   
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
H) INTERNAL HARMONY 
 
 
1. Internal harmony in an organization is manifested in an absence of internal strain, members 
who are highly integrated into the system and smooth internal functioning.  In your opinion 
does the EAC have internal harmony in its operations? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer above 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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2. The EAC has seven organs: The Summit of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the 
Coordination Committee, the Sectoral Committees, the East African Legislative Assembly, 
the East African Court of Justice and the EAC Secretariat.  With regards to the interpretation 
of the EAC Treaty do you think there is inter-organ harmony between and among these 
organs? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer. 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. If your answer to question (2) above is in the negative, what do you attribute this situation to? 
How can the harmony among and between the EAC organs be improved? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. The Treaty provides that the Secretary General is the Chief Executive Officer of the EAC 
irrespective of inter-organ arrangements.  In your opinion how does this affect the doctrine of 
separation of powers in the EAC?   
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
5. Having regard to question (4) above, do you perceive the above Treaty provision as 
problematic? If yes, why?   
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
6. Various regional institutions such as the Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA), 
the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) and the East African Development Bank 
(EADB) are spin offs from the EAC and consequently fall under its jurisdiction. What is your 
opinion about the harmony between the EAC Secretariat and EAC institutions?  Is the 
relationship effective?  If not, why not?  How can the harmony between the EAC Secretariat 
and EAC institutions be improved? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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7. In your opinion is there harmony between and among the EAC Secretariat’s functional 
departmental units?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer above. If your answer is in the negative, what can be done to 
ensure a more harmonious relationship between and among the EAC Secretariat’s functional 
departmental units? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
8. The EAC has three main cadres of staff: Executive, Professional and Support Staff.  Would 
you describe the relations between and among the cadres of staff as harmonious? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer above. If your answer is in the negative, what can be done to 
address the concerns you have expressed? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
I) ADAPTATION TO CHANGE 
 
1. The success and effectiveness of an organization may be mirrored in its ability to adapt to and 
accept change.  Significant changes have occurred in the EAC, for instance, two more 
countries i.e. the republics of Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty.  In your 
opinion does the EAC have the ability to effectively adapt to and manage change? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your opinion.   
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. If your answer is in the negative, what can be done to ensure the EAC’s effective adaptation 
to change? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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J) TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
 
 
1. Transformational leadership is mirrored in the ability of an organization’s top 
leadership to instil in organizational members the passion and direction necessary to 
achieve organizational goals and objectives.  In your opinion does the EAC have 
transformational leadership? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your answer.   
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. In your assessment, has the Office of the EAC Secretary General contributed or otherwise to 
the effective achievement of the EAC’s objectives?  Please give specific examples. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. If your answer to number 3 above is in the negative, why do you think the Office of the 
Secretary General failed to contribute to the effective achievement of EAC’s objectives?  
What can be done to enhance the Secretary General’s capacity for success? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
K) POLITICAL WILL 
 
1. Political will implies determination on the part of the government to advance a given cause, 
that is, the government moves beyond concepts and talk to taking action that actually 
advances the particular cause.  In your opinion do you think there is adequate political will to 
enable the EAC effectively achieve its goals and objectives? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your opinion. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
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2. Are there any cases where you think inadequate political will has impeded the realisation of 
EAC objectives?  Give examples of such instances. 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. What can be done to ensure adequate political will for effective achievement of objectives by 
the EAC?  
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. In your opinion does the membership of EAC Partner States in other Regional Integration 
Institutions like COMESA and SADC affect EAC’s effectiveness?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your opinion. 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
5. The EAC Partner States have established specialised Ministries and Ministers responsible for 
EAC Affairs.  In your opinion are these institutions contributing to the effective achievement 
of EAC’s objectives?  If your answer is in the negative, what improvements would you 
suggest to make these Ministries more effective? 
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
6. The EAC Secretariat is the executive organ of the Community whose key functions includes, 
among others, the implementation of programmes for the most appropriate, expeditious and 
efficient ways of achieving the objectives of the EAC.  In your opinion, should the EAC 
Secretariat have some decision making powers?   
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
If yes, in what areas?  And why? 
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.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
L)  CONCLUSION -  ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS  
 
1. Organizational effectiveness denotes the ability of an organization to be effective in achieving 
the objectives for which it was established.  In your opinion does the EAC have the ability to 
effectively achieve the objectives for which it was established?  
 
a)  Yes  b) No 
 
Give reasons for your response.  
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. What do you identify to be some of the key factors that impinge on the EAC’s ability to 
effectively achieve its objectives?   
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. How can such factors be addressed? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
I am sincerely grateful and would like to once again thank you for creating time out of your busy 
schedule to answer these questions.  May the Almighty God bless you. 
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ANNEX B 
 
SIRTE DECLARATION 
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), met at the 
fourth Extraordinary Session of our Assembly in Sirte, in the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, from 8 to 9 September 1999, at the invitation of the Leader of the AI Fatah Revolution, 
Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, and as agreed upon during the Thirty-fifth Ordinary Session of our 
Summit in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999.  
2. We deliberated extensively on the ways and means of strengthening our continental Organization 
to make it more effective so as to keep pace with the political, economical and social developments 
taking place within and outside our continent. 
3. In this endeavour, we were inspired by the ideals which guided the Founding Fathers of our 
Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their resolve to forge unity, solidarity and cohesion, 
as well as cooperation, between African peoples and among African States.  
4. We recall the heroic struggles waged by our peoples and our countries during the last century of 
this millennium for political independence, human dignity and economic emancipation.  
We take pride in the achievements made to promote and consolidate African unity and we salute the 
heroism and the sacrifices of our peoples, particularly during the liberation struggles. 
5. As we prepare to enter the twenty-first century, and cognizant of the challenges that will confront 
our continent and peoples, we emphasis the imperative need and a high sense of urgency to rekindle 
the aspirations of our peoples for stronger unity, solidarity and cohesion in a larger community of 
peoples transcending cultural, ideological, ethnic and national differences.  
6. In order to cope with these challenges and to effectively address the new social, political and 
economic realities in Africa and in the world, we are determined to fulfil our people's aspirations for 
greater unity in conformity with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community (the Abuja Treaty). 
It is also our conviction that our continental Organization needs to be revitalized in order to be able to 
play a more active role and continue to be relevant to the needs of our peoples and responsive to the 
demands of the prevailing circumstances. 
We are also determined to eliminate the scourge of conflicts which constitutes a major impediment to 
the implementation of our development and integration agenda. 
7. In our deliberations, we have been inspired by the important proposals submitted by Colonel 
Muammar Ghaddafi, Leader of the Great AI Fatah Libyan Revolution, and particularly, by his vision for 
a strong and united Africa, capable of meeting global challenges and in shouldering its responsibility 
to harness the human and natural resources of the continent in order to improve the living conditions 
of its peoples. 
8. Having discussed frankly and extensively on how to proceed with the strengthening of the unity of 
our continent and its peoples, in the light of those proposals, and bearing in mind the current situation 
on the continent, we DECIDE TO: 
(I) Establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our 
continental Organization and the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community. 
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(II) Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 
in particular: 
(a) Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty, 
(b) Ensure the speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for in the Abuja Treaty, such as 
the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and, in particular, 
the Pan-African Parliament.  
We aim to establish that Parliament by the year 2000, to provide a common platform for our peoples 
and their grass-root organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the 
problems and challenges facing our continent. 
(c) Strengthening and consolidating the Regional Economic Communities as the pillars for achieving 
the objectives of the African Economic Community and realizing the envisaged Union. 
(III) Mandate the Council of Ministers to take the necessary measures to ensure the implementation of 
the above decisions and, in particular, to prepare the constitutive legal text of the Union, taking into 
account the Charter of the OAU and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.  
Member States should encourage the participation of Parliamentarians in that process.  
The Council should submit its report to the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of our Assembly for 
appropriate action. 
Member States should work towards finalizing the process of ratification, where appropriate, by 
December 2000, in order for a constitutive Act to be solemnly adopted in the year 2001, at an 
Extraordinary Summit to be convened in Sirte. 
(IV) Mandate our Current Chairman, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and President Thabo 
Mbeki of South Africa, to engage African creditors on our behalf on the issue of Africa's external 
indebtedness, with a view to securing the total cancellation of Africa's debt, as a matter of urgency.  
They are to coordinate their efforts with the OAU Contact Group on Africa's External Debt.  
(V) Convene an African Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
the Continent, as soon as possible. 
(VI) Request the Secretary General of our Organization, as a matter of priority, to take all appropriate 
measures to follow up the implementation of these decisions.  
Done at Sirte, Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 9.9.99  
 
 
 
 
(Source: http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/riefforts/ref/other5.htm) 
